The effects of COAG's national reform agenda on central agencies by Harwood, Jeffrey & Phillimore, John
Jeffrey Harwood and John Phillimore
The John Curtin Institute of Public Policy
Curtin University
This report examines the effect on Commonwealth and 
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This report examines the effect on Commonwealth and State central agencies of the reform 
agenda adopted by the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), with a particular focus on the 
reforms proposed and undertaken since the federal election in November 2007. Collectively, these 
reforms could constitute the most significant changes to Australian federalism in a generation. This 
study considers the responses of central agencies to this COAG Reform Agenda. How are the 
Commonwealth and State central agencies responding, and what challenges do they face? 
 
1.1 Background 
Twenty-five years ago, referring to Commonwealth-State relations, Warhurst (1983: 1) argued that 
the key relationships remain those that bind the functional departments together, to 
the exclusion of central agencies, in the making of policy. The strength of these links ... 
is mighty in comparison with the as-yet puny efforts of the central agencies... 
 
This description is surely out of date. Over the last quarter of a century, the power of the ‘centre’ 
has increased at the expense of the ‘periphery’. The emergence of whole-of-government issues has 
required coordinating Ministers (at Commonwealth level, this means the Prime Minister, Treasurer 
and Finance Minister) to oversee policy formulation, implementation and evaluation. Centralised 
budget oversight has further strengthened the hand of central agencies. Relentless media 
pressures, too, have required figureheads that symbolise ‘the government’ in its creation of news 
stories, as well as the need for a coordinated and consistent response to events. These Ministers’ 
respective departments have also enjoyed growth and an increasing influence over policymaking 
more generally. 
 
With the formation of COAG in December 1992, there are signs that the power of central agencies 
has also increased in Commonwealth-State relations – and this may in turn have a centralising 
influence on bureaucratic relationships. Traditionally, COAG meetings have been attended only by 
the Prime Minister, Premiers, Chief Ministers and the President of the Australian Local Government 
Association. More recently, Prime Minister Rudd also involved Treasurers at COAG. As ‘line’ 
Ministers are advised by their central agencies on matters of intergovernmental relations and the 
Prime Minister sets the COAG agenda, power increasingly appears to flow from the central 
agencies, rather than the reverse.   
 
As a result, relationships between central and line agencies are likely to be changing. This is 
evidenced, in part, by the interplay of COAG, COAG working groups, and Ministerial Councils. 
COAG is responsible for the creation and abolition of Ministerial Councils, and many items at COAG 
are increasingly referred down to these Councils for consideration and action, and then 
(sometimes) referred back for COAG decision or authorisation. This places central agencies in a 
potentially powerful position vis-à-vis line agencies – although one that has not been subjected to 
significant analysis. However, it is also possible for Commonwealth and State line agencies to forge 
alliances counter-posed against Commonwealth / State central agencies, in contrast (or in addition) 
to the more ‘normal’ negotiating positions based around Commonwealth-State debates.   
 
The COAG National Reform Agenda, begun in February 2006, has dominated recent COAG 
meetings and is having a major impact on the workload and strategic policy directions of central 
agencies across Australia. It is also, very likely, affecting relations between Commonwealth and 




Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal Financial Relations suggests somewhat different roles for 
central and line agencies, with all specific purpose payments funds going to Treasury Departments 
in a single tranche, rather than to line agencies for individual agreements. Likewise, the broader 
COAG Reform Agenda, and the expanded role for the newly created COAG Reform Council, will also 
be impacting on the policy and organisational capacities of central agencies. 
 
This report updates and extends our knowledge on the extent and the ways that the reforms are 
affecting Commonwealth and State central agencies. In doing so, it builds on earlier literature such 
as Warhurst (1983) and, in particular, Painter’s (1998) study of the cooperative federalism period of 
the early-mid 1990s, which, based on his discussions with officials throughout the country and file 
material from the central agencies, argued explicitly that Australia was moving towards more 
collaborative Commonwealth-State relations and a greater role for central agencies. 
 
The report also recognises that federalism incurs fixed costs that must be met by all jurisdictions – 
and assumes that not all governments necessarily have the financial and policy capacity to cover 
the entire COAG agenda. For smaller States and Territories, there are likely to be significant 
difficulties involved in employing sufficiently skilled people to formulate and coordinate policy, 
respond to or counter the positions adopted by the Commonwealth, and travel to COAG meeting 
destinations. The burden of both attending and coordinating much of this activity falls upon central 
agencies. 
 
1.2 ANZSOG study on central agencies 
This report follows an earlier study for ANZSOG by Kelly (2010) and her associates which found that 
‘more strategic and more interventionist’ roles are being assigned to central agencies as political 
leaders seek to introduce policy reforms other than those associated with managerialism and new 
public management. They also found that attempts to develop a ‘strategic centre’ were being 
frustrated by ambiguity over the roles of the central agencies, which led to uncertainty over the 
appropriate mix of policy tools, skills and staffing needs.  
 
Drawing upon their primary research and Mintzberg’s work on organisational coordination, Kelly 
and her associates developed a model to help clarify the roles and responsibilities of the central 
agencies. It was premised upon a finding that ‘the centre’ is a ‘complex, interrelated network of 
institutional actors that is often divided by overlapping goals, disparate cultures and expertise, and 
a competitive search for influence’. Following Althaus, Bridgman and Davis (2007), a strategic 
centre was considered to comprise three strategic domains – political, policy and operational / 
administrative – in which functional roles ‘overlapped’ key (‘central’) agencies.  
 
The political domain is characterised by the dominant role of premiers’ and prime ministers’ 
departments and their exclusive role in managing relations between cabinet and the 
governmental bureaucracy, and ‘central agencies and their ministers’. Kelly (2010) described 
strategy making in this domain as both ‘tactical and emergent’ – intended to deliver and 
maintain a ‘shared perspective or narrative’. Typically, cabinet offices endeavour to manage 
cabinet, ministers, political advisers, the opposition, the news media and parliament in a never-
ending news and polling cycle. This involves controlling the political agenda by developing 
procedures that guide political decision-making and the dissemination of information. However, 
this raises tensions between the focus on re-election and longer-term policy and operational 
matters, and between the impetus to be ’reactive and responsive’ and maintaining a constant and 





The policy domain is characterised by the roles of the treasury and finance departments and 
their responsibility for economic policy analysis, and the roles of first ministers’ departments in 
providing sector-specific and whole-of-government policy advice. Kelly (2010) observed that it is 
a domain that comprises a ‘complex network’ of actors across government and society, with no 
single authority dominating. In contrast to perspectives in the political domain, those in the policy 
domain are inherently longer-term. While line agencies retain responsibility for their functional 
policy areas, tensions exist over who should be responsible for setting the policy objectives. Kelly 
argues that the centre should be responsible for co-ordinating the agenda across multiple actors 
via boundary spanning functions and managing the policy networks rather than directly 
undertaking policy analysis development, implementation etc. 
 
The operational (or administrative) domain is undertaken by public service commissions in 
overseeing human resources and departments of treasury and finance in developing and 
administering budgets across public sectors. Kelly (2010) found that in this domain, central 
agencies are primarily concerned with ensuring the operational capacity of the public sector 
through planning and the ‘effective and efficient use of resources’ – ‘financial, human, 
technological, etc.’ – across public sectors and with the performance management of individual 
departments and agencies. Therein lies the challenge for the central agencies: to reconcile the 
tension between the devolution of policy and operational responsibility to agencies and 
departments, while ensuring the allocation of resources is consistent with overall government 
policy and sustainable in the long term.  
 
This model not only identifies the appropriate demarcation of roles and responsibilities of 
central agencies in a strategic centre, but also highlights the need to maintain capacity across the 
strategic domains if tensions are to be addressed and imbalances avoided. If insufficient 
resources are distributed across the central agencies to engage in political management, budget 
management, general economic analysis, specialist policy analysis and human resource 
management, then one or two domains will dominate. For example, if resources are directed 
primarily towards the cabinet office and political 
management, then short-term perspectives will nearly 
always prevail at the expense of longer-term policy 
analysis and strategic management. Likewise, economic 
and policy analysis that ignores political dimensions can 
have fatal consequences for governments.   
 
The successful shaping of a strategic centre is not 
inexorable; however, it is more likely if the political and 
institutional contexts are well understood. One such 
context is Commonwealth-State relations and in 
particular the COAG Reform Agenda (see Box 1). Recent 
COAG meetings have been dominated by this Agenda, 
which is widely regarded as having a major impact on the 
workload and policy directions of central agencies across 
Australia. 
 
In this report, we ask: To what extent and in what ways 
has the COAG Reform Agenda impinged upon the 
conduct of intergovernmental relations by State and 
BOX 1: COAG Reform Agenda 
At the 20th meeting of COAG in 
Melbourne on 20 December 2007, 
leaders agreed to the COAG Reform 
Agenda. This agenda constituted an 
intent to improve productivity and 
living standards by reforming 
federal funding arrangements, 
harmonising regulations across the 
country, especially those concerned 
with qualifications and  the mobility 
of labour, supporting social 
inclusion and environmental 
sustainability, closing the gap on 
Indigenous disadvantage, and 
developing national market 
frameworks to support energy and 




Commonwealth central agencies? In addition, to what extent and in what ways has the COAG 
Reform Agenda impacted on the broader operations of the central agencies in each jurisdiction? 
 
In seeking to answer our primary question, we acknowledge the following three assumptions:  
 
1. Public policy is becoming increasingly centralised (or at least initialised) in Canberra; 
2. Intergovernmental relations are becoming more significant to the public policy agenda; and 
3. At least partly because of these two factors, central agencies across the federation are 
drawing power inwards in order to strengthen their strategic policy and management 
capacity.  
 
With these assumptions in mind, our research methodology was to study the effect of the COAG 
Reform Agenda upon intergovernmental relations vertically between Commonwealth and State 
central agencies, horizontally between central agencies in different States, and to examine how 
the various central agencies have endeavoured to respond to the demands of the COAG Reform 
Agenda and best preserve their interests. Data for the study are considered from the year 2005-06 
to enable us to compare the current state of play with the time when the National Reform Agenda 
was first proposed by Victoria at COAG in June 2005. Where possible, we focus on mechanisms 
and processes related to the NRA / COAG Reform Agenda, rather than the entire COAG program. 
We seek to emphasise public management organisation, legislative mechanisms, resources and 
funding, rather than debates within and between governments about the merits of particular 
policy initiatives. In other words, the focus is on the intergovernmental and policy processes and 
public sector management impact of the COAG Reform Agenda, rather than on the policy content 
of the Agenda per se. To do otherwise would cast an exaggerated political pall over 
intergovernmental relations in Australia and put at risk the confidentiality of those senior officers 
who we interviewed. We do not deny politics in this report; however, we do not privilege it.  
 
Data were collected from four principal sources. First, semi-structured interviews were held with 
senior officials in central agencies and the CRC. We interviewed twenty representatives – up to and 
including Department Secretaries – from the Commonwealth DPMC and the Treasury, as well as 
from the Departments of Premier and Cabinet and Departments of Treasury and Finance in 
Victoria, New South Wales, Western Australia, South Australia and Queensland. All of these people 
were or are directly involved in intergovernmental relations and the COAG reform process. Second, 
data were provided directly from the central agencies, including details about representation on 
COAG working groups and sub-groups, and the number of personnel involved in intergovernmental 
relations over the past five years. Third, considerable data were gleaned about the activities of 
COAG and central agencies from annual reports and communiqués. Fourth, we examined publicly 
available documents, such as newspaper articles, media releases and speeches. 
  
1.3 Structure of the report 
The report is structured as follows. 
 
In the second chapter, we examine the primary literature on intergovernmental relations in 
Australia over the past thirty years to delineate the relative standing of the various central 
agencies concerning the conduct of intergovernmental relations, and to draw out relevant 
theoretical insights. Several authors have written substantial academic works on the conduct of 
intergovernmental relations in Australia, the emergence of first ministers’ departments as the 




concept to emerge out of this literature is that of ‘interdependency’ and this provides the 
conceptual lens through which we study the effect of the COAG Reform Agenda on 
Commonwealth and State central agencies and their responses.  
 
In the third chapter, we examine how the COAG Reform Agenda has affected intergovernmental 
relations between the Commonwealth and the State central agencies. We find that it has 
reinforced long-standing tensions over vertical fiscal imbalance, the privileged status of the 
Commonwealth at COAG and the reporting requirements of the States. While State officials regard 
the COAG Reform Council as a neutral arbiter, they note that the need to develop appropriate key 
performance indicators and collect the necessary data has placed considerable demands upon 
their strategic centres. While the CRC has risen in prominence on account of the COAG Reform 
Agenda, ministerial councils have met a different fate. Following the Hawke Report, COAG has 
restructured the system of ministerial councils and rationalised their number, as well as directing 
them to focus upon issues directly concerned with the COAG Reform Agenda. 
 
In the fourth chapter, we explore the ways that the COAG Reform Agenda has affected how 
central agencies have engaged with their counterparts in other States. Perhaps contrary to 
expectations, the COAG Reform Agenda does not appear to have engendered much in the way of 
informal divisions of labour. Furthermore, we find that the Council for the Australian Federation 
does not appear to have become the institutional mechanism for horizontal cooperation its 
founders had hoped. For the most part, intergovernmental relations between the State 
jurisdictions is being driven by their policy capacity and available resources, which, in turn, can be 
linked to the emphasis that their Premiers have placed on intergovernmental relations and federal 
leadership.  
 
In the fifth chapter, we explain how the demands of the COAG Reform Agenda have impinged 
upon the internal operations of the Commonwealth and State central agencies and how they 
have responded. It appears that the COAG Reform Agenda has served to stimulate reorganisation 
and capacity building, although there is also occasional resentment by some States at the impact 
COAG and the enormous workload associated with the reform process have had in displacing State 
policy and organisational priorities. Relations with their respective line agencies are mostly 
cooperative as expertise is respected, but the central agencies are generally dominant. In some 
cases, they have gone so far as to incorporate matters concerning the COAG Reform Agenda into 
their State strategic plans.  
 
In the sixth and final chapter, we present our findings and conclude that in some ways, at least 
initially, the COAG Reform Agenda had a greater impact upon the Commonwealth central 
agencies than it did upon the State central agencies. The Commonwealth, after a relatively 
lukewarm attitude to the reform process under the Howard government, suddenly found itself 
fully committed to driving the process and achieving the reforms. The Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet and the Commonwealth Treasury have had difficulties retaining or obtaining 
sufficient staff during the reform process. In the case of the States, Victoria played a key role in 
initiating the reforms, while New South Wales was preoccupied with its own political issues and 
machinery of government changes. The other States, with fewer resources available to be 





2. Conceptualising intergovernmental relations in Australia 
In this chapter, we conceptualise the nature of intergovernmental relations in Australia. In the 
first part of this chapter, we review major studies of Australian intergovernmental relations 
published over the past three decades to trace how central agencies and line agencies have 
evolved (or been transformed), and been effectively promoted or relegated in their relative 
standings as a consequence of changes to their political environments. Although there are 
occasionally periods when the various parties are in conflict, we argue in the second part that 
intergovernmental relations in Australia are best conceptualised in terms of ‘interdependency’ and 
as a ‘game’. 
 
2.1 Review of Australian intergovernmental relations 
This review of key texts in Australian intergovernmental relations focuses upon eight important 
studies. It begins with  Holmes and Sharman’s (1977) analysis of the ‘game’ played at Premiers’ 
Conferences during the 1970s, and follows with Warhurst’s (1983) use of the metaphors ‘gossamer 
threads’ and ‘rods of iron’ to describe intergovernmental relations involving central and line 
agencies in the 1970s and early 1980s. Next comes Painter’s (1987) documentation of the relative 
disinterest in intergovernmental relations in South Australia, Victoria and New South Wales 
following the demise of the Whitlam government in 1975, Chapman’s (1988) discussion of 
intergovernmental forums, and Campbell and Halligan’s (1992) study of the Prime Minister as a 
driver of the management and reform of intergovernmental relations. We then look at three 
studies written following the establishment of COAG in 1992: Weller’s (1996) assessment of 
intergovernmental processes early in the COAG era and his advocacy for a whole-of-government 
approach; Painter’s (1998) conceptualisation of the emergence of COAG as a game played between 
the strategic agencies; Davis’ (1998) discussion of how Queensland adopted a whole-of-
government approach by tightening policy coordination at the centre; and Menzies’ (2011) 
discussion of the intergovernmental capacity of the DPMC over the past two decades. 
 
It should be noted that this review is not intended to constitute a fully annotated bibliography of 
the field; rather, we find ourselves tracing the emergence of the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) and the respective premiers' departments as the dominant players 
in the game of intergovernmental relations.  
 
What is noteworthy is the relative lack of more recent academic analyses of central agencies and 
the intergovernmental relations function. Only Menzies (2011) and Carroll and Head (2010) have 
provided an account of the recent COAG reforms as they played out in one jurisdiction (Victoria). 
Most other commentary has come from practitioners (e.g. Morauta 2011; Silver 2010).  
Holmes and Sharman (1977): Commonwealth vs. the States at the premiers’ conferences 
In their study of The Australian Federal System, Jean Holmes and Campbell Sharman (1977) 
analysed intergovernmental relations in the context of the premiers’ conferences – the 
precursors to COAG. Holmes and Sharman challenged the conventional wisdom that premiers’ 
conferences entailed bargaining between the two levels of government and that the States and the 
Commonwealth could each be understood to constitute ‘single entities’. On the contrary, what 
ensued, according to Holmes and Sharman (1977: 119–120), were ‘diplomatic relations … 
involv[ing] a mixture of relationships varying from coercion to unanimous agreement against a 




‘teams’ were not entirely united, rather they were composed of departments and leaders with 
their own particular goals.  
For most of the period under review, Gough Whitlam was the prime minister and the 
Commonwealth was increasingly expansive. This engendered considerable opposition in several 
States – Western Australia, Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland had liberal or conservative 
governments opposed to policy centralisation in Canberra.  
 
The Commonwealth ‘team’ – as it were – comprised the prime minister, other cabinet ministers, 
and officials from the Treasury, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, and the larger 
line agencies, such as the Department of Social Security. Among the agencies, the 
Commonwealth Treasury was dominant. As the agency responsible for Commonwealth finances 
and State funding (through specific purpose payments and financial assistance grants), the 
Commonwealth Treasury had especially close working relationships with the respective State 
treasuries and monopoly access to their financial data, which enabled it to fully brief the prime 
minister on the veracity and efficacy of State claims (Holmes and Sharman 1977: 120–121). 
Likewise, the larger line agencies had developed over the years a close understanding and relations 
with their colleagues in the States. On the other hand, the DPMC did not possess the capacity to 
coordinate fully intergovernmental relations (Holmes and Sharman 1977: 123–124). It lacked the 
Treasury’s access to State financial data and an equivalent network with the premiers’ 
departments, which were more likely to be adversaries than respected counterparts. To overcome 
its information deficit, DPMC began to compile lists of State programs being supported by federal 
funds, identified the rationale for federal involvement, the amounts transferred and an evaluation 
of each program. Thus, the Department could now brief the prime minister on specific aspects of 
intergovernmental relations and justify its involvement in premiers' conferences. 
 
The State ‘teams’ were characterised by the dominance of their Premiers. While they, too, had to 
take into account the views of Cabinet ministers, their status was not as great as that of their 
Commonwealth colleagues. Holmes and Sharman (1977: 126–127) attributed this to the general 
desire of Premiers to retain exclusive control over State budgets and treasury departments (most 
premiers held both positions in cabinet at this time), while preserving their ‘symbolic’ status that 
signified their superior rank over other ministers and their ‘real’ status that required that they be 
consulted on matters of intergovernmental relations. Hence, full responsibility rested with the 
respective premiers for the tactics and strategies that they employed in this ‘game’ (Holmes and 
Sharman 1977: 127–128). 
 
The game that ensued between the two ‘teams’ at premiers’ conferences was one in which each 
side tactically employed their resources in an effort to achieve different ‘goals’. In this 
‘confrontation’, a prime minister could exploit the bureaucratic and financial resources of the 
Commonwealth to entice the premiers into accepting his offer (Holmes and Sharman 1977: 130–
131). However, their use was constrained by his budget strategy and election promises, the 
demands of the various Commonwealth departments, and the interests of caucus and cabinet 
members. On the other hand, the premiers could exploit four ‘political resources’: the cooperation 
of the States needed to make possible many of the Commonwealth’s policy objectives; their shared 
party allegiances with the prime minister; claims that they spoke for disparate regional and special 
interests within the State; and the premiers’ ‘tactical advantage’ of not having to consult with 
cabinet during negotiations (Holmes and Sharman 1977: 131–132).  
 




premiers, who, in turn, would counter that it was inadequate. After an adjournment, and if under 
sustained pressure from the premiers, the prime minister would make a ‘final offer’. At this stage, 
the prime minister and the premiers would make clear their various views about what constituted 
the national interest. Finally, the policy items on the agenda were discussed, although not 
necessarily resolved. This led Holmes and Sharman (1977: 133) to conclude that  
the conferences can never be exercises in co-operative planning as some commentators 
have suggested as a desirable goal, because they are the manifestations of the differing 
political priorities that exist in the various units of the governmental system. They may 
lead to some immediate policy modifications by one government or another, but this is 
incidental. The conferences are principally homoeostatic devices to preserve a rough 
political equilibrium in intergovernmental relations by sensitising governments to 
each other’s problems and by preventing divergent goals from becoming major 
confrontations … 
 
Warhurst (1983): Gossamer Threads and Iron Rods 
Like Holmes and Sharman, John Warhurst (1983) studied federal affairs at a time when specialist 
intergovernmental managers were still something of a novelty in the premiers’ departments and 
the DPMC. Table 1 shows that few resources were directed towards intergovernmental relations by 
these agencies (Warhurst 1983: 9). In the case of Western Australia, the Department of the 
Attorney-General was assigned responsibility for these matters.  
 
Table 1: Specialist Intergovernmental Relations Managers in Australian Governments, 1983 
 
Government Date Created Responsible Minister Department Name Staff 
      
Commonwealth 1975 
Prime Minister and separate 
Minister Assisting the Prime 




Domestic Relations and 
Transport Branch 6 
New South 
Wales 1974 
Premier; during 1975-76 
there was a separate Minister 
for Federal Affairs 
Premier’s 
Senior Administrative 
Assistant, Govt Branch 




Premier; during 1975-82 
there was a separate Minister 




Branch (formerly Federal 
Affairs Division) 
6 
Queensland 1974 Premier Premier’s 
Intergovernmental Relations 
(formerly Federal Affairs 
Division) 
4 
South Australia 1976 
Premier; between 1979 and 
1982 the Attorney-General 
also held the title of Minister 
for Federal Affairs 
Premier’s Intergovernmental Relations Branch 3 
Western 
Australia 1976 
Attorney-General is also 
Minister for 
Intergovernmental Relations 
and Defence Liaison 
Attorney-
General 
Senior Administrative Officer 
(Federal Affairs) 2 
Tasmania N/A Premier Premier’s Senior Research Officers (Intergovernmental Relations) 1 





Expertise in intergovernmental relations still resided primarily with the line agencies, which 
were in regular (sometimes daily) contact with their counterparts across Australia. Warhurst 
(1983: 1) adopted a metaphor used by one of his sources to describe the difference between the 
line and central agencies when it came to intergovernmental relations: 
The key relationships remain those that bind the function [line] departments together, 
to the exclusion of central agencies, in the making of policy. The strength of these links, 
described by one officer as ‘rods of iron’, is mighty in comparison with the as yet puny 
efforts of the central agencies whose own hold over the process was accurately seen by 
the same officer as mere ‘threads of gossamer’.  
Warhurst (1983: 6) attributed this to the Prime Minister’s and Premiers’ Departments not having, 
until the 1970s, sufficient capacity to maintain a coordinating role comparable to the treasury 
departments. The line agencies, on the other hand, had developed relations and lines of 
communication between one another that made central coordination difficult. While Warhurst 
(1983: 22) believed that the emergence of ‘intergovernmental specialists’ within the first 
ministers’ offices might facilitate resolution of conflict between agencies in different levels of 
government, he concluded that there were still too few to override the expertise and experience 
in intergovernmental relations that existed in the line agencies.  
 
Painter (1987): One step back? 
 Warhurst's conclusion was corroborated by Martin Painter's (1987) study of policy coordination 
in Victoria, New South Wales and South Australia and his general finding that the 
intergovernmental relations units in their respective premiers’ officers were scaled back by the 
early 1980s. In Victoria, a Federal Affairs Division with six officials was established in 1976 (Painter 
1987: 137). Its responsibilities were mostly concerned with maintaining across the service 
information exchange about federal issues and the coordination of State agency interactions with 
the Commonwealth. The Treasury retained ownership of federal financial relations. The Federal 
Affairs Division was abandoned following a restructuring of the Premier’s Department in 1982–83 
(Painter 1987: 149). 
 
Similarly, in New South Wales, a Federal Affairs Division was established within the Premier’s 
Department in 1975 by the then Premier, Tom Lewis (Painter 1987: 99). This was a response to the 
Commonwealth government’s expansion into traditional State policy areas and a perceived 
intrusion upon ‘States rights’. With the ascendency of the New South Wales Labor Party and 
Premier Neville Wran in 1976, the Federal Affairs Division was soon abolished and its 
responsibilities dispersed throughout the Department.  
 
South Australia, under the Labor premiership of Don Dunstan, maintained a Coordination Branch 
within the Policy Division of the Premier’s Department (Painter 1987: 121). Whereas the New 
South Wales government was hostile to the activities of the Commonwealth, the South Australian 
government was receptive to its entreaties. Nevertheless, it was anxious that agreements be 
coordinated and policy be consistent across government. Only two officials were assigned to these 
duties, however. Painter also noted that the Development Division within the Premier’s 
Department coordinated submissions to the Commonwealth Industries Assistance Commission 
and its predecessor, the Tariff Board. Following the election of a State Liberal government in 
October 1979, the Policy Division was dissolved (Painter 1987: 123).  
 
Chapman (1988): Intergovernmental forums   




with intergovernmental forums as institutions being increasingly used to resolve 
intergovernmental issues. There were, Chapman contended, three types of intergovernmental 
forums. The first type was the inter-jurisdictional ministerial council (IJMC), which we now simply 
refer to as ministerial councils (Chapman 1988: 105–108). At the time of Chapman’s writing, there 
were thirty-six IJMCs, twenty-one of which had been established after 1970. The second type was 
the intergovernmental board or commission, which was concerned with a specific function that 
straddled jurisdictions, such as the management of the River Murray (Chapman 1988: 108–110). 
The third type comprised officials, whose involvement in developing solutions was ‘technical’ in 
nature, rather than ‘representative’ (Chapman 1988: 110–113).   
 
While Chapman (1988: 116–119) saw the utility in the different types of intergovernmental 
forums, he also recognised how they subverted or could subvert the traditional policy process. 
First, maintaining the ‘smooth flow of business’ was becoming more important than addressing 
substantive policy issues. For example, some secretariat officials avoided placing contentious policy 
issues on agendas in an effort to preserve intergovernmental relationships that might be undone 
by conflicting interests. Second, although the ‘hidden’ realm of intergovernmental forums made it 
easier to achieve ‘national approaches’, it effectively ‘circumvented’ the democratic elements of 
the policy process by limiting the number of actors involved. Third, the ‘lines of accountability’ 
between these forums, cabinet and parliament were unclear. Certainly, not all ministers felt 
obliged to report to their cabinets on what transpired at IJMCs and, because they did not concern 
particular electoral constituencies, they did not report to their respective parliaments.  
 
In addition to his discussion of intergovernmental forums, Chapman also revisited the matter of 
specialist intergovernmental managers raised previously by Warhurst (1983) and Painter (1987). 
Table 2 highlights the downgrading in importance of intergovernmental relations by the 
Commonwealth with related matters being directed to the legal branch of the DPMC. Likewise, 
Western Australia and Tasmania closed their intergovernmental relations sections. South Australia, 
on the other hand, substantially increased its intergovernmental relations section. Although 
Chapman (1988: 113–114) pointed out that there was ‘no underlying logic’ to these changes, he 
remarked that officials were not always assigned a formal intergovernmental role. In fact, contrary 
to what Table 2 implies, officials within Premier’s Departments and private offices occasionally 
contacted their counterparts in other jurisdictions to create a much larger intergovernmental 
network. 
 
Chapman’s most significant contribution, however, was his conceptualisation of 
intergovernmental relations as inherently interdependent. We discuss this in detail in the second 





Table 2: Specialist Intergovernmental Relations Managers in Australian Governments, 1986 
 
Government Date Created Responsible Minister Department Name Staff 
      
Commonwealth 1975 
Prime Minister and 
separate Minister Assisting 









(6 in 1983) 
      
New South 




Government Branch  
1  
(1) 
      





      
Queensland 1974 Premier Premier’s Intergovernmental Relations  Branch 
6 
 (4) 
      











Minister for Federal Affairs 
Attorney-
General 
Inquiries dealt with 




      
Tasmania N/A Premier Premier’s 






Source: Chapman (1988: 114–115) 
 
Campbell and Halligan (1992): The ascent of the DPMC – new public management and ‘new 
federalism’ 
While not solely concerned with intergovernmental relations, Campbell and Halligan’s study of 
Prime Minister Bob Hawke’s political leadership and reforms of Australian government shines 
considerable light on the emergence of the DPMC as the dominant force in Australian 
intergovernmental relations. In July 1987, the Commonwealth machinery of government was 
transformed in a move that institutionalised the new public management reforms already in place. 
Hawke abolished the Public Service Board. The DPMC played a crucial, albeit low key, role in policy 
coordination and was responsible for overseeing the changes. A new, but considerably weaker, 
Public Service Commission was established under the DPMC to manage Senior Executive Service 
employment, human resource management across the service and policies concerning promotion, 
recruitment and discipline (Campbell and Halligan 1992: 49). Responsibility for pay and conditions 
was transferred to the Department of Industrial Relations. The new Department of Finance (which 
had been split from the Treasury in 1976) was put in charge of classifications and, significantly, 




program. This ensured its standing as a key central agency. With the DPMC establishing its own 
economic policy unit, Treasury’s exclusive control over economic policy was diminished.    
 
However, the DPMC did not immediately endeavour to utilise its elevation within the 
Commonwealth to drive intergovernmental relations. Campbell and Halligan (1992: 89) noted that 
in most of the Department’s annual reports published throughout the 1980s, ‘Commonwealth-
state relations’ was subsumed under its policy advice and coordination role, but there was little 
detail about what it actually did. This suggested to them a ‘low level of activity’. This was 
supported by officials they interviewed, who felt that there was a rather ad hoc attitude within the 
DPMC towards intergovernmental relations (Campbell and Halligan 1992: 90). Management of 
federal issues were addressed when they arose, rather than on an on-going basis by a particular 
unit. 
 
In 1990, the DPMC capitalised upon the 1987 machinery-of-government reforms through  the 
behind-the-scenes work of Department Secretary, Mike Codd, and his support of Prime Minister 
Hawke’s proposal for a ‘New Federalism’. Suddenly, intergovernmental relations were at or near 
the top of the governmental agenda, the Commonwealth was advocating cooperative federalism 
between the three levels of government, and the DPMC was driving the process. A 
Commonwealth-State Relations Steering Committee was established, along with a 
Commonwealth-State Relations Secretariat, to provide administrative and policy coordination for 
the Special Premiers’ Conferences. These were held in October 1990, May 1991 and May 1992. 
Campbell and Halligan mistakenly concluded that with Paul Keating’s ascendency to the Prime 
Ministership, his public opposition to New Federalism and close ties to the Treasury would 
undermine the process. Instead, at the Special Premiers’ Conference held in May 1992, which was 
chaired by Keating, the first ministers agreed to create the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG).   
 
Weller (1996): Whole-of-government coordination by the ‘central agency club’ 
Just as new public management underlined analyses of intergovernmental relations in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, so by the mid-1990s had attention turned to the mechanisms and 
workings of COAG. Bob Hawke’s ‘new federalism’ had been realised to some extent, albeit 
somewhat ironically by his successor Paul Keating, who had opposed Hawke’s original proposals. 
Patrick Weller’s (1996) assessment (originally prepared for the DPMC in July 1995) of the Special 
Premiers’ Conference / COAG processes focussed upon: ‘the definition of problems and evaluation 
of solutions; the process of policy development and adoption; and implementation and 
monitoring’.  
 
The significance of Weller’s assessment (at least for the present study) lays in its recognition of 
the interdependencies underlying intergovernmental relations, his advocacy of whole-of-
government responses to federal issues and central agency coordination of this work, and his 
contention that there needed to be developed a better framework of accountability. Weller 
(1996: 103) observed that  
• intergovernmental relations continue even when political leaders are not engaging publicly;  
• honesty and trust are integral to negotiations;  
• all players are dependent upon one another to maintain agreements; and  
• power, resources and capability are asymmetrical, but governments still have to negotiate 





Moreover, he argued that the central agencies possessed a broader, whole-of-government 
perspective and willingness to drive COAG’s policy reforms. Weller attributed this to the central 
agencies being committed more to ideas and solutions, whereas their line agency counterparts 
were committed to existing programs and were either ‘passive’ or ‘directly opposed’ to COAG 
policy reforms (Weller 1996: 103). Without the involvement of the central agencies, reform 
seemed remote and less urgent. 
 
The problem facing central agencies, Weller (1996: 102–103) conjectured (perhaps presciently or 
with one eye on the then newly formed National Competition Council), was that they were not 
capable of overseeing the implementation of federal reforms. Their expertise lay in policy 
development; but the line agencies, which did possess such expertise, tended to oppose reforms. 
A new ‘model’ was needed to monitor and report on progress – of course, this is the role now filled 
by the COAG Reform Council.  
 
Painter (1998): The establishment of COAG and whole-of-government coordination 
Martin Painter’s (1998) study of the politics immediately preceding and following the 
establishment of COAG is the preeminent work on contemporary intergovernmental relations in 
Australia. Its contributions are threefold: it explains the dynamics of intergovernmental relations in 
Australia; discusses the role of central agencies in coordinating intergovernmental relations across 
the whole-of-government; and argues that the type of federalism prevailing at any given time is a 
culmination of the politics of intergovernmental relations being played out in a variety of settings.  
 
Similarly to Holmes and Sharman (1977), Painter used the metaphor of a ‘game’ to explain the 
coexistence of cooperation and conflict in Australian federalism. For Painter (1998: 62–63), the 
explanation could be found in the shared commonalities of Australian political executives, i.e., in 
the political system, its culture and constitution, in the membership of political parties with 
national and state branches that share similar ideas and policies, and in the various overlapping 
and distinct institutional arrangements around the country. What emerged were particular games 
played by the respective governments, first ministers, ministers, central agencies and line agencies 
at all levels, often depending upon the jurisdictions and the policy areas in which the games are 
held. They may be opponents in one venue, but allies in another. The key to the dynamic was that 
the participants were often ‘relatively indifferent’ to much of what was going on around them – 
they were only concerned with a handful of issues. The objective of the intergovernmental game 
was to exploit the ‘tolerant indifference’ of others and draw upon their cooperation. Hence, 
some issues were redefined in ways that retained some ‘core objectives’, while others were 
shelved. Another tactic involved ‘trading off support across issues between parties to whom 
different issues of principle and interest are critical …’  
 
A key element in the coordination of the ‘games’ were the central agencies that were now 
coordinating a whole-of-government approach to major policy issues. Painter (1998: 66–67) 
found that the premiers’ and treasury departments were becoming increasingly involved in 
coordinating intergovernmental relations. The new public management reforms initiated in the 
mid-late 1980s further enhanced the capacity of the central agencies relative to what previously 
existed (Crisp 1961, 1967; Mediansky and Nockles 1975; Warhust 1983), and by the 1990s, 
intergovernmental relations was an integral part of policy and strategy. The complexity of cross-
sectoral policy problems already involved meetings and negotiations between numerous officials, 
line ministers and ministerial councils. With the emergence of the SPC / COAG agenda, the 





Ultimately, though, Painter (1998: 186–190) found that the dynamics of Australian federalism 
was a function of political preferences, especially those of the Prime Minister, rather than 
political institutions, such as the SPC / COAG. He observed that in the first two years of the 
Howard government (1996-1997), the Prime Minister was relatively disinterested in COAG as the 
primary mechanism for managing intergovernmental relations – it was, after all, an initiative of his 
Labor Party predecessors. Instead, he preferred to have his cabinet ministers channel the ‘policy 
detail’ through ministerial councils. More generally, Painter (1998: 190) concluded that choices of 
cooperative or adversarial tactics by political leaders depended upon their perceptions of the 
political advantages that could be achieved at a particular time. 
 
Davis (1998): Top-down, centralised intergovernmental relations 
Adopting a State rather than a Commonwealth focus, Glynn Davis (1998) explained how the then 
Queensland Premier, Wayne Goss, sought to meet the demands of COAG by restructuring 
Cabinet and his department, and applying a whole-of-government approach to policy 
coordination. As the Director-General of the Queensland Department of the Premier and Cabinet 
(DPC) at that time, Davis was obviously interested with the governance and coordination of the 
State. Relatedly, he was concerned with how the State should coordinate its responses to the 
demands of COAG. The traditional approach of relying upon a unit within the DPC was dismissed as 
‘inadequate’ (Davis 1998). There were simply too many COAG working groups. Instead, he decided 
that it was necessary to establish centrally coordinated ‘structures and routines’ to ensure that all 
officials engaged in intergovernmental negotiations understood the State’s positions on various 
issues.   
 
Goss responded to the problem by disaggregating and identifying the particular ‘coordination 
tasks’ facing the State government and instituting corresponding structures and routines. The 
first task concerned political coordination, which involved a consistent presentation of the 
government’s positions to the electorate (Davis 1998: 154–155). The Premier and his office took 
control of the political agenda, established a comprehensive cabinet committee system, developed 
a ‘media strategy’ and instituted rules that prevented ministers from entering into 
intergovernmental agreements without the prior approval of cabinet. 
 
The second task concerned policy coordination that ensured coherent policy options, which did not 
contradict one another, and were not undermined by national polices (Davis 1998: 155–158). The 
solution was to establish and document formal procedures for government business in a cabinet 
handbook. In addition, ministers and officials were required to submit well in advance of cabinet 
meetings submissions identifying the type of submission (legislative, policy, appointment), the 
objective, legal, economic, administrative and regulatory implications, and the likely responses of 
stakeholders and the news media. The effect of these procedures filtered through to the line 
agencies – if they wanted their policy proposals to be considered by cabinet and be adopted, then 
they had to develop thoughtful and methodical proposals.  
 
Coordinating these policy procedures and intergovernmental relations was a new Office of the 
Cabinet (a similar office had been established in New South Wales under Premier Nick Greiner) 
(Davis 1998: 157). Officials from the Office of Cabinet not only developed the briefs for COAG 
meetings, they also participated in COAG working groups and ministerial council committees. This 
ensured a single coordinated policy agenda. 
 
The third task was one of administrative coordination. It was not explicitly concerned with 




achieve effectively and efficiently cabinet’s policy objectives. To this end, the number of 
government departments was reduced from twenty-seven to eighteen, the Public Sector 
Management Commission was established to implement these changes in the machinery of 
government and, to make the public sector more transparent, a new financial reporting framework 
was imposed (Davis 1998: 158–159).  
 
Together, these reforms enabled Premier Goss to centralise coordination around Cabinet, the 
Office of Cabinet, the Public Sector Management Commission and, ultimately, through himself 
(Davis 1998: 159–161). However, as Davis noted, this management approach can only be 
successful and maintained if a Premier is both talented and energetic. In the long term, there is a 
risk that the system and the coordination of intergovernmental relations will decline.   
 
Menzies (2011): Top-down, ad hoc intergovernmental relations 
Based on the view that intergovernmental relations across in the federal sphere is essentially 
driven by the Prime Minister, Jennifer Menzies (2011) compared the intergovernmental capacity 
of successive governments led by Prime Ministers Hawke, Keating, Howard and Rudd. Drawing 
upon interviews with senior State and Commonwealth officials, Menzies (2011: 408) found that 
the ‘systemic capacity’ of the DPMC to manage intergovernmental relations ultimately ebbs and 
flows according to the ‘interests and agenda’ of Prime Ministers.  
 
Menzies examined in turn: the structural capacity of the DPMC, its human capacity and its 
process capacity during these periods. The structural capacity refers to the existence of the 
institutions and resources necessary to achieve the policies identified by the Prime Minister as 
requiring consideration, negotiation and agreement by Commonwealth and State governments 
(Menzies 2011:). 
 
Human capacity refers to those skills required by officials to engage in intergovernmental relations 
(Menzies 2011: 414‒415). The first set of these skills are those associated with generalists across 
the service, such as the ability to provide policy advice on a variety of issues, possess the written 
skills to prepare briefing notes, agenda papers and communiqués, and the oral skills needed to 
chair meetings, provide oral briefings and negotiate. The second, more specialised, set of skills 
concern the game of intergovernmental relations. DPMC officials must be conversant with the 
complexity of the political processes and dynamics that straddle not just the Commonwealth 
government, but also State governments, to ensure that the Prime Minister’s options remain open 
during negotiations. They must also possess the diplomatic skills needed to maintain relations 
between jurisdictions even when political leaders are publicly hostile, as well as to build trust 
between political leaders and between officials. Menzies also found that ‘playing the game’ of 
intergovernmental relations requires DPMC officials to dabble in the ‘dark arts’, that is, tactics such 
as ‘divide and conquer, ambush, veto and withhold information’ (Menzies 2011: 415).   
 
The process capacity of the DPMC encapsulates the skills associated with secretariat work to 
coordinate briefings and meetings (Menzies 2011: 415‒416). Thus, DPMC officials must be able to 
develop, coordinate and circulate agendas and papers, receive Cabinet approval, and organise 
meetings.  
 
Menzies found that while the process capacity of Commonwealth officials had remained 
consistent over the past twenty-five years, the structural and human capacities have varied. The 
reason for this variation is that the DPMC has preferred to respond to the immediate demands of 




degree of interest in, and priority towards, intergovernmental relations. Consequently, the 
Commonwealth has lacked the ongoing strategic capacity to drive intergovernmental relations, and 
instead focussed more on procedural matters. This has led to the States often filling the void.   
 
2.2 Key Themes  
One of the key themes emanating out of our review of the literature on intergovernmental 
relations in Australia is that of interdependency. While there are periods characterised by political 
and bureaucratic conflict, for the most part intergovernmental relations in Australia are best 
conceptualised in terms of ‘interdependency’. This concept is based upon the idea that no 
government organisations have all the resources they need to achieve their goals and, hence, 
voluntarily enter into arrangements with other organisations to obtain the necessary resources. 
Even the more powerful actors will likely need to concede some goals or exchange resources with 
the weaker actors to achieve their primary goals.  
 
However, the concept of interdependency appears counter-intuitive to those who view the 
Australian federal system primarily in terms of constitutional / cabinet government. From this 
perspective, research focuses upon prime ministers, cabinet, parliamentary conventions and 
constitutions, i.e., the history and normative ideals of what has been variously termed cabinet 
government or constitutionalism. It is also assumed that cabinet is the prime mover of public 
policy. The broader role of ministerial policy advisers, department secretaries, stakeholders and 
interest groups are largely ignored. It is recognised that they play some part in bringing an issue to 
the attention of ministers and getting it on to the cabinet agenda, but the political dynamics of this 
are essentially set aside in a ‘black box’.  
 
As Weller (2005) has remarked, such a perspective omits much of what still needs to be 
understood about the workings of Australian government and policymaking. First, it pays little 
heed to the autonomous actions of central agencies. On the contrary, it is assumed that central 
agencies are the agents of their cabinet ministers (or the prime minister), and policy and programs 
are assumed to follow the directions emanating from cabinet. While we do not deny the 
importance of cabinet in providing policy leadership and financial support for program, numerous 
studies of policy implementation have highlighted the difference between policy objectives at the 
centre and what is realised at the ‘street level’. The concept of cabinet government cannot explain 
this divergence between objectives, directives and outcomes. 
 
Second, and a corollary of the first point, is that the concept of cabinet government cannot 
explain how policy is coordinated. Following the devolution of responsibility for policy programs 
since the 1980s, as governments around Australia (and elsewhere) sought to implement 
managerialism and ‘new public management’, the lines of coordination – regardless of whether 
they concern administrative, policy or political coordination – have become increasingly complex. A 
theory of government and the policy process needs to be able to explain the institutions and 
dynamics beyond cabinet, if it is to be relevant to the study of intergovernmental relations 
between and withincentral agencies.  
 
Unlike cabinet / constitutional approaches that assume power relations are hierarchical and 
fixed by formal rules, the concept of interdependency directs us not to assume particular power 
relations. This was theorised and demonstrated by Rhodes (1981: 99) in his study of relations 
between central departments and local authorities in Great Britain. Organisations possess power 




obtain elsewhere. However, this power is reciprocal. No matter how much power a central 
department possessed, it would remain dependent, to some extent, upon local authorities for the 
resources it lacked.  
 
The concept of interdependency also leads us to carefully examine institutional relationships and 
challenge traditional assumptions by taking into account other factors, such as motivations, 
resources, informal rules of engagement and strategies. In some circumstances, 
intergovernmental relations may be characterised by zero-sum transactions and be extremely 
asymmetrical; in other circumstances, relations may be more symmetrical. In either case, analysis 
is evidence-based. 
 
Most importantly, interdependency provides a perspective that is intuitively consistent with the 
ideals and general practice of federalism. As Chapman (1988: 99) argued 
by emphasising the interactions and interdependencies rather than the adversarial or 
constitutional positions of the participants, attention is directed through policies to 
processes. Inter-governmental relations arise through the desire of governing units in a 
federal system to achieve good policies; ‘good’ in the sense that they would be feasible 
within given restraints and that they would be effective in solving, or at least reducing, 
the underlying problem.  
 
This interactive process may be described as based on exchange since it starts from the 
premise that all parties wish to maintain the relationship and therefore will facilitate 
resolution of the issues. Such a view does not ignore the possibility that one or other of 
the parties to the exchange may take the extreme position in relation to a particular 
issue and withdraw. However, it is not unrealistic to assume that this is unlikely to occur 
over very many specific areas and certainly not at one and the same time so as to lead 
to secession.  
 
The reality, as Chapman (1988: 104) explained, is that most policy decisions taken in a federation 
will overlap with others decisions. More often than not, officials need to enter into bilateral or 
multilateral negotiations – ‘based on mutuality and reciprocity’ – that recognise one another’s 
interdependency. On these occasions, intergovernmental forums as ‘moderating institutions’ are 
established, so that information can be exchanged, conflict managed, agreements reached and 
(sometimes overarching) policies developed.   
 
Another key theme emerging from the literature is the characterisation of intergovernmental 
relations as a game. It is underpinned by Holmes and Sharman’s work on premiers’ conferences in 
the 1970s and Painter’s analysis of SPC / COAG politics in the 1990s. Following the theme of 
interdependency, we conceptualise the game of intergovernmental relations as one in which the 





3. Intergovernmental relations between Commonwealth and 















































The powers of the Commonwealth are not exclusive, unless it so legislates. In cases of legislative 
conflict between the State and Commonwealth governments, s.109 holds that ‘the latter shall 
prevail…’ This has enabled the Commonwealth to encroach upon policy areas previous considered 
by the States to fall within their purview. 
  
3.1.2 Fiscal federalism 
Power relations between the Commonwealth and the States are further skewed in favour of the 
former by its collection and distribution of revenue. Following the Uniform Tax Case (1942), the 
Commonwealth effectively gained a monopoly over the levying of income tax and State 
expenditures have exceeded their revenue sources (e.g. royalties, stamp duty, payroll tax). This is 
due to the High Court's broad interpretation of s.90, which states that the Commonwealth shall 
have the power to impose ‘duties of customs and of excise’. Its ruling that the Commonwealth had 
the legitimate authority to monopolise the imposition of income taxation enabled the 
Commonwealth to fund a variety of welfare programs not previously provided by the States. It also 
meant that the States would henceforth be beholden to the Commonwealth for general purpose 
grants and specific purpose payments to meet their expenditures.  
 
The outcome has been a vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI) that greatly favours the Commonwealth. 
Technically, the term ‘vertical fiscal imbalance’ describes the variance between the high revenue / 
low expenditure responsibilities of one level of government against the low revenue / high 
expenditure responsibilities of another level. Usually, the variance favours the central government, 
which provides grants to cover the regional government’s fiscal deficit.  
 
Consequently, the Commonwealth has provided revenue assistance through various 
mechanisms. Traditionally, this involved the distribution of financial assistance grants and specific 
purpose payments based upon Commonwealth-State negotiations and agreements reached at the 
annual Premiers' Conference. Since the introduction of the GST, the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission has redistributed GST revenue to the States in accordance with the principle of 
horizontal fiscal equalisation (HFE): ‘each State should be given the capacity to provide the average 
standard of State-type public services, assuming it does so at an average level of operational 
efficiency and makes an average effort to raise revenue from its own sources’.  
 
The division of powers and fiscal federalism set the parameters within which intergovernmental 
relations between the Commonwealth and the State central agencies take place. The division of 
powers provisions can and have been used to limit State policy autonomy, but place almost no 
constraint upon policy expansion by the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth has also used its 
monopolisation of income taxation revenue to attach conditions and reporting requirements to 
specific purpose payments. Furthermore, some States (‘donors’) frequently complain that they 
contribute relatively more revenue to the Commonwealth coffers than they receive back through 
HFE compared to their counterparts (‘recipients’). Thus,   
 
• the primary fiscal intergovernmental objectives of the Commonwealth are to maintain an 
agreeable equity of distribution of funding between the States and retain a level of 
control over how that funding is used; while  
• the primary fiscal intergovernmental objectives of the States are to preserve their 
remaining policy responsibilities and secure funding sufficient to resource their public 





3.2 COAG: Formation, Structure and Rationale 
The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) was 
established in December 1992 as the peak forum for 
intergovernmental relations in Australia. It comprises 
the Prime Minister, the State Premiers, the Chief 
Ministers of the Australian Capital Territory and the 
Northern Territory, as well as the President of 
Australian Local Government Association. COAG meets 
on an as-needed basis and has met every year since its 
inception, twice in 1994, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 
2011, and four times in both 2008 and 2009.  
Officially, COAG was established to ‘initiate, develop 
and monitor the implementation of policy reforms 
that are of national significance and which require 
cooperative action by Australian governments’. 
Politically, it signalled a move towards cooperative 
federalism in Australia and recognition that there is 
unnecessary overlap and administrative duplication 
between the Commonwealth and State jurisdictions 
(see Painter 1998b for a detailed discussion of the 
politics behind the formation of COAG). Moreover, it 
was realised that an increasing number of policy issues 
crossed borders, for example, water resource management. Hence, it was also established as a 
forum for discussion and negotiation of national regulatory frameworks, ministerial council 
deliberations, and international treaties that impinge upon subnational governments.  
Prior to the establishment of the COAG Reform Agenda in 2007, COAG had been the focal point for 
intergovernmental deliberation over: 
• the National Competition Policy;  
• counter-terrorism, including a National Emergency Protocol, and the strengthening of 
Australia’s counter-terrorism legislation;  
• mental health, notably the formulation of a five-year National Mental Health Plan; 
• the use of human embryos in medical research;  
• the regulation of the availability of handguns; and  
• water resource management, through the formulation of the National Water Initiative.  
 
Until the COAG Reform Agenda, the National Competition Policy (NCP) was easily the most 
significant and wide ranging ‘federal’ policy agreed to at COAG (see Box 2). The NCP was the 
name given to a set of reforms accepted by the Commonwealth, States and Territories in October 
1992, in response to the findings of the National Competition Policy Review Report (the so-called 
‘Hilmer Report’). Specifically, these National Competition Policy reforms resolved to:  
• use the Trade Practices Act 1974 to prevent anti-competitive behaviour by all government 
and private businesses; 
• foster ‘competitive neutrality’ so as to enable private businesses to compete equally with 
government businesses for tenders;  
• streamline the regulatory and pricing frameworks of water, gas and electricity utilities, along 
BOX 2 
National Competition Council 
The National Competition Policy (NCP) 
was overseen by the National 
Competition Council (NCC), which was 
established in late 1995. The NCC was 
an independent, statutory body, 
whose role was to advise on, rather 
than implement, the NCP. The NCC 
was also responsible for assessing the 
progress of State and Territory 
governments in implementing the 
reforms, ascertaining whether 
individual States had made sufficient 
progress to receive their 
compensation payments and making 
available to the public information 
about the details and progress of the 
NCP.  
 
The NCP and NCC were the models 
upon which the COAG Reform Agenda 





with the road transport sector; 
• establish a national access regime to facilitate sharing of essential infrastructure among 
competing businesses; and  
• examine and reform laws that hinder competition, except in cases found to be in the public 
interest.  
 
In return for successful implementation of the NCP, State and Territory governments received per 
capita payments from the Commonwealth. These were intended to reflect that although the 
benefits of greater competition flow on to the community, in general, the direct financial benefits 
tend to flow to the Commonwealth in the form of increased taxation revenue. Although not 
without its critics, the NCP was widely regarded as having demonstrated that the 
Commonwealth and States could cooperate to achieve mutual policy goals.  
 
However, COAG reflects the constitutional framework that privileges the Commonwealth in 
intergovernmental relations. This is because ‘COAG’, as Fenna (2007: 304) has argued, is an ‘event’ 
– it is something that occurs. It is not an institution that exists in any meaningful sense. COAG does 
not reside in any single space (like Parliament) and it does not have a constitution or remit. Unlike 
the Council for the Australian Federation (see discussion later in this chapter), it is not established 
by an intergovernmental agreement and does not have an independent secretariat.  
 
This enables the political executive of the Commonwealth to dominate intergovernmental 
relations at COAG. The Prime Minister sets the dates and agenda of COAG meetings (Wanna et al 
2009). First Ministers may propose items for the agenda, but the Prime Minister can refuse their 
inclusion. The Prime Minister also chairs the meetings and issues the invitations to the Premiers 
and the Chief Ministers. Under the Prime Ministership of Kevin Rudd, invitations were also 
extended to State and Territory Treasurers. Prime Minister Gillard has discontinued this practice. 
The COAG Secretariat, which advises the Prime Minister on these matters, is based in the 
Commonwealth Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Finally, the Prime Minister 
controls the release of conference papers. Stories of COAG (and premiers’ conference) papers 
being slipped under doors the night before meetings abound in federal folklore. Whether tactically 
intended to place the States in an uninformed position or simply, a consequence of urgency or 
disorganisation, the Commonwealth has regularly released papers just ‘a day or two’ before 
meetings.  
 
Ultimately, however, COAG meetings and the work they generate reflects the interdependency 
of intergovernmental relations between the Commonwealth and State central agencies. 
Certainly, the Commonwealth central agencies dominate the federal agenda, but they need the 
State central agencies to support, collaborate and cooperate in order to achieve many of its policy 
objectives. For example, the NCP would not have been realised without the support of the States 
to pass the requisite legislation and make the necessary changes to their utility and regulatory 
frameworks. Likewise, if the sub-national governments want to retain some semblance of control 
within their jurisdictions, then they must negotiate with the Commonwealth at COAG. Hence, 
there is always a flurry of intergovernmental activity in the lead-up to COAG meetings to ensure 






3.3 COAG Reform Agenda 
3.3.1 Background: The National Reform Agenda 
In May 2005, with the ten year funding deadline for the NCP looming, the Victorian government 
proposed a ‘new reform agenda’ (Government of Victoria, 2005) to succeed it, which constituted 
the beginning of a significant push by the States and Territories to present their positions on 
national issues and be more assertive in their dealings with the Commonwealth. The New 
Reform Agenda included reforms to the vocational education and training sectors and personal 
income taxation system, the introduction of a ‘holistic patient-oriented health system’, the 
formulation of a greenhouse gases trading emissions scheme, the establishment of a national 
infrastructure scheme and reforms to improve labour market participation rates. It was further 
proposed that COAG facilitate this new reform agenda by developing initiatives, incentives 
(including funding), indicators by which to measure progress, and an independent agency to assess 
progress.  
 
With the Victorian government having laid much of the groundwork, the National Reform 
Agenda was agreed upon by COAG in February 2006. It was an arrangement designed to improve 
services and living standards by focussing on three broad policy streams: (1) human capital, 
especially, education and training, health and support for work; (2) competition, notably the 
renewal of the National Competition Policy to develop a market-oriented framework to support 
investment in transport and  energy infrastructure; and (3) regulation, to reduce the load imposed 
by all levels of government, yet maintain a balance between market efficiency and social goods. It 
was further agreed that COAG would formulate intergovernmental action plans setting out actions, 
expected outcomes, policy measures and targets. COAG also agreed ‘in principle’ to establish a 
COAG Reform Council (CRC) – responsible to COAG – for monitoring and reporting on progress 
being made towards the National Reform Agenda. It came into existence in 2007. 
 
Almost immediately after the election of the Rudd Labor government in November 2007, the 
National Reform Agenda was repackaged as the COAG Reform Agenda and progress began 
towards its substantive policy formulation and implementation. With COAG meeting four times 
in each of the following two years – an unprecedented frequency – the central agencies worked 
furiously to meet the demands of their political leaders.    
 
3.3.2 Policy development: The COAG working groups 
Policy development under the COAG Reform Agenda was headed by seven COAG working 
groups, established at the December 2007 COAG meeting. Traditionally, COAG working groups had 
been chaired by senior officials; however, these new working groups were chaired by 
Commonwealth cabinet ministers and attended by senior Commonwealth, State and Territory 
officials. The COAG working groups were charged with developing strategic policy directions and 
ensuring improved outcomes and performance in the following areas: preventative health, 
indigenous healthcare, primary care, hospitals and aged care; education and training systems; 
climate change and water scarcity; the efficient provision of adequate infrastructure; business 
regulation and competition reform; improved affordability of, and access to, housing; and social 
inclusion and closing the gap on indigenous disadvantage.  
 




central agencies and line agencies, were established and met regularly to work out how the 
policies would be coordinated, financed and implemented. Most of the working groups have now 
reported to COAG and been disbanded (see Appendix 1 for details and membership of the various 
working groups). The relevant ministerial councils have been (re)assigned their duties. 
 
Although most of these COAG working groups achieved their objectives – the still meeting COAG 
Business Regulation and Competition Working Group being the exception – they highlighted the 
privileged position of the Commonwealth in intergovernmental relations. The Commonwealth 
sets COAG agendas and Commonwealth officials acknowledged that these were based on election 
policies. The States had little choice but to try to maintain some balance in terms of policy 
understanding or risk losing out during negotiations. Several State officials commented on the 
demanding workload brought about by the relatively high frequency of the meetings. 
Furthermore, they described the structure of the COAG working groups as ‘quite challenging’. With 
Commonwealth ministers chairing the meetings, Commonwealth and State officials were reluctant 
to argue against the ministers’ demands – ‘you can’t thump the table at a Minister’. Consequently, 
State officials were usually left behind to do the ‘heavy lifting’, which put State ministers offside 
because they felt crowded out. Interestingly, we were informed by Commonwealth officials that 
the Commonwealth offered the positions of deputy chairs to State and Territory ministers; but 
their first ministers declined because they did not want their line ministers tied up by COAG 
business.  
 
3.3.3 The Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal Financial Relations 
The cornerstone of the COAG Reform Agenda is the Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal 
Financial Relations (IGAFFR), which commenced on 1 January 2009 (COAG 2008). The IGAFFR 
constituted a rationalising and restructuring of the system of specific purpose payments (SPPs) 
from the Commonwealth to the States and Territories. Previously, the system had been 
encumbered with numerous financial arrangements that, on-the-whole, were seen as placing 
onerous reporting requirements upon the States and becoming increasingly prescriptive in how the 
monies were to be spent. It was widely argued that to enhance State policy autonomy there 
needed to be fewer SPPs that recognised the specific circumstances faced by the State 
governments and had outcomes-based objectives.  
 
The long-standing regime of SPPs was replaced by so-called national SPPs and national 
partnership payments. Now, there are just five national SPPs – all of which are linked to national 
agreements (see Appendix 2). The national SPPs span the principal policy areas of the States – 
health, schools, skills training, housing, and disabilities services (as well as a framework SPP on 
indigenous development). The funding is ongoing, so the parties do not have to keep returning to 
the negotiating table in order for services to be delivered after a particular date. Furthermore, 
funding is indexed annually and distributed according to each jurisdiction’s share of the total 
population. The only requirement of the States is that the funds be allocated to the designated 
policy area and in such a way as to meet the mutually agreed objectives. Ostensibly, this 
constituted a major reform and a significant rationalisation of the previous system of ninety or 
more SPPs. 
 
Unlike the old SPPs, there is no financial ‘stick and carrot’ to ensure performance accountability 
under the national SPP agreements. Instead, to prompt action any shortfalls by individual States 
and Territories will be published in annual reports by the CRC. This is effectively the same approach 




Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision (SCROGSP) and is published every 
January, and provides comparative information on the efficiency and effectiveness of a range of 
state government services such as housing, childcare, hospitals, prisons and schools.  
 
However, the idea of a ‘tied grant’ is still realised in the IGAFFR by the provision for different 
types of national partnership payments (NPPs). States and Territories can enter into agreements 
with the Commonwealth to receive payments that support specific projects, facilitate reforms by 
the States, or reward those States that deliver on agreed reforms. The fact remains that under this 
arrangement the current and future Commonwealth governments can choose to promote NPPs 
that place conditions, reasonable or otherwise, upon the States and Territories. By the end of 
March 2011, there were already forty-eight active national partnerships (see Appendix 3). 
 
To assist the implementation of particular reform initiatives and to reward good performance 
through national partnership payments, the IGAFFR earmarked Commonwealth funding for a 
new COAG Reform Fund. This structure resembled the competition payments provided under the 
NCP. The COAG Reform Fund is sourced from the Commonwealth budget, as well as from the 
Health and Hospitals Fund, the Education and Investment Fund and the Building Australia Fund 
established by the Commonwealth. 
 
From the Commonwealth’s perspective, it can be said that in many respects the States have 
never had it so good. Previously, the Commonwealth’s line agencies controlled funding and had a 
highly prescriptive role, while the State-level agencies focussed on defending their positions and 
seeing what they could get away with to get their funding. That all changed with the signing of the 
IGAFFR. In the case of the national agreements, it is ‘very easy for the States; just report that 
they’re spending in the sector’. In the case of national partnerships, there has been a shift to 
outcomes-based reporting, which requires the States to meet the agreed outputs (for example, the 
number of schools built and legislative changes) and achieve the negotiated outcomes. From the 
perspective of the Commonwealth, it has provided the money and the States now have to deliver. 
Some Commonwealth officials recognise that this also makes it easier for them – it is they who 
require frequent reporting from the States.  
 
A Commonwealth official also commented that the treatment of national agreements and national 
partnerships by the Commonwealth Grants Commission is now clearer. The national specific 
purpose payments, i.e. the old SPPs, are distributed on an equal per capita basis, whereas the 
national partnerships provide scope for more unequal distribution. Thus, there is less incentive for 
States and Territories to jockey among themselves to get more than their ‘fair share’. 
 
Although State officials concur that the new financial arrangements have indeed led them to 
consider State policies within a broader federal context and establish more useful internal 
reporting measures, they counter that the Commonwealth is forcing the States to enter more 
and more into prescriptive national partnerships that are really the tied grants of old, just under 
a different guise.  
Throughout 2009 and 2010, we saw people conceding on the principles [of the IGAFFR] 
left right and centre … We've sort of taken two steps forward and one step back … We 
were on the same page as the Commonwealth [in 2008] … [In 2009, however, the 
Commonwealth was] big on words, but those were not reflected in their actions … 
Every time that we pointed out that the detail of agreements were inconsistent with the 
IGAFFR, the Commonwealth would respond that ‘this is a special case’ and then the 





In effect, State intergovernmental relations officials believe that the Commonwealth is 
endeavouring to use the National Partnerships to micro-manage their activities.  
 
Commonwealth officials concede that more national partnerships have been established than 
they had anticipated; however, they counter that the States insisted that they fall under the 
purview of the DPMC. The Commonwealth, they explained, is more relaxed, as long as each 
national partnership is ultimately signed by the Prime Minister and covers the relevant detail. 
However, according to these officials, State central agencies insist that the details be channelled 
through them because they want to maintain their dominance over the line agencies.    
 
Yet, State concerns about ‘scope creep’ – additional reporting requirements and milestones that 
go beyond what was originally agreed – persist. State officials contend that the implementation 
plans being presented to them do not reflect the intent of the original national partnerships and 
enable the Commonwealth to micro-manage the States. An official from one of the smaller States 
explained that ‘sometimes DPMC have not been involved at all, other times they have been quite 
heavily involved. We've had everything from the Commonwealth line agency to our line agency, 
PM&C to DPC and then the cross-overs, as well’. Sometimes, however, if the national partnership 
documents have arrived late and ministers negotiate these over the phone, then ‘unsustainable 
measures’ may result.  
 
One State official expressed the frustration encountered across the jurisdictions and that has been 
voiced for some time – publicly by politicians, privately by officials – in this case, over the Health 
Agreement: 
We don't like any of it, but it’s given us so much money - we sign up … They use that 
[Commonwealth funding] to wade into so many areas of State responsibility … We 
want the cash; we have to deal - but we resent very strongly having to play the deal. 
 
In 2010, the Heads of Treasury (HOTs) were assigned the task of reviewing the national 
agreements, national partnerships and related implementation plans and of determining 
whether they were consistent with the principles of the IGAFFR, as well as the ‘clarity and 
transparency of objectives, outcomes, outputs, and roles and responsibilities, and the quantity 
and quality of performance indicators and benchmarks’. The HOTs found that although the 
IGAFFR framework was sound and the national and sub-national governments were acting with 
the best of intentions, ‘some challenges remain’.  
 
3.4 Performance monitoring and reporting: The COAG Reform Council  
The COAG Reform Council is responsible for performance monitoring and reporting to COAG 
under the IGAFFR. Its public assessments form the basis for reward payments from the 
Commonwealth to the States. Originally established in 2007 to oversee progress on COAG’s 
National Reform Agenda, it comprises six members: three (including the deputy chair) appointed 
on the recommendation of the States and Territories, and three (including the chair) nominated by 
the Commonwealth. Although administratively located within the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, the CRC secretariat are drawn from Commonwealth, State and Territory 
governments and have their office in Sydney. Unlike the National Competition Council, which 
reported to a Commonwealth minister, the CRC reports to COAG. 
 




reporting concerned with the COAG Reform Agenda and any other tasks assigned to it by COAG. 
At the time of writing, the CRC was charged with reporting on:  
• the performance of the Commonwealth and the States and Territories in 
achieving the outcomes and performance benchmarks specified in National 
Agreements   
• whether predetermined performance benchmarks have been achieved under 
National Partnerships 
• the performance of the Commonwealth and the Basin States under five bilateral 
Water Management Partnerships under the Agreement on Murray-Darling 
Basin Reform 
• the aggregate pace of activity in progressing COAG‘s agreed reform agenda 
• the consistency of capital city strategic planning systems with the new national 
criteria.  
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In preparing its reports, the CRC draws upon independent technical analysis. Various 
Commonwealth, State and non-government service providers collect much of the data concerning 
the performance indicators. These data are verified by State and Commonwealth line agencies, the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics and the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, and analysed by 
the Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision (SCROGSP) and various 
experts. (Chart 1 illustrates the flow of information within the performance framework).  
 
The reporting process draws upon the experience of the National Competition Council and 
provides for consultation with the States. Upon drafting a report, the CRC forwards the relevant 
sections to each of the various State and Territory Departments of Premier and Cabinet for 
comments. The departments then have the opportunity to examine how the CRC has used the 
SCROGSP analysis and formulate responses before returning these for consideration by the CRC. 
The CRC then hands over the final report to each DPC, which is publicly released a month later.  
 
The actual lines of accountability within the COAG reform framework, however, are still 
considered unclear. As one senior official describe the situation, it ‘still [constitutes] a fairly 
confused picture . . . where the CRC sits with respect to the Productivity Commission and with 
respect to the actual roles of Treasuries reporting under the agreement . . . is an ongoing 
challenge’.  
 
As an integral institutional component of the COAG Reform Agenda, the CRC exerts considerable 
influence and this influence has increased with the expansion of the COAG Reform Agenda. Table 
3 lists the reports produced by the COAG Reform Council in 2009 and 2010. It evidences not just 
the scope of the CRC’s work, but also implicitly, the increasing workload placed upon central 





Table 3: COAG Reform Council reports, 2009 and 2010 
 
Subject Area Report Titles Date Submitted to COAG 
 
Aggregate Progress on 




National Partnership to Deliver a Seamless National 
Economy: Report on performance 2009-10 31 December 2010 (due) 
 
National Partnership to Deliver a Seamless National 
Economy: Report on performance 2008-09 23 December 2009 
 
Disability National Disability Agreement: Baseline performance report for 2008-09 30 April 2010 
 
Education 
National Education Agreement: Performance report for 
2009 30 September 2010 
 
National Education Agreement: Baseline performance 
report for 2009 30 September 2009 
 
Healthcare 
National Partnership Agreement on the Elective Surgery 
Waiting List Reduction Plan: Period 2 assessment report 30 November 2010 
  
National Partnership Agreement on the Elective Surgery 
Waiting List Reduction Plan: Period 1 assessment report 30 June 2010 
 
Housing Affordability National Affordable Housing Agreement: Baselines performance report for 2008-09 30 April 2010 
   
Indigenous Reform National Indigenous Reform Agreement: Baseline performance report for 2008-09 30 April 2010 
   
Skills and Workforce 
Development 
National Agreement for Skills and Workforce 
Development: Performance report for 2009 30 September 2010 
  
National Agreement for Skills and Workforce 




Water Management Partnerships: Report on performance 
2009 30 September 2010 
 
Table 4 lists the CRC reports submitted or due to be submitted to COAG in 2011. During this period, 
we see evidence of not only the CRC’s increasing workload, but also that of the central agencies 
and line agencies. Thirteen reports in total were due to be submitted to COAG – the same number 
as for the previous two years combined. The reasons for this increased workload are that, in 
addition to the national agreements, the CRC is now reporting on the national partnerships and 
Capital City Strategic Planning Systems. At the December 2009 COAG meeting, it was agreed that 
all States would institute capital city strategic plans by 1 January 2012. These strategic plans are to 
be founded upon agreed criteria concerning housing affordability, urban congestion, climate 
change, land-use, transport, infrastructure, demographic change and government coordination. 
The CRC, which will be supported by an expert advisory panel, was tasked with building and 





Table 4: COAG Reform Council reports, 2011 
 
Subject Area Report Titles Date Submitted/Due 
to COAG 
 
Aggregate Progress on 
COAG Reform Agenda 




National Partnership to Deliver a Seamless National Economy: 
Report on performance 2010-11 
31 December 2011  
   
Disability National Disability Agreement: Performance report for 2009-10 29 April 2011 
   
Education National Education Agreement: Performance report for 2010 30 September 2011 
National Partnership Agreement on Literacy and Numeracy: First 
assessment report 
25 March 2011 
   
Healthcare National Partnership Agreement on the Elective Surgery Waiting 
List Reduction Plan: Period 3 assessment report 
8 August 2011 
National Healthcare Agreement: Performance Report for 2009-10 29 April 2011 
National Partnership Agreement on Essential Vaccines: Period 1 
assessment report 
30 June 2011 
National Partnership Agreement on Essential Vaccines: Period 2 
assessment report  
10 August 2011 
 
Housing Affordability National Affordable Housing Agreement: Performance report for 
2009-10 
29 April 2011 
 
Indigenous Reform National Indigenous Reform Agreement: Performance report for 
2009-10 
29 April 2011 
 
Skills and Workforce 
Development 
National Agreement for Skills and Workforce Development: 
Performance report for 2010 
30 September 2011 
National Partnership Agreement on Youth Attainment and 





Murray-Darling Basin Water Management Partnerships: Report 
on Performance 2010 
30 September 2011 
 
Capital City Strategic 
Planning Systems 




However, the influence of the CRC across the central agencies may not be quite as pervasive as 
we assumed. For example, there was no one within the Victorian Department of Treasury and 
Finance who was directly responsible for dealing with the CRC. The view expressed there was that 
‘it's early days and the CRC has not released that many reports’. The DTF has no direct contact with 
the CRC; rather it contributes to the DPC’s analysis. Nevertheless, it is anticipated that the CRC 
reports will be useful in the future. An official from a smaller State remarked that ‘the beauty is 
that it's real material . . . It's a great discipline on government to actually cut the rhetoric and 
actually deliver on outcomes for citizens’.  
 
Generally, the State central agencies are satisfied with the role and performance of the CRC. 
Most officials we interviewed considered the CRC process to be ‘excellent’, especially the outcomes 
focus. The CRC has responded and been open to influence from the States. A South Australian 
official explained that there had been repeated correspondence with the CRC about ‘some of their 
measures and how they are using them to measure homelessness - that has been a long term 
policy experience for us’. Certainly, the dealings with the CRC are regarded as being more 





The issue that the State central agencies are most concerned with and frustrated by are the 
inadequacies of the datasets and the need for indicator rationalisation. It is an issue that is 
recognised in the COAG Reform Council’s 2010 annual report, which brings together reporting for 
ROGS, national partnerships, national agreements and minimum datasets. The CRC has worked 
with the Productivity Commission and the relevant data agencies to encourage States to develop 
appropriate policy frameworks and program logic to evaluation. Certainly, there is a push to ‘align’ 
these indicators. However, meetings with the CRC have not always been successful, partly because 
everybody ideally wants to keep their own indicators.  
 
The general view among officials is that the reporting framework for the CRC is full of data gaps 
and inadequacies. This was summed up by a State treasury official, who accepted that   
it was clear that we needed to have some rationalisation of data collection [Currently] 
the same data is collected in different forms for different publications. That's just a 
waste … [for example] half of the indicators in the Healthcare Agreement don't have 
datasets to report yet … [Moreover, it takes] five years to get a dataset up and running. 
When we argued that the principle of these SPPs would be that there were to be up to 
ten indicators that the public would understand, and the first health agreement came 
out with 90 . . . many of which there was no data to estimate. You have to ask yourself, 
what would you do with the data anyway? How many teenagers are having 
unprotected sex? How would you know and what would you do about it? We were told 
that was incredibly important because of a, b, c and d! 
 
As another official reluctantly accepted, ‘The data just doesn't tell you what you want to know, but 
it's the best measure we've got’. 
 
The problem for some is that the CRC has included in its reports data from a variety of sources. In 
particular, there are external performance indicators established outside of the COAG sphere. 
COAG has since provided the CRC with a ‘clearer direction’ that assessments in relation to COAG 
agreements should be premised upon performance indicators contained within COAG agreements. 
That said, officials agree that most CRC reports have added value to the COAG reporting process.  
 
An official from a premier’s department identified the Homelessness National Partnership 
Agreement as a further case in point. When it was being formulated, it was sent out to ‘data 
experts’ who identified a whole raft of variables that they would like to measure and a lot were 
incorporated into the agreement. This official argued that strategic, high level indicators need to be 
developed to create a more useful picture.  
 
It was also reported to us that some of the smaller line agencies (e.g. indigenous affairs) have 
sought to use the agreements as a means to infiltrate larger departments (e.g. health) that already 
have to address a number of competing policy items of equal importance, and not just the item 
that concerns the smaller agency. Hence, they have supported the incorporation of particular 
indicators in overarching agreements. 
 
At the February 2011 COAG meeting, a senior officers group comprising officials from treasury 
and premiers’ departments was established to address the issue of too many performance 
indicators within the various agreements. There is now a steering committee and nine sub-groups 
involved in the process. It first identified those agreements most in need of review and has begun 





Officials within State central agencies are also frustrated by the rigidity of the CRC’s 
requirements. If a State does not meet a target by a due date – even by just a few days – then the 
CRC will conclude that the State failed to meet its target. Of course, by the time that the CRC 
reports its finding the target may have already been met. For example, in the case of indigenous 
housing, the States are required to have built a certain numbers of houses by a particular date. 
There are regular teleconferences between the State and Commonwealth line agencies to 
ascertain progress and anticipate any problems in reaching milestones. Unfortunately, the 
implementation plan did not anticipate the problems of building houses in remote areas of one 
State, such as a small labour pool. Nor was it able to anticipate the death of an indigenous youth 
and serious injuries to two others on site. ‘You only need one thing to go wrong in a remote area 
like that and you have no chance of reaching the milestone’. The DPC and line agency made 
representations to the CRC asking, ‘Can we have a one-month carry-over? And not only did we not 
get a reply to that, but we also got a headline in the paper’. In addition, they had their funding 
withdrawn. 
 
Frustration was also expressed that the CRC is not taking sufficient account in its targets of the 
contextual differences in the indicators and outcomes across the States; in other words, 
recognition of where jurisdictions start from a lower base. Some State officials argued that the 
CRC needed to take into account contextualised information, i.e. analysis that takes into account 
initially lower / higher base levels than other States. They favour both percentage improvement 
and comparative analysis against national results. This is because percentage improvement may be 
significant from a low base, but still very low when compared against other States. However, COAG 
has, at times, said, ‘today starts now’. 
 
3.5 Ministerial councils 
3.5.1 Background 
Broadly speaking, ministerial councils have been created to facilitate high-level negotiation 
between the States and the Commonwealth in specific policy areas. Ministerial councils can 
instigate and formulate policy reforms, as well as resolve intergovernmental issues that may arise. 
They can also put forward policy reforms to COAG and, if agreed to by COAG, administer their 
implementation.  
 
As of July 2010, there were forty-three ministerial councils comprising ministers from the 
Commonwealth, States, Territories, and the responsible ministers from New Zealand and Papua 
New Guinea, and representatives from the Australian Local Government Association (COAG 
2009:1). The roles of the ministerial councils were not prescribed – in fact; the Guidelines for the 
Creation of New Ministerial Councils that COAG accepted in 2001 state that 
if legislation is considered necessary to confer functions and powers on a Ministerial 
Council, the Council should not specifically be named in the legislation, allowing for 
greater flexibility in the roles and responsibilities of statutory Councils. 
 
3.5.2 Criticisms of ministerial councils 
Over the period 2008-2010, most of the ministerial councils were ‘put out to pasture’. Previously, 
Commonwealth line ministers negotiated national agreements – although cabinet tightly 
controlled the terms of the conditions to which they could agree. The exceptions have been those 
to which COAG has assigned particular tasks. For example, at the April 2010 COAG meeting, the 




approval by COAG by mid-2011. 
 
The reason for their decline has been a sustained attack upon their efficacy from both within and 
outside of government. Privately, officials express their frustration with the disinterest shown by 
their ministers – State and Commonwealth – in attending and seriously dealing with the agenda at 
hand. The business community has been especially critical of ministerial councils on the grounds 
that they add yet another layer to the federal bureaucracy, contribute to political inertia and lack 
accountability. The Business Council of Australia (BCA 2006), for example, has commented that  
Referring important policy matters to Ministerial Councils for consideration has been 
equated with giving them the ‘kiss of death’. The development of national uniform 
defamation laws, for example, was debated by the Standing Committee of 
Attorneys‑General for over 20 years. 
 
Furthermore, the BCA and other members of the business community have called for ministerial 
councils to meet more regularly, make public their work and milestones, and report on their 
progress using key performance indicators. 
 
3.5.3 Incorporation into COAG and the reform process  
In April 2009, COAG agreed to proceed with an independent review of ministerial councils. 
Although the report, conducted by Dr Alan Hawke, has not been made public, COAG (2010)  
agreed in principle to reforms that will see current Ministerial Councils rationalised to 
11 or fewer Councils overseeing key areas of ongoing importance to both the 
Commonwealth and the States, including health, education and training, community 
services, infrastructure, police and emergency services, and financial relations. COAG 
will also convene from time to time Select Councils of Ministers when it requires advice 
on particular matters within specific timeframes. 
 
The general view among the officials who we interviewed (prior to the February 2011 COAG 
meeting) was that the roles of ministerial councils would soon be circumscribed and aligned to 
meet the demands of the COAG Reform Agenda. We were also told that line agencies were 
voicing ‘concern’ in support of their particular ministerial councils because, ‘most of them 
[ministerial councils] are going to fold . . . [although] there does appear to be growing acceptance’ 
[by line agencies]. However, unlike the highly centralised and controlled process that characterised 
2008, more authority would be granted to the remaining ministerial councils to work on behalf of 
COAG. It was expected that the influence of the Ministerial Council for Treasurers (MCT) and 






































In fact, following its February 2011 meeting, COAG announced that by 1 July it would reduce the 
number of ministerial councils from forty-one to twenty-three and establish three new types of 
ministerial council: standing councils, select councils, and ministerial legislative and governance 
fora (see Chart 2). Under the new ministerial council system, ministerial councils will be more 
closely focussed on national reform and oriented towards supporting the work of COAG. This is 
intended to provide greater oversight of the various national agreements and national partnership 
agreements, increase ministerial involvement in COAG reform activities, emphasise 
implementation and improve lines of accountability. 
 
The bedrock of the new ministerial council system will be the standing councils. There will 
initially be twelve, permanent standing councils established to address ‘enduring issues of national 
significance’. Each will identify priorities they will address and attach timeframes to each, fulfil 
legislative and governance functions consistent with their purview, and provide COAG with annual 
reports outlining their decisions over the past year.  
 
More ephemeral will be the select councils. Like their parliamentary namesakes, they will exist for 
specified periods and focus upon ‘specific reform tasks of critical national importance’. Initially, 
Council of Australian Governments (COAG) 
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there will be six select councils, although COAG has indicated that the number will vary from five 
to seven.   
 
The legislative and governance fora will address matters beyond the scope of the standing 
councils that require ministerial attention. They will primarily be concerned with managing and 
overseeing ministerial responsibilities detailed in intergovernmental agreements, legislation and 
treaties that are not the purview of the standing councils. There will be five legislative and 
governance fora upon commencement of the new system.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
Most of the overarching policy development of the COAG Reform Agenda has now been 
addressed. In 2010, there was just one COAG meeting and the talk among officials was of ‘bedding 
down’, i.e., consolidating all the work that ensued over the past two years. The focus of the central 
agencies has shifted to the associated implementation plans, the negotiation of new national 
partnerships, reform of the institutional framework and redefining the focus of COAG. Overall, and 
despite the litany of complaints about vertical fiscal imbalance, institutional bias favouring the 
Commonwealth, ‘scope creep’ by the Commonwealth agencies and the ever-increasing demands 
for data being placed upon the States, intergovernmental relations between State and 







4. Intergovernmental relations between State central agencies 
When we commenced this project, the talk, at least, was all about cooperative federalism – not 
only between the Commonwealth and the States, but also between the States. It seemed 
reasonable to assume that the extensive demands of the COAG Reform Agenda might engender an 
informal division of labour between State central agencies over policy development. Moreover, 
with the push for greater harmonisation of regulations across the country, we might expect to see 
greater use of uniform legislation. From the outside, the already established Council for the 
Australian Federation (CAF) appeared to be the focal point for State intergovernmental relations.  
 
However, cooperation between States is much more evident between officials than it is between 
premiers and between ministers. Central and line agency officials regularly liaise with one another 
through formal gatherings, such as COAG working groups and sub-groups, senior officials 
meetings, Heads of Treasuries meetings and meetings of ministerial councils, and through informal 
channels, such as by telephone and emails. Their political leaders are more circumspect, especially 
if they belong to parties different to their interstate counterparts. While premiers have, on 
occasion, presented a united front against a prime minister at COAG, this was cooperation against 
a ‘common enemy’. Traditionally, the States have competed with one another to maximise their 
share of the Commonwealth funding pie and to preserve their interests. Officials acknowledge 
their interdependencies, but premiers and ministers are more anxious that they be seen to 
preserve their State’s policy autonomy.  
 
In this chapter, we examine the impact of the COAG Reform Agenda upon intergovernmental 
relations between central agencies and their interstate counterparts. First, we find that the COAG 
Reform Agenda has not stimulated a formal division of policy labour in which the workload is 
distributed among the central agencies. Rather, intergovernmental relations have focused more 
upon informal policy learning between officials. Second, we find that although State central 
agencies have used various types of uniform legislation to institute reforms, it is not unequivocal 
that there has been an overall increase due to the COAG Reform Agenda. Finally, we analyse the 
impact that the Council for the Australian Federation (CAF) has had on intergovernmental relations 
between State strategic agencies. It is apparent that the realisation and implementation of the 
COAG Reform Agenda has not enabled CAF to overcome political division and the self-interest of its 
members.  
 
4.1 Division of labour – policy 
Intergovernmental relations between the States tend to be ad hoc and occur naturally. When 
issues arise, there is an almost constant flow of email traffic. This is collaborative and builds 
camaraderie, especially in light of the perception of the Commonwealth as a common adversary. 
 
A common view expressed by officials was that ‘every State tries to formulate its own position’. 
While the larger States tend to write the first drafts and, hence, get to influence policy outcomes, 
some of the smaller jurisdictions will lead occasionally on some items. Strong alliances can also 
form among officials from various States, sometimes with one State agreeing to make the running 
on an item and letting another State lead on a second item. However, in general, a planned 






Exceptions arise from time to time. If a jurisdiction has particular expertise in a policy area, or is 
a forerunner on an issue or a policy adopter, then it is in a better position to provide policy 
leadership. An official from another State noted, for example, that in vocational education and 
training policy, Victoria has a vast information resource to draw upon and always looks to provide 
the policy leadership. However, the suggestion that Western Australia might lead the other States 
on mining issues because it has immediate, material interests was quashed by a Victorian official 
who countered that if the Victorian Department of Premier and Cabinet left every bit of mining 
analysis to Western Australia, then it would not be looking after Victoria's interests. 
 
This suggests that the distribution of policy work is partly a function of available resources, that 
is, the larger States have more resources available to direct towards policy analysis in various 
policy areas. This was supported to some extent by  an official from a larger State who told us of 
being approached at a meeting by representatives from smaller States asking about not only the 
issues being addressed at that meeting, but also about issues concerning a particular national 
partnership. The official lacked expertise in this area and had to plead ignorance. This indicated to 
the official that these people had greater policy responsibilities because their central agencies 
were not as well resourced.  
 
Interestingly, another official from the same State suggested that the difference between States 
might be that the larger States have greater discretion over how they used their resources and 
the areas where these could be directed. The official remarked that the smaller States tend to 
focus their resources on research concerning the Commonwealth Grants Commission - ‘a 
percentage point can mean millions to them’.  
 
The smaller States can afford their policy specialisations, but not too many. South Australia has 
devoted considerable resources over many years towards climate change policy. A South Australian 
official gave the example of a brainstorming session with the Premier over that State’s White Paper 
on Climate Change, during which they discussed what the other jurisdictions were doing. It 
depended in part on the policy agenda and the policy cycle. In this case, ‘the emissions trading 
scheme [was] off the agenda and the Commonwealth had taken a position on adaptation. What 
were we going to do as a State? How would it play out here?’ The official pointed out, however, 
that a middle-sized State, like South Australia, cannot afford to do this across-the-board, rather 
such work is directed towards significant issues for the State. 
 
Policy convergence between the States is also just as likely to be coincidental, as it is strategic. As 
one official noted, it is not surprising that Western Australia and Queensland have similar policy 
positions in the federal sphere given that they both have widely distributed populations, they have 
largely resource-based economies, pay a considerable amount of tax to the Commonwealth and, to 
some extent, fund some of the other States and Territories.  
 
There is a conscious effort to engage in policy learning across the States; however, there appear 
to be no formal structures to facilitate such activities. While there are regular discussions among 
CAF officials, teleconferences are used to address problems as they arise. 
 
Despite the lack of institutionalised policy learning mechanisms, there is a reasonably 
sophisticated understanding of what the counterparts of line agencies are doing in other States. 
People meet with counterparts at professional forums and meetings to find out what is working in 





4.2 Division of labour – legislation 
A division of labour is more evident – if not systematic – in that area of governance concerned 
with legislation. As we explain below, greater use has been made of uniform legislation following 
the introduction of the COAG Reform Agenda. Following Wanna et al (2009) and the Parliamentary 
Counsel’s Committee (2008), we conceptualise four types of uniform legislation – referral of 
powers, template / complementary applied laws, mirror / model laws, and framework laws – 
situated along a continuum bounded by the degree of autonomy that such legislation grants to 
individual State jurisdictions.  
 
4.2.1 Referral of powers legislation 
At one end of the continuum, representing the least amount of autonomy to individual State 
jurisdictions, is referral of powers legislation. This type of legislation entails States referring 
‘matters’ or ‘authority’ to the Commonwealth under s.51 (xxxvii) of the Constitution, which may 
then legislate in accordance with the referral. In addition to the constitutional reference, 
legislation of this type is typically characterised by the following: a provision setting out the terms 
of the authority being referred; a provision setting out how such a parliamentary act may be 
amended by the Commonwealth; and a sunset clause terminating the referral on a specified date 
by an act of the State parliament. Referral of powers legislation is sometimes utilised in cases 
where there is a perceived need for national uniform legislation in areas that are not explicitly 
within the purview of Commonwealth. It also avoids the Commonwealth having to ask the 
electorate to support a constitutional amendment; historically, most proposals have been rejected.  
 
Not surprisingly, the States have been reluctant to forgo their legislative autonomy and utilise 
referral of powers legislation. Since the introduction of the COAG Reform Agenda in December 
2007, the only uniform legislation of this type passed has concerned consumer credit and the 
introduction of a national personal properties securities register. More significantly, almost all of 
the referral of powers legislation has followed the emergence of COAG and the push over the past 
decade for greater policy and regulatory uniformity across the federation.  
 
4.2.2 Template legislation / complementary applied laws 
Template legislation (or contemporary applied laws) is established by one jurisdiction enacting a 
law and that law then being adopted by other parliaments. It assumes the need for total 
uniformity in statutes and subordinate legislation, and generally utilises a single administrative 
portal implementing uniform administrative rules and decisions. The primary strength of template 
legislation is complete consistency across the federation. It also normally involves States working 
together to achieve harmonisation, thus enabling them to maintain an active policy role. It may 
also be associated with the establishment of a policy-making or regulatory body on which States 
are represented directly or have a say over key appointments. However, it may be disadvantageous 
to the States if they unintentionally surrender policy capacity to the Commonwealth that 
effectively exclude them from an area of legislative responsibility and administration, especially 
when it is prepared to fund the administrative arrangements. 
 
As we expected, the States have preferred template / applied complementary legislation over 
referral of powers legislation. It has also been used more frequently since the introduction of the 
COAG Reform Agenda. Over the past decade, the Commonwealth, Victoria, Queensland and South 




based their legislation. While it was regularly employed in the 1990s, the passing of template 
legislation concerned with child education and care services, national trade measurement, 
occupational licensing, national gas and the regulation of health practitioners over the last two 
years suggests that the States are becoming more at ease with this particular mechanism.  
 
4.2.3 Mirror / model legislation 
‘Mirror’ or ‘model’ legislation is a type of uniform legislation that allows some discretion for 
variability; complete uniformity may not be needed provided there is an agreed base or set of 
standards. It involves a model law being developed (often by a ministerial council), with each State 
parliament then enacting it, but being able to make variations to meet local circumstances. This 
model provides one of the better ways to allow for greater harmonisation, yet still allows the 
States to implement their own versions and retain some ownership over implementation (and to 
amend their component of the legislation subsequently). Mirror legislation tries to avoid the 
pitfalls experienced with corporate affairs where the Commonwealth’s push to harmonise has seen 
the States entirely excluded from this field of policy and administration. In principle, mirror 
legislation can emanate from any level of government and accepted by another. States can also 
introduce mirror legislation without the need to involve the Commonwealth in matters that are 
entirely within State areas of responsibility. 
 
Mirror / model legislation remains the States’ preferred mechanism for achieving legislative 
uniformity across the federation. Furthermore, we also see a consistent increase in the use of this 
mechanism. It was used in the earlier years of federation and started to become more prominent 
in the early 1980s. In the post-COAG era, mirror / model legislation was regularly utilised by the 
various jurisdictions to make uniform their intergovernmental agreements. While the COAG 
Reform Agenda has provided an impetus for uniformity, it has not generated a particularly 
significant increase in the use of mirror / model legislation.  
 
4.2.4 Framework laws 
A legislative technique that allows the most autonomy and capacity to States and Territories is 
the adoption of framework laws, which establish a generic framework of policy intent that 
outlines a set of minimal conditions or regulations, or expresses a minimal set of national 
provisions. This mechanism is designed to give State jurisdictions the power to vary the provisions, 
usually up rather than down. For example, minimal provisions are contained in national templates, 
while sub-national governments can adopt higher standards or offer better provisions to the 
national template for their own jurisdictions. This occurs in situations where the Commonwealth 
establishes procedures to deal with an issue, but allows State procedures to replace them if the 
Commonwealth deems them adequate. However, little use has been made of this type of 
legislation.  
 
In sum, it is evident that increasing use is being made of the various forms of uniform legislation. 
What is less clear is whether the introduction of the COAG Reform Agenda has contributed 
significantly to the increase. In fact, the increased use of uniform legislation of all types coincides 
with the institution of COAG, rather than the COAG Reform Agenda.  
 
4.3 Council for the Australian Federation 
It is a matter of conjecture whether the Council for the Australian Federation (CAF) has been 




recognised on a number of previous occasions (see, for example, Bannon 1992; FSRC 1998; Goss 
1998). Although similar institutions exist in both Canada (Council of the Federation) and the United 
States (National Governors Association), previous efforts at horizontal cooperation in Australia had 
traditionally been ad hoc or limited. While the Leaders Forums set up during the early 1990s were 
influential, they were dominated by the agenda of the Special Premiers’ Conferences (later COAG). 
Moreover, they did not receive any formal bureaucratic support, and eventually became little more 
than brief tactical meetings between leaders immediately prior to COAG meetings (Tiernan 2008). 
 
State and Territory first ministers signed a Memorandum of Understanding in October 2006 to 
form a body modelled on Canada’s Council of the Federation. They agreed to meet at least yearly 
to discuss COAG-related matters (either in advance or subsequent to COAG meetings) and cross-
jurisdictional issues in which the Commonwealth may have a minor or no role. It also provided a 
platform to communicate broader issues of public interest. All members can attend CAF meetings, 
even if, on occasion, some agenda items only apply to certain jurisdictions (e.g. common dates for 
summer-time daylight saving, which only operates in some States). Meeting communiqués are 
later published on the CAF website.  Like COAG, consensus decision-making is the intention, and 
decisions are not formally binding. 
 
The CAF has established its own secretariat to enhance independent policy coordination and 
research capacity among the States and Territories, distinct from the Commonwealth. This has 
led to the commissioning of independent work on climate change and education reform, as well as 
the establishment of cross-jurisdictional working groups of officials on regulatory and tax system 
harmonisation. In April 2007, CAF released the first of what it called its ‘federalist papers,’ entitled 
Australia’s Federal Future (Twomey and Withers 2007), which put an economic and political case 
for federalism, focussing on the advantages of decentralisation, choice and diversity, 
customisation, competition, creativity and innovation, and cooperation. The message of the paper 
was that while Australians tend to complain about federalism, it performs well by international 
standards and has many advantages vital to productivity and wellbeing. However, in its attempt to 
portray federalism as a positive influence, the paper tended to de-emphasise many of the 
associated problems of federalism, such as overlap and duplication – evident to politicians and 
practitioners, but also canvassed widely in the federalism literature (Hollander 2009). Subsequent 
federalist papers put out by the Council sought to engage more closely with some of the 
practicalities of operating a system of divided jurisdiction (CAF 2007; Wanna et al 2009). 
 
Despite its obvious achievements, it is difficult to ignore the elephant in the room: CAF is (or 
was) a political vehicle for the State Labor governments. CAF was established at a time when a 
Liberal-National Party Coalition controlled the Commonwealth government and all State and 
Territory governments were Labor-led. The former felt frustrated by the emergence of ‘wall-to-
wall’ State and Territory Labor governments, while the latter believed the Commonwealth 
understated the importance of their role in the federation, was starving them of the necessary 
funds to undertake their duties and encroaching more and more into their traditional policy areas. 
 
Although a Liberal-National Coalition government was elected nationally in March 1996, at the 
State level, Labor governments were being elected (Tasmania in 1998, Victoria in 1999, Western 
Australia and the Northern Territory in 2001, South Australia in 2002). Following the election of the 
Labor government in South Australia in March 2002, Australia faced the unique situation of having 






However, the balance of power in the federation has now tipped the other way. In 2007, the 
Labor Party won government federally. In 2008, the Liberal Party took control in Western Australia 
and doubts were raised about whether the climate of cooperation could and would be sustainable. 
With the fall of the Brumby Labor government in Victoria in 2010, and the ascendency of Ted 
Baillieu as the new Premier of the Liberal-National Party Coalition government, talk quickly turned 
to his long-standing commitment to competitive federalism. The significance of Liberal Barry 
O’Farrell’s elevation to the NSW Premiership in March 2011 is still unclear. In a speech to the 
National Press Club the previous month, O’Farrell stated that ‘the future of COAG, and more 
broadly federal and state relations, lies not in the direct control of Canberra but a state and 
territory-led injection of competition and collaboration’. 
 
It remains to be seen how the dynamics of CAF will operate as governments change over time, or 
how influential it will be on federalism and intergovernmental relations issues. Arguably, CAF is 
becoming less important to State governments. Its most recent meetings have reverted to being as 
pre-COAG meetings rather than stand-alone meetings with their own agendas. No public 
communiqué has been released arising from a CAF meeting since November 2009. 
 
With the election of non-Labor governments and moves towards ‘competitive’ federalism, 
questions about future collegiality and information sharing between State central agencies 
cannot be avoided. Some State officials were positive in their outlook: intergovernmental relations 
between the State central agencies are generally collegial. This is evident, we were told, in the 
briefing notes to Premiers that usually contain a heading ‘Views of other States and Territories’. It 
is not possible for intergovernmental relations units to do their jobs without knowing what their 
counterparts in other jurisdictions are doing. Some officials also find that such interaction provides 
a ‘double check’ about what is happening in a policy sphere. One official remarked about 
the number of times that I’ve been particularly concerned about an  issue that no one 
else seems to be [within that central agency], I’ve picked up the phone to other 
jurisdictions and gone ‘look, my line agencies are screaming out here and this to me 
doesn’t quite seem to make sense. Is this something in your area as well?’ And, they’ve 
gone ‘well, I’m not getting that feeling. Let me make a couple of calls and I’ll see what I 
can do’. They’ve come back and gone ‘actually, now that you’ve raised it, I’ve checked 
with my [line] agencies and they’ve gone ‘yes, we should have picked that up’.  
 
It was remarked that there is obviously some information in terms of strategy that may not be 
shared with jurisdictions of a different ‘political colour’. This fact is implicitly acknowledged by the 
respective players, as well as the understanding that each will go as far as they can to share what 
they want to share. Crucially, it is not in their best interests to have their first ministers blindsided. 
Hence, officials in one State may inform their counterparts that their premier is likely to raise issue 
X. Officials can then brief the prime minister and the other premiers, formulate a response and 
identify areas of flexibility. In that way, a meaningful dialogue can ensue at the highest level. 
Otherwise, a prime minister or premier would most likely respond that it was first time that s/he 
had heard of issue X and would have to take it on notice.  
 
Aside from providing avenues for policy discussions, some senior State officials still expressed 
disappointment in how CAF has evolved and what it has achieved. One official summed it up, 
thus: ‘CAF seems to have lost a bit of momentum and it remains to be seen whether it will regain 
some in a year's time. It lost its way when it sought to become the advocate and custodian of the 
federation and act as a policy advocate’. At this point, said another official, ‘it steps over the line to 




expansion of COAG, there was no niche for it to fill. If anything, it would only serve to replicate the 
work of the COAG working groups. Consequently, the States could not perceive any benefit in 
matters being prosecuted at CAF and again at COAG by predominantly the same people’.  
 
Opinion is divided over how to reconstitute the standing of CAF. For some, it remains a 
potentially effective lobbying tool in terms of achieving consistent positions in cases where 
consistency can be achieved. For others, CAF has to have more strategic relevance than developing 
tactics immediately preceding COAG meetings. It was suggested that CAF could be better utilised 
as a point of exchange where officials focus less on policy content and the obvious political 
tensions, and more on developing shared administrative mechanisms. An example given by one 
State official were the best-practice guidelines for national partnerships being developed by the 
States. How are these guidelines shared and viewed by the other States? The official believed that 
CAF could have provided such a forum, but did not. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
While the State central agencies have evidenced some commitment to working together, there 
does not appear to be a deep-seated commitment to institutionalising such engagement. The 
increased use of uniform legislation, especially to push through the various elements of the COAG 
Reform Agenda, certainly indicates a preparedness to cooperate. However, the States are anxious 
to retain policy autonomy and reluctant to work too closely with one another. This is not surprising 
given the constant threat of policy incursion by the Commonwealth. As far as CAF is concerned, we 
can only speculate; but it appears that the real commitment among State central agencies has 
been to a substantive set of policy ideas – the COAG Reform Agenda – rather than to an abstract 








5. Intergovernmental relations within the central agencies  
The COAG Reform Agenda has given intergovernmental relations a sustained prominence rarely 
enjoyed throughout the history of Australian federation. As we show in this chapter, Australian 
governments have increased – by varying proportions – the resources directed to improve their 
capacity in this area and position themselves favourably in Commonwealth-State negotiations.  
 
The chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part, we summarise how the central agencies 
in the Commonwealth, Victoria, South Australia, New South Wales, Queensland and Western 
Australia were affected by the introduction of the COAG Reform Agenda and how they 
reorganised themselves and their personnel. Next, we detail the ways that the central agencies 
have responded to the increased demands placed on their intergovernmental relations 
responsibilities through training and recruitment. Then we consider the coherence of 
intergovernmental relations in terms of cabinet oversight, the division of labour within and 
between central agencies and the extent of their integration with their State strategic plan in 
relevant jurisdictions. 
 
Throughout the chapter, we draw upon three primary sources of data. The first source is material 
contained within department annual reports. From these we have been able to identify the tasks 
undertaken each year by the central agencies and observe how, in most cases, the workload first 
increased in response to the COAG Reform Agenda and has now plateaued. The second source of 
data is quantitative – mostly concerning the size of intergovernmental relations units over the past 
few years – which were provided directly by the central agencies. Finally, considerable data were 
drawn from the twenty face-to-face and telephone interviews we conducted with officials in 
intergovernmental relations units and more senior personnel overseeing policy divisions and 
departments.    
 
5.1 Organisation and personnel  
5.1.1 The Commonwealth  
The COAG Reform Agenda and federal affairs, generally, have been driven by the Department of 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) ever since the then Department Secretary, Mike Codd, 
helped convince Prime Minister Bob Hawke to put federalism on his fourth term agenda. Codd 
subsequently established the Commonwealth-State Secretariat, which was headed by an associate 
secretary and supported by a first assistant secretary, an assistant secretary and seven policy 
officers. From 1990 to 1996, the intergovernmental relations process was driven by the 
Commonwealth-State Secretariat, which also did a lot of the policy work.  
 
After John Howard’s elevation to Prime Minister in 1996, COAG’s importance waned and the only 
substantive federal initiative was the goods and services tax, which was run in conjunction with 
the Commonwealth Treasury. However, as the National Reform Agenda and, later, the COAG 
Reform Agenda gained momentum, the impact upon the Commonwealth central agencies 
increased. This is reflected, as we explain, in how the central agencies – primarily the DPMC and 
the Treasury – organised themselves, their workloads, their training strategies and endeavoured to 
make the strategic centre more coherent as a whole. 
 




agencies since the introduction of the COAG Reform Agenda and this is evidenced by changes to 
the organisation and to personnel. Both the DPMC and the Treasury have intergovernmental 
relations units and the staff numbers in these units have increased. Within each department, there 
has emerged an informal division of labour in which the intergovernmental relations units are 
concerned with coordination and information flow, while policy development is assigned (not 
surprisingly) to the policy divisions. The intergovernmental relations units did not have particularly 
prominent roles in the COAG working groups and sub-groups, rather Commonwealth line agencies 
provided the secretariats for all but one of the working groups.  
 
While generally it is true to say that nothing happens at COAG without the Prime Minister’s 
acquiescence, the Commonwealth undeniably followed Victoria’s lead to drive Australian 
federalism with its National Reform Agenda. In 2005-06, during which time (February 2006) the 
NRA was agreed upon by COAG, just two divisions within the DPMC – the Industry, Infrastructure 
and Environment Division, and the Social Policy Division – were responsible for the bulk of the 
work concerned with the NRA. At this stage, aside from handling Commonwealth-State financial 
matters, the Economic Division was not directly involved in the NRA. Meanwhile, the Treasury 
focused, as we would expect, on the competition and regulatory aspects of the National Reform 
Agenda, but also upon climate change policy and human capital reforms. During this period, the 
Treasury’s Commonwealth-State Relations Division was not directly involved in the NRA.  
 
By 2006-07, with federal issues beginning to dominate the political agenda, the Commonwealth 
central agencies were increasingly engaged in work related to the National Reform Agenda. At 
this stage, there were just three or four people working full-time on COAG in the Industry Policy 
and COAG Branch of the DPMC (out of 655 people working in the Department in June 2007). If 
major issues arose – concerning for example, the health workforce – then taskforces were 
assembled with the bulk of personnel being seconded from line agencies. The line agencies 
typically devoted two FTE to an issue, which may have effectively been six people. The workload of 
those Treasury divisions directly involved in intergovernmental relations also increased noticeably.  
 
Whether the Commonwealth’s enthusiastic adoption of the National Reform Agenda after the 
election of the Rudd Labor Government in November 2007 (and its subsequent rebadging as the 
COAG Reform Agenda) will come to be regarded as a watershed in Australian federalism, only 
time will tell. However, its impact upon the organisation of the Commonwealth central agencies 
and their management of intergovernmental relations was immediate. At the end of June 2007, 
the Department was divided into eight divisions and the APEC Taskforce under Department 
Secretary Peter Shergold, with four deputy secretaries overseeing these. An organisational 
restructure the following year by Shergold’s replacement, Terry Moran, saw the Department 
divided into four groups – Domestic Policy, National Security and International Policy, Governance, 
and Strategic Policy and Implementation – comprising various policy and functional divisions. 
 
Significantly, it saw the establishment of the COAG Unit, as part of the Domestic Policy Group. 
The COAG Reform Agenda was agreed to by COAG in December 2007 and the workload increased 
exponentially across the responsible divisions of the Domestic Policy Group. Energies were focused 
on setting up the new COAG working groups, which were to be chaired by Commonwealth 
Ministers, rather than officials (as was previously the case). Likewise, the relevant divisions within 
the Treasury were actively advising the government on various aspects, supporting high-level work 
groups and helping to formulate policies consistent with the COAG Reform Agenda.  
 




activity in late 2008 / early 2009, the DPMC’s COAG Unit comprised twelve people, with ‘probably 
upward’ of forty FTE working on COAG-related matters (against 617 in the entire Department). 
During this period, the Industry, Infrastructure and Environment Division, the Social Policy Division 
and the newly created Families, Immigration and Social Support Division (which subsumed the 
Office of Work and Family) were heavily involved in the development of national agreements, 
national partnerships, and strategies concerned with the various policy elements of the COAG 
Reform Agenda. The year also constituted the peak in the Treasury’s COAG-reform activities. From 
late 2008 to early 2009, the Commonwealth-State Relations Division had a minimum of twenty-five 
FTE working on the COAG Reform Agenda.  
 
In 2009-10, COAG met less frequently, the COAG working groups were being wound up once they 
completed their assigned tasks, and the ‘bedding down’ of the reforms by the central agencies 
became evident. The DPMC remained heavily involved with the COAG Reform Agenda, with 
various divisions becoming increasingly involved with implementation plans. As a lot of work was 
being undertaken in line areas regarding health, indigenous concerns and business regulations, 
there were still at least forty people in the DPMC engaged on the COAG Reform Agenda. The COAG 
Unit had ten FTE (out of 657). With the coordination of implementation plans being mostly the 
responsibility of the DPMC, the workload of the Treasury contracted across three divisions, 
although the workload of the expanded Infrastructure, Competition and Consumer Policy 
Division increased. This can be largely attributed to the on-going challenge of gaining acceptance 
and approval across the federation for business regulation and competition reforms. 
 
5.1.2 Victoria 
Victoria is widely perceived as leading intergovernmental relations in Australia in recent years – 
in some respects, even more so than the Commonwealth. More than in any other State, 
intergovernmental relations are integral to the Victorian central agencies. It generated the 
Governments Working Together (2004) report, initiated the National Reform Agenda and, along 
with South Australia, devised the Council for the Australian Federation. To meet the demands of 
the COAG Reform Agenda, the Victorian central agencies are characterised not just by their 
organisational structures and resources, but also by a sense of purpose and the flexibility to 
achieve their goals. It is not unreasonable or unkind to describe some of the officials we 
interviewed as ‘true believers’. The Commonwealth adopted the National Reform Agenda as its 
own at COAG, but it is still Victoria’s baby.  
 
As the initiator of the National Reform Agenda, the Victorian DPC had been focused upon 
intergovernmental relations for some time. In this respect, the formalisation of the COAG Reform 
Agenda has not caused great disturbance or upheaval. Former Department Secretary, Terry Moran, 
created the Policy and Strategy Projects Branch in early 2003 to focus and think strategically about 
policy. It did not have to respond to Cabinet on a day-to-day basis. At this stage, intergovernmental 
work within the Victorian DPC was primarily the responsibility of the Government Branch. Through 
2006-07, the DPC and the DTF were heavily driving the NRA and merging it with what was 
happening in Victoria, ‘so that State reform was consistent with national reform’.  
 
To accommodate the re-badged and expanded COAG Reform Agenda, the Victorian DPC was re-
organised in 2007-08. Previously, people were being seconded from other agencies to meet the 
demands on Victoria generated by the newly elected Rudd government and its federal reform 
program. Now, the COAG workload was spread over a greater number of branches, with the 




responsibility for ‘big thinking’ on federalism issues. This is seen as a response  
to the significance of what was going on and the necessity [of having] a group of 
people who really understood the fundamental architecture of the reforms and could 
not only coordinate the detailed specifications of those reforms, but could actually drive 
policy thinking in critical areas.  
 
The National Reform Branch, which included a Deputy Secretary and twenty-five officers, saw 
itself as ‘quite a powerful body because we volunteered as frequently as we were able to take 
responsive leadership’. Leadership of intergovernmental relations included representation in each 
of the COAG working groups. The DPC wanted secretary-level representation, and if that was not 
possible, tried not to go too far below that level. ‘It was about showing others how serious we 
were about it … We then selectively chaired sub-groups that were of particular interest to the 
State’. However, the responsibilities of the National Reform Branch and the Government Branch 
overlapped and this was evidenced by their collaborating over the provision of secretariat services 
to support the Premier in his role as Chair of CAF.  
 
In the DTF, work was devolved throughout the Department with a high degree of coordination 
by the Economic and Financial Policy Division. It also was pointed out to us that many more 
people were involved in the COAG process than is reflected in the official FTE figures. As additional 
resources (i.e. officers) were not being employed, COAG-related matters effectively consumed all 
the discretionary resources available to senior managers.  
 
Within the DPC, the National Reform Branch took over COAG and CAF secretariat duties from 
the Government Branch in 2008-09, and the Policy and Strategy Projects Branch and the DPC 
Implementation Unit merged, perhaps reflecting an expectation that the reform process would 
soon move from being preoccupied with strategy and policy development to include also 
matters of program evaluation and performance monitoring. On some issues, the National 
Reform Branch had its own line area responsibilities. For example, because of the large national 
component, it ran vocational education and training policy and oversaw policy on international 
students. Meanwhile, the DTF consolidated its work on the COAG Reform Agenda.  
 
While the Commonwealth was perhaps more interested in bedding down and consolidating 
what had been achieved over the past few years, the Victorian central agencies pushed for 
further reforms. In 2010, there were still nineteen positions in the National Reform Branch. Aside 
from supporting the Premier over the previous two years at three COAG meetings and 
participating in fourteen SOMs, the branch also initiated through CAF a research project that 
developed modes of governance that promote cooperative federalism and another that developed 
government policy on referrals of powers legislation and national legislative arrangements.  
 
Despite its primacy on intergovernmental matters, the National Reform Branch did not always 
take lead responsibility for intergovernmental relations within the Victorian DPC. In addition to 
other branches of the DPC also being engaged in COAG-related policy development, people were 
brought in from other sections of the DPC and across the service to form ‘virtual teams’ to 
undertake projects in addition to their regular work. This was the case when the National Reform 
Branch teamed with the Policy, Strategy and Reform Branch and the Social Policy Branch to 
respond to the Commonwealth’s proposed health reforms.  
 
To meet the increased workload of the COAG Reform Agenda and Treasury’s role at COAG being 




Treasurer Secretary was created. The Deputy Secretary (Economic and Financial Policy) led six 
teams, one of which was Tax and Intergovernmental Relations; however, there was no equivalent 
to DPC’s National Reform Branch. Whereas the National Reform Branch contributes to policy 
content, DTF has aligned its permanent teams on major policy areas and then the IGR team 
provides its particular input. There is a preference for creating ‘virtual teams’ and bringing the 
‘right people to the table on different issues’ if and when they are required. For example, because 
‘health’ has policy implications that sit in the Economic and Financial Policy Division, budgetary 
implications that reside in the Budget and Financial Management Division, capital expenditure that 
is relevant to the Commercial Division, and relevance to the health area of the DPC, the virtual DTF 
Health Reform Team was established. Interestingly, the Department’s 2009-10 annual report 
suggests that its work on the COAG Reform Agenda had declined significantly. The DTF may be 
bedding down its responsibilities regarding the various national partnerships, but it has re-
organised and situated itself for further strategic reforms.  
 
5.1.3 South Australia 
Unlike Victoria, the South Australian central agencies do not possess the weight of resources to 
project leadership in all facets of intergovernmental relations. As one senior official put it: ‘South 
Australia is too small to matter, but still big enough to influence’. In that sense, we noted a prudent 
and strategic use of resources coupled with a desire to take federal leadership on issues of 
importance to South Australia. It was also clear that the South Australian central agencies were 
committed to addressing domestic concerns identified in the South Australia Strategic Plan (SASP) 
and aligning as much as possible its various indicators and measures to those contained within 
national SPPs and national partnerships. 
 
In 2005-06, South Australia was not really a player in Australian intergovernmental relations. An 
intergovernmental relations unit was not indicated on the DPC organisation chart The only 
substantive intergovernmental policy engagements featured in the DPC’s Annual Report concerned 
climate change policy, the COAG Review of the National Competition Policy and indigenous affairs 
(not NRA-related). However, South Australia – through the DPC – was beginning to lead the 
federation in the area of climate change-related policy. For the most part, the DTF’s involvement 
in intergovernmental relations concerned the traditional activity of State treasuries: federal fiscal 
relations.  
 
The South Australian central agencies were still not significant players in 2006-07; however, 
there were signs that the profile of intergovernmental relations was being raised. 
Intergovernmental relations was now formally run out of a ‘reformed and enlarged’ Cabinet Office, 
which, in addition to managing federal matters, was also charged with developing and 
implementing the SASP, coordinating whole-of-government Cabinet proposals, providing 
secretariat support to Cabinet and its committees, and monitoring the implementation of Cabinet 
decisions. The DTF was also becoming increasingly involved in the NRA along with the DPC - not 
just in matters concerned with fiscal federalism, but also in the policy analysis of the human capital 
components.   
 
The signs proved illusory, at least those that had emanated from the DPC. The DPC provided 
some leadership in federal matters in 2007-08, but, apart from representing South Australia on the 
seven COAG working groups, it was mostly confined to climate change policy and secretariat 
support. South Australia’s leadership in climate change policy is highlighted by its six 




Commonwealth; in fact, it was the only working group on which a State had greater representation 
than the Commonwealth. On the other hand, the DTF adopted a broader policy perspective and 
became fully engaged by the COAG Reform Agenda. 
 
However, by 2008-09, the DPC was much more involved in work associated with the COAG 
Reform Agenda; certainly, well beyond its previous focus on climate change policy. While there is 
unlikely to be a single variable responsible for this transformation, we cannot help but recognise 
the organisational transformation that followed the appointment of Chris Eccles, formerly a 
Deputy Secretary in the Victorian DPC (National Reform and Climate Change Group), as the new 
Department Secretary in 2009. Following his arrival, the DPC created an evaluation and reporting 
mechanism to record the State’s performance against outcomes agreed by COAG and South 
Australia’s Strategic Plan targets. It also developed the State’s positions on various funding 
agreements and maintained its leadership in climate change policy. Although not as expansive as 
the DPC, the DTF maintained its high level of involvement in the COAG Reform Agenda.  
 
The South Australian central agencies were now much more outward-looking entities, especially 
the Department of Premier and Cabinet. Aside from the vast array of programs and initiatives 
across the COAG Reform Agenda that the Department now supported, it actively sought to take 
leadership among the States at COAG forums in areas such as climate change policy, indigenous 
reform and urban development. The DPC, like its Victorian counterpart, began to commission 
independent COAG-related studies. Interestingly, as the DPC’s involvement in the COAG reform 
process increased, so there appears to have been a corresponding decline in the DTF’s 
involvement. This may be a quirk of the annual reporting process, which moved away from each 
Branch accounting for its activities, to one in which the Department identifies its work in various 
programs and sub-programs. 
 
The commencement of the COAG Reform Agenda coincided with an increase in the size of the 
intergovernmental relations unit within the DPC from three to twelve FTEs. With greater 
capacity, its prominence and support of South Australian involvement in COAG working groups and 
sub-groups has also increased. Unlike other jurisdictions, the intergovernmental relations unit 
within the DPC has been assigned an increasingly strategic role, in addition to its coordination 
functions. Following the institution of the Integrated Reporting and Evaluation Framework, the 
South Australian central agencies utilise a whole-of-government approach to policy development.  
 
Nevertheless, given the middling size of the South Australian public service, it has been 
considered prudent not to have intergovernmental relations operating in isolation from the 
‘policy grunt’. The view among senior officials is that it is necessary to have an approach that 
captures capability in an integrated way: the office of IGR, the Executive Committee of Cabinet 
secretariat that is looking after the State strategic plan and the mainstream Cabinet Office, which is 
focussed on policy expertise across the policy domains. This also means bringing in policy expertise 
from outside of the South Australian DPC.  
 
5.1.4 New South Wales 
The government of Australia’s largest State has endured considerable political instability for the 
duration of the National Reform Agenda / COAG Reform Agenda and this appears to have 
undermined its potential leadership in intergovernmental relations. From 1 July 2005 to 30 June 
2010, New South Wales had four premiers and three treasurers. There was also a succession of 




2007, and the machinery of government restructured from July 2009, when thirteen so-called 
‘super departments’ encompassing specific policy areas were created and subsumed their 
corresponding statutory authorities and public bodies. Consequently, the central agencies were 
not consistently focused on driving the federal reform process – and intergovernmental relations 
certainly did not enjoy the same profile as it did in Victoria.  
 
In 2005-06, New South Wales was the remaining State with a Cabinet Office distinct from its 
Premiers’ Department. Responsibility for federal matters and intergovernmental relations rested 
primarily with the Social Policy and Inter-governmental Affairs Division of the Cabinet Office. 
Work was already being distributed across the division. Responsibility for coordinating the Premier 
and Director-General’s involvement at COAG and SOMs, respectively, rested with the 
Intergovernmental and Regulatory Reform section. The Social Policy section was focussed on 
health reform and mutual recognition of qualifications, while the Greenhouse Office was driving 
the State’s climate change policy both internally and at the national level.  
 
By contrast, the National Reform Agenda was not a priority for the New South Wales Premier’s 
Department. In the Department’s annual report for this period, the only references to COAG 
concerned counter-terrorism, the National Action Human Influenza Pandemic Plan and issues 
surrounding the Murdi Paaki COAG Trial. There was no acknowledgement of the National Reform 
Agenda and there was no intergovernmental relations unit (or similar) listed under the various 
divisions of the corporate structure. 
 
Unlike the Cabinet Office / DPC, the Office of Financial Management (OFM) within the New 
South Wales Treasury has enjoyed some stability at an executive level. Secretary John Pierce was 
at the helm for twelve years until December 2008, when Michael Schur took over in that role. 
Furthermore, it has retained three of its seven member executive team for the duration of the 
COAG Reform Agenda to date. For most of 2005-06, the Fiscal and Economic Directorate was 
responsible for intergovernmental policy issues, including competition policy and the structural 
reform of energy markets. 
 
In 2006-07, the workload concerned with the National Reform Agenda increased across the 
central agencies. The New South Wales Premier’s Department and the Cabinet Office were 
merged, the Intergovernmental Relations Unit no longer held divisional status and was subsumed, 
along with the Social Policy Branch, within the new Policy Development Division. The Better 
Regulation Office was situated in the General Counsel Division. At the same time, the newly 
reconstructed Department was engaged on the COAG Best Practice, Human Capital, Health 
Workforce and the Competition and Regulation working groups. The Office of Financial 
Management also became heavily involved in the NRA and established the National Reform Branch 
within the Fiscal and Economic Directorate to coordinate this work. It was separate from the 
Commonwealth Grants Commission / revenue unit and comprised staff previously working in the 
economic strategy branch, in part, on COAG-related competition and regulatory issues. Additional 
staff were subsequently added.  
 
By 2007-08, the New South Wales central agencies were fully integrated into the new COAG 
reform process. The COAG Reform Agenda was recognised in the DPC’s 2007-08 annual report as ‘a 
major priority for the DPC, NSW Treasury and key line agencies across the NSW Public Sector’ 
(2008: 6). The OFM, too, was immersed in work geared towards developing the IGAFFR, furthering 






The events of 2008-09 highlight the importance of organisational stability for strategic leadership 
and sustained focus on COAG-related matters. It would be inaccurate to say the involvement of 
the DPC in the COAG Reform Agenda effectively ground to a halt as the Department was again 
restructured; however, very little mention is made of it in the Department’s annual report. The 
previous organisation of nine divisions was completely overhauled and, in its place, only the Office 
of the Director General, the General Counsel Division and the Parliamentary Counsel’s Office 
remained. The new divisions included Community Engagement and Events, Government 
Coordination, Public Sector Management Reform, and Policy and Strategy, where the National 
Reform Unit was situated. On the other hand, the OFM, which had been able to remain above the 
fray, continued to be ‘highly involved’ in the reform process. 
 
It is evident from their respective annual reports that the central agencies were extremely busy 
in 2009-10 with not only developing policy through COAG and its various working groups, but 
also with implementing these reforms at the State level. With the departmental restructure 
behind it, the DPC was again able to focus on the COAG Reform Agenda. This was particularly 
timely given that it was required to lead negotiations with the Commonwealth over the National 
Health and Hospitals Network Agreement. Thus, for the duration of the reform process, the 
National Reform Unit increased in size from three to five FTEs. It reported directly to an assistant 
director-general and was purely concerned with intergovernmental matters, i.e., it dealt with the 
IGAFFR and the intergovernmental machinery around COAG and CAF, as well as monitoring 
progress on national partnerships. 
 
Overall, the New South Wales Treasury has committed far more resources to COAG issues. 
Currently, there are twenty-five FTEs within Treasury dedicated to COAG issues, with nine FTEs in 
the central COAG team. In addition to the Director of the COAG Team, there are four senior people 
with high-level technical skills and four graduates. It oversees the overall risk management 
associated with national partnerships – i.e., the meeting of milestones and receipt of reward 
payments – and participates in the ‘negotiation phase’ to ensure that the Treasury’s budget 
interests are taken into account before the agreements are aligned. There is also a team within the 
Human and Social Services Directorate concerned with COAG matters. The growing importance of 
the COAG Reform Agenda to New South Wales was reflected in the decision by the OFM to add 




In contrast to New South Wales, the Queensland central agencies had a more stable leadership 
following the introduction of the National Reform Agenda in February 2006. During this period, 
Queensland had two Premiers (Beattie and Bligh), two Directors-General of the DPC and a single 
Under Treasurer. Following its rebranding as the COAG Reform Agenda in November 2007, the 
Queensland public service was led by Premier Anna Bligh, Ken Smith (DPC) and Gerrard Bradley 
(DTF). Under this leadership, intergovernmental relations enjoyed a steadily increasing profile, 
highlighted by the Premier’s role as Chair of CAF from October 2008 till October 2009.  
 
Although not a driver of the COAG Reform Agenda, the Queensland central agencies have been 
particularly responsive to the demands that the reform process has placed upon it. These 
responses have been characterised by strategies to maximise limited resources. Consequently, 




development of intergovernmental networks. As a consequence of the COAG reform process, 
intergovernmental relations in Queensland have become more coherent: Cabinet maintains clear 
oversight of COAG matters, the State strategic plan is gradually being aligned to national COAG 
indicators, there is a definite division of labour between the DPC and Treasury intergovernmental 
units, and central-line agency relations are supportive. 
 
Both central agencies have intergovernmental relations units, although Treasury’s contribution is 
mostly technical in nature. The number of FTE staff committed to intergovernmental relations in 
the DPC has remained at seven for the duration of the COAG Reform Agenda. The DPC unit 
comprises two directors: one mainly concerned with treaties, especially with the Papua New 
Guinea and the Torres Strait Islands, Forum of Federation type issues and the international 
environment; the other is primarily responsible for matters related to the COAG Reform Council, 
including accountability issues, performance monitoring and participation. Policy work on 
infrastructure, transport, and economic participation, taxation and vocational education and 
training is shared. However, we were told that ‘when it gets close to COAG meetings, we pretty 
much throw our organisational delineations out the window and we do whatever we need to do to 
get over the line’. 
 
In 2005-06, the National Reform Agenda was not yet a major priority for the Queensland DPC 
and Treasury. Of course, the NRA had only being signed off in February 2006 and, so, that is partly 
to be expected from one of the smaller States. Aside from identifying that intergovernmental 
relations was situated in the Policy Division of the DPC, there is very little in the annual report to 
suggest that it really mattered. The Treasury Office’s involvement in intergovernmental relations 
mostly concerned the IGA on the Reform of Commonwealth-State Financial Relations and 
membership on several COAG working groups.  
 
COAG enjoyed a higher profile across the two central agencies in 2006-07. In 2006, Ken Smith was 
appointed Director-General of the DPC, the Department was restructured, and greater mention 
was made of the work concerned with the NRA. Following the restructure, the DPC had four 
divisions: Future Directions Strategy; Trade and International Operations; Governance; and Policy. 
The intergovernmental relations unit remained in the Policy Division. The Treasury Office in 
Queensland Treasury was also engaged in the various COAG NRA working groups and reviewed the 
Productivity Commission’s modelling of the effect that the NRA would have on the Queensland 
economy.  
 
With the COAG Reform Agenda becoming a reality in late 2007, the new Prime Minister’s home 
State took up the challenge. In 2007-08, the DPC was responsible for coordinating across the 
whole-of-government Queensland’s involvement in the new COAG Reform Agenda. This entailed 
not only representation on COAG working groups, but also coordination of the Queensland 
government’s submission to the Garnaut Climate Change Review and its response to the COAG 
mental health plan. Like its counterparts in the other States, the Queensland Treasury was ‘heavily 
involved’ in the reform process in 2007-08. Although the Treasury Office led the department’s 
expanded COAG program, the Office of Economic and Statistical Research devoted considerable 
resources to the modelling of climate change policy. 
 
In 2008-09, both the DPC and the Treasury were immersed in the COAG Reform Agenda. The DPC 
Intergovernmental Relations Unit supported the Premier at four COAG meeting and two CAF 
meetings, and had a prominent role on most of the COAG working groups and sub-groups. While 




typically, they were joined by representatives from the DPC’s policy areas that were also actively 
involved. During this period, the Treasury Office analysed the effect that the Carbon Pollution 
Reduction Scheme and the renewable Energy Target would have upon the State’s government-
owned corporations, reviewed the State’s port network and developed a new governance 
framework, and coordinated the State’s activities in meeting its Seamless National Economy 
obligations. Meanwhile, the Office of Economic and Statistical Research and the Department of 
Communities formed the Indigenous Statistics Team to advise the government on indicators for the 
National Indigenous Reform Agreement and contribute data to the State’s Closing the Gap Report 
2007-08.  
 
Although there is a sense that 2009-10 was a period of ‘bedding down’, it is evident from the 
annual reports of both central agencies that the State’s involvement in the COAG Reform Agenda 
had not eased substantially. The DPC’s Intergovernmental Relations Unit was still fully engaged in 
coordinating development of numerous agreements and implementation plans, as well as 
supporting the Premier at COAG and CAF meetings. Across the Policy Division, the Economic Policy 
Unit was focussed on developing and coordinating the State’s climate change policy, the 
Environment and Resources Policy Unit led negotiations with the Commonwealth over the 
implementation of the Murray-Darling IGA, and the Social Policy Unit was engaged in COAG-related 
skills and education policy development. Likewise, the Treasury Office also continued to contribute 
strongly to the COAG reform process by overseeing policy work towards payroll tax harmonisation 
and standard business reporting, contributing to the Occupational Licensing National Law Bill and 
to the Heads of Treasuries (HOTs) review of national agreements, national partnerships and 
implementation plans. That the workload had eased a little is perhaps reflected in the Office of 
Economic and Statistical Research not being engaged in COAG-related work.  
 
5.1.6 Western Australia 
Since Federation, anti-Commonwealth sentiment has been a consistent, if not dominant, theme 
in popular political culture in Western Australia. Distrust of ‘Canberra’, distance from the ‘Eastern 
States’ and the good fortune to possess enormous mineral resources have engendered a great deal 
of parochialism among the general public and a defensive, reactive and fairly suspicious attitude to 
federal-state relations by its political leaders. The organisation of policy advice and operational 
activities reflected these attitudes, with WA having distinctive characteristics in its COAG and 
intergovernmental dealings: its Office of Federal Affairs was generally not situated within the policy 
division of the Department of Premier and Cabinet but in its public sector management division; 
also its Senior Official was not the department’s director general but rather the head of the Office 
of Federal Affairs. As frustration has mounted about the extent of VFI and Western Australia’s 
declining relative share of GST revenue, the COAG Reform Agenda has stimulated considerable 
activity within the Western Australian central agencies.  
 
For a State that had, for the most part, neglected COAG and high-level intergovernmental 
relations, the Western Australia Department of Premier and Cabinet reacted quite quickly to the 
apparent emergence of COAG as a major policy force from 2005-6. This can be seen in two 
initiatives. First, in May 2006, the Department brought the Office of Federal Affairs – which had 
been located within the public sector management section of DPC – under the purview of the 
Department’s Policy Division to establish the Intergovernmental Relations Unit with the objective 
of bringing a ‘whole-of-government perspective’ to intergovernmental relations. A new director 
who had been brought into the policy division in 2005 to work on intergovernmental relations was 




Until May 2006, policy advice to the Premier on the National Reform Agenda was mostly provided 
and coordinated by the Social Policy and Greenhouse Units within the Policy Division, while the 
Office of Federal Affairs had focused on cross-government coordination rather than active policy 
development work. Secondly, although it was not a driver of federal reform, the DPC 
acknowledged the ‘growing importance of COAG’ by establishing a ‘Canberra Office’ in February 
2006. Its brief was to ‘to promote the State’s interests and priorities in the national capital, and 
enhance understanding by State agencies and key local stakeholders of Commonwealth policies 
and initiatives’ (DPC 2006: 28). 
 
Within the Department of Treasury and Finance, COAG-related matters primarily fell within the 
purview of the Economic Area, along with the Revenue and Intergovernmental Relations Section. 
The latter is concerned primarily with the IGAFFR and dealings with the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission, with policy being distributed throughout the Treasury.  
 
In late 2007 through to early 2008, the intergovernmental relations unit of the DPC and the Policy 
Division, in general, received a considerable increase in resources. This gave the Department a 
stronger policy focus, especially in areas connected to the COAG Reform Agenda. Also, an 
Emissions Trading Unit was instituted to advise and contribute to the Commonwealth’s Green 
Paper for a National Emissions Trading Scheme. In its annual report, the DTF noted that it had 
‘invested considerable effort … in the COAG process’. 
 
The election of a Liberal Party minority government in Western Australia in September 2008 was 
soon followed by further significant organisational changes. Most importantly, the DPC was split 
with the former public sector management activities being hived off to become the new Public 
Sector Commission. DPC itself was restructured to emphasise ‘public policy, strategic issues and 
planning’, and the Intergovernmental Relations Unit was retained and strengthened in the Cabinet 
and Policy Division. The effect of the new government and the increasing COAG Reform Agenda-
related workload was felt equally by the DTF, which at the same time was absorbing new functions 
in the form of the State Supply Commission, as well as Building Management and Works from the 
Department of Housing and Works. During the year, a Regulatory Gatekeeping Unit was established 
to review all new regulatory proposals and amendments to make sure that they are in the public 
interest. This unit also played an important role in COAG’s competition and regulation reforms, as 
WA was the deputy chair of the COAG working group for this function. 
 
As 2009-10 proceeded, Western Australia became more prepared to stand up to the 
Commonwealth in a very public way while still introducing technology to facilitate easier and 
perhaps more regular contact with other jurisdictions. DPC’s Cabinet and Policy Division, along 
with the Treasury, not only engaged in the usual central agency roles of providing their ministers 
and chief executives with support at high level meetings, negotiating national partnership 
agreements and coordinating whole-of-government input into the COAG reform process, they also 
participated in the HOTs review of the IGAFFR to voice their strong concerns that Commonwealth 
line agencies were not respecting the spirit of the IGAFFR. Furthermore, they supported the 
government in its refusal to sign the National Health and Hospitals Network Agreement at the 
COAG meeting in April 2010. This was followed soon afterwards by strong criticism (and 
accompanying policy analysis) of the proposed resource super profits tax. At the same time, the 
DPC introduced a new telepresence facility that ministers and officials can use to ‘attend’ 





5.2 Training and recruitment 
5.2.1 Staff retention 
Within a year of Prime Minister Rudd chairing his first COAG meeting, stories of long hours and 
burnout emanated from central agencies around the country. The timeframes established at 
COAG – essentially by the Commonwealth – saw an initial ‘cranking up’ period of about six months 
followed by eighteen months of intense policy work. Federalism and intergovernmental relations 
had rarely, if ever, been so high on government agenda. If central agency officials were not 
attending meetings of the COAG working groups and sub-groups, Senior Officials Meetings and 
Heads of Treasuries meetings and negotiating the new federal financial framework, the national 
SPP agreements and the first wave of national partnership agreements, then they were developing 
policy proposals or reviewing proposals from other jurisdictions – often in collaboration with line 
agency officials. 
 
Our discussions with officials reveal that stories of burnout and high staff turnover were not 
entirely due to the pressures associated with the COAG Reform Agenda. For example, while 
senior officials in the Commonwealth DPMC attributed the difficulty in retaining staff in part to 
COAG work being not only ‘rewarding’, but also ‘demanding, high pressure work’ and ‘draining’, it 
was also explained that the DPMC is regarded as a ‘training ground’ for officers, who will return to 
the line agencies. Therefore staff turnover is expected. 
 
Burnout was an issue in State premiers’ departments; again however, it was not entirely COAG-
induced. For example, an official from Victoria’s National Reform Branch observed that the periods 
immediately preceding and during COAG-related meetings are very hectic and, so, there is ‘a bit of 
a burn-out problem’. However, the average duration of employment across the DPC is 
approximately two years because its people are valued elsewhere. The same official recognised 
that there is a need to ‘stabilise people’ and suggested that  
perhaps the National Reform Branch is not as good as it should be at tapping into the 
existing expertise across the DPC - a lot of people have moved on, but retain tacit 
knowledge of intergovernmental relations that could be drawn upon. 
 
The Queensland and Western Australian Departments of Premier and Cabinet also found that staff 
turnover was due to the attraction of staff with intergovernmental knowledge and experience, 
rather than burnout. Staff from the Western Australian DPC have not only moved across to the 
State’s line agencies, but have also relocated to Commonwealth and other State central agencies. 
Similarly, in Queensland, all the directors involved in the COAG process in 2007-08 are still 
involved. They were ‘intimately involved’ in the negotiations over the various agreements and 
knew the agreements ‘inside-out’ and ‘some of the challenges going forward’ and, so, they are 
‘uniquely placed to understand the complexities of these issues’. Consequently, they have been 
able to ‘grasp opportunities’ that have arisen in the line agencies to implement the various 
agreements.  
A lot of the agencies do not have the opportunity of sitting at the table and listening to 
the discussions and understanding where the Commonwealth is coming from and, 
indeed, when the Commonwealth line agency is pushing a different agenda to be able 
to have the confidence to say ‘well, no, this is not what COAG agreed to – COAG agreed 
to this, your Prime Minister agreed to this, go away, this isn’t what we agreed to’.   
 




significant nor perceived as a problem. The officials we interviewed within the Commonwealth 
Treasury did not find this particularly surprising because many senior personnel have long 
established careers within the organisation. To prevent burnout, such as might occur during the 
COAG reform process, the Treasury rotates its people every two to three years. However, it was 
brought to our attention that lately the internal job market within the Treasury has become more 
‘problematic’ because the reform period was perceived as ‘sexier’ than the implementation phase, 
and therefore attracting people into IGR and COAG units was more difficult. 
 
The State treasuries are also characterised by a number of long-serving officials, especially in the 
area of intergovernmental relations. This is just as well because, as a Queensland official pointed 
out, these people would not be easily replaced, as the requisite knowledge needs to be grounded 
in real world experience and cannot be taught.  
 
5.2.2 Staff development 
With intergovernmental relations personnel moving on due to burnout and opportunities 
elsewhere, central agencies have needed to replenish their stocks. It is universally accepted that 
intergovernmental relations is best learnt on-the-job. Some limited training is provided for officials 
in the Commonwealth and Queensland central agencies; however, even in these jurisdictions, 
training is considered supplementary. Significantly, great store is placed in introducing graduates to 
intergovernmental relations early in their careers through rotations and on-the-job placements.    
 
Intergovernmental Relations Training 
The Commonwealth DPMC and Treasury have actively recruited or trained staff to improve 
capacity. As few people across the service specialise in intergovernmental relations, a variety of 
educational strategies are being employed and explored to fast-track understanding of 
intergovernmental relations and the COAG Reform Agenda. All new Senior Executive Service staff 
are required to be briefed by the head of the COAG Unit. Every quarter, he addresses about forty 
to fifty people on the current situation in Commonwealth-State relations. Currently, the 
Department is exploring possible training and implementation networks – these do not yet 
formally involve the States; however, there were plans to contact them regarding possible 
arrangements. The view of senior officials is that if there are training gaps, then the Department 
will look to establish appropriate courses.  
 
To improve intergovernmental relations capacity within the Queensland central agencies, 
existing staff have received specialised training.  Two all-staff forums have been held, with 120 
people attending each. Staff from the DPC and DTF Intergovernmental Relations Units explained 
both the new federal framework and the intent underlying the framework, as well as some of the 
challenges that lay ahead. Subsequently, a number of discussions were held with directors-general 
of each of the departments, as were forums for deputy directors-general. Workshops are held 
every six-twelve months, where ten to twenty people involved in intergovernmental relations are 
invited along to share their understanding and experiences with other people who are struggling 
with similar issues, and to discuss strategies that may be working in different policy areas.  
 
Recruitment 
Within the DPMC, the head of the COAG Unit is the only Commonwealth-State specialist and 
training is generally on-the-job. People are rotated through the COAG Unit for two to three COAG 
meetings and then return to their policy area position. Hence, the work of the COAG Unit is 




necessary, it draws on specialist expertise from within the Department. Some senior officials have 
private sector backgrounds; others have experience in both State and Commonwealth agencies. 
 
The Commonwealth Treasury has recruited staff from within the Treasury, some through normal 
Treasury recruitment, and in a specialist recruitment round. It has not specifically targeted State 
employees, as these people tend to specialise in the Commonwealth-State area for a considerable 
length of time and remain in their home States. Hence, the State treasury departments have more 
institutional, corporate knowledge. Nevertheless, the policy work of the Commonwealth Treasury 
has expanded and so has its need for additional staff. The initial focus was on payment systems, 
that is, officers who possessed finance and accounting skills. The focus has now shifted to general 
policy skills.  
 
The Victorian DPC has, at times, chosen a different strategy and looked to the private sector for 
new ideas. In the recent past, the National Reform Branch included a number of people whom 
were drawn from private consultancies and were unambiguously policy practitioners. They brought 
with them bespoke techniques that they were apply to apply to the problems at hand. Today, the 
National Reform Branch comprises permanent staff; the exception being when a specialist team 
needs to be established. For example, when negotiating the Health Agreement in July / August 
2009, they seconded personnel from the Health Department. However, the National Reform 
Branch does not have a secondment process through which knowledge about intergovernmental 
relations can be disseminated across the DPC and the rest of the public service. Furthermore, there 
does not appear to be a generalist / specialist divide, rather the view is held that ‘there is an 
institutional memory that is transmitted to people when they arrive’.  
 
Typically, central agencies recruit a range of policy generalists, policy specialists and graduates to 
bolster the capacity of their intergovernmental relations units / federal policy branches. In the 
New South Wales DPC, generalist staff – especially junior officers – are trained on-the-job. They 
attend in-house and COAG working group meetings and extend their knowledge and skills by 
preparing briefs for COAG meetings and working with more experienced colleagues. On occasion, 
the Department utilises secondments from line agencies – for example, for the COAG meeting to 
formalise the National Health and Hospitals Network Agreement – who possess particular 
technical skills and expertise. Otherwise, the Department tends to opt for generalist staff. Likewise 
the COAG Team within the New South Wales OFM drew upon staff from within Treasury, some of 
whom had related expertise in competition policy and business regulation policy, while others 
were generalists.  
 
In the main, the Victorian DTF recruits generalist economists and accountants depending upon 
the skills set required. Areas concerned with the Commonwealth Grants Commissions require 
people with a more quantitative background, while other areas are seen as requiring generalists – 
not necessarily economics graduates – who possess sound analytical skills. The Department’s 
graduate recruitment program is designed to provide graduates with an overview of the Victorian 
public service. Each year, the DTF has four graduates, with no more than two based in the 
Department. The objective is to ensure that they find out how line agencies work with central 
agencies and build up their networks in that first year. Networks are regarded as essential to 
Treasury officials because they lack the depth of understanding possessed by line agency officials. 
Graduates are also introduced to COAG work. 
 
The stocks have been replenished in Western Australia’s  central agencies, so to speak, by taking 




offered in intergovernmental relations and people are expected to learn on-the-job. Occasionally, 
policy specialists sometimes bring with them some experience in intergovernmental relations in 
addition to their policy knowledge. As part of their rotation, the DPC’s graduate officers spend time 
in the Intergovernmental Relations Unit. Some later return to join the Unit as junior (level 4) 
officers.  
 
The South Australian DPC has not just sought generalists, but also those with a substantial 
understanding of policy content that can be then applied within the Department. Credibility, as 
one officer explained,  
comes from your capacity to (a) understand the policy content (b) to have the credibility 
through relationships with Canberra and with other States … Translating your personal 
knowledge into a central agency environment … And, that means credibility back with 
the line agency … So that when you're developing a State policy position in Health or 
Education, people in those agencies value your contribution because you straddle the 
divide between the line agencies at State and Commonwealth level … You know what 
you're talking about. 
 
To develop the appropriate personnel, the DPC has a secondment arrangement with the South 
Australian line agencies. The line agencies pay people to spend time in the DPC, where they are 
admitted to both the policy and intergovernmental relations areas. Each agency has an obligation 
to have at least one person in the DPC. The larger line agencies, for example, the Department of 
Education and Children’s Services and SA Health, provide two officers. At the same time, the DPC 
has the right of veto. Although agencies lose good people for a period of twelve months, they gain 
invaluable experience and this is recognised by the line agencies. However, ‘it is an open question 
as to whether the transaction costs associated with getting the right person here is worth the 
benefit of rotation’. In addition to the secondment program, vacancies arise every six months and 
the National Reform branch picks up people from the policy branches.  
 
5.3 Coherence of the central agencies 
5.3.1 Cabinet oversight 
Cabinet oversight of federal matters – be it directly concerned with COAG meetings, COAG 
working groups, COAG Reform Council reports or ministerial councils – is generally more regular 
and focussed than it was before the implementation of the COAG Reform Agenda. However, the 
frameworks and mechanisms established to formalise oversight processes vary considerably both 
in form and in the degree to which they are integrated into the broader framework of government.   
 
Within the Commonwealth, intergovernmental agreements and the like have certainly come 
under greater scrutiny. Under John Howard’s prime ministership, the COAG Unit prepared an 
omnibus submission to Cabinet. Under the Labor regime, the Prime Ministers have signed off on 
national agreements and partnerships after they have passed through the regular cabinet process, 
with the DPMC and the Treasury involved as and when required. Treasury officials also noted that 
with their Minister’s formal participation in COAG, there has been increased briefing note activity. 
 
Of the States, South Australia has established the most systematic oversight framework. The 
whole-of-government Integrated Reporting and Evaluation Framework has three main functions:  
1.  To monitor outcomes related to IGAFFR commitments at a State level;  




3.  To develop a whole of government view of policy priorities that can be fed into the 
budget process. 
 
The Executive Committee of Cabinet (ExComm), which is chaired by the Premier, has overall 
responsibility for the framework. It is here that strategic conversations takes place about 
intergovernmental relations issues, such as health reform, and the positions of the other 
jurisdictions and whom South Australia should be aligning with. 
 
Full meetings of Cabinet tend to be more ‘transactional’. Pre-COAG Cabinet submissions are 
followed by post-COAG submissions, the implementation plans attached to national agreements 
have to be signed off by Cabinet and all ministers are required to put in a Cabinet note that they 
plan to attend particular ministerial councils meetings. Officials are also asked to ‘brief-up’ through 
the Interdepartmental Committee. ExComm is assisted by a group of Chief Executives, who 
comprise the COAG Implementation Reporting and Evaluation Group (CIREG).  
 
Central agency oversight of ministerial involvement in ministerial councils has been incorporated 
into the Integrated Reporting and Evaluation Framework. Ministers are required to inform the 
Executive Committee of Cabinet in writing that they will be attending ministerial councils.  
 
While Cabinet provides the oversight, CIREG does the performance analysis along with policy 
reference groups that are set up for each of the key national partnership agreements. CIREG is 
the State body responsible to ExComm (and ultimately Cabinet) for governance and oversight of 
South Australia’s implementation of the IGAFFR. It monitors and reviews current programs to meet 
South Australia’s obligations in national agreements and national partnerships. The Group also 
develops policy priorities based on this work and on related information about South Australia’s 
progress against SASP targets. CIREG then feeds this information through ExComm into the annual 
State budget process. At the request of ExComm, CIREG also oversees and approves the State’s 
position in negotiations that might lead to new national partnerships, national agreements or 
memoranda of understanding with the Commonwealth under COAG.  
 
In turn, CIREG obtains advice and information from cross-agency Policy Reference Groups (PRGs). 
The primary function of the PRGs is to advise lead agencies on the development of integrated 
implementation plans. These plans are ‘integrated’ because they take account of supporting 
national partnerships to the extent that those latter agreements support achievement of the 
outcomes, outputs and measures in the national agreements. They are also integrated in the sense 
that, where appropriate, they refer to corresponding SASP targets or key performance indicators. 
There are eight policy references groups operating – one for each of the national agreement areas, 
one for the National Partnership on the Seamless National Economy, and one for the national early 
childhood development reform agenda. The various memberships comprise officials from the DPC, 
DTF and relevant line agencies.  
 
An ongoing function of PRGs is to undertake, at the request of CIREG, periodic reviews of the 
effectiveness of specific policies and programs in delivering IGAFFR outcomes. Policy reference 
groups also advise lead agencies on the development of reports to Cabinet (by notes or 
submissions are required) about the data provided to the COAG Reform Council and the 
implications to the State.  
 
Policy reference groups can also make recommendations to CIREG, which can then be sent to 




one official explained, sometimes the ‘Commonwealth slips them in pretty damn quickly and 
makes them up - I mean, how many NPs can you have? CIREG doesn't have to look at them; CIREG 
is more about the implementation. We try to give best advice to the Premier, but we don't want to 
block his room to manoeuvre at COAG’. 
 




































































Despite the importance of COAG reporting, the critical driver of the Integrated Reporting and 
Evaluation Framework is the South Australian budget cycle. Where appropriate, ExComm 
provides advice based on CIREG’s work to the Expenditure Review and Budget Cabinet Committee 
to inform policy and budget setting processes. CIREG oversees preparation of a section to be 
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included in the Cabinet submission seeking approval of the budget. The section will advise Cabinet 
of the implications of the proposed budget for the State in relation to the achievement of IGAFFR 
and related SASP targets. 
 
Cabinet oversight of COAG matters has also become more focussed in the other State 
jurisdictions, albeit somewhat less systematic than in South Australia.  
 
Throughout their tenure, the Bracks and Brumby Cabinets in Victoria retained regular and formal 
oversight of COAG matters. The Cabinet essentially established the overall policy position. The 
National Reform Branch of the DPC was concerned with developing an overarching strategy to 
achieve that policy. This included identifying the issues on which to challenge the Commonwealth 
and the negotiating strategies that would be employed. Usually, this involved resisting what is seen 
by Victorian officials as policy encroachment by the Commonwealth and retaining Victoria’s policy 
autonomy. A week prior to COAG meetings, the National Reform Branch made a submission to the 
Policy and Strategy Committee of Cabinet to establish and agree upon Victoria’s negotiating 
positions. However, these positions were not fixed, as unexpected events might unfold at COAG 
and documents may arrive late from the Commonwealth. In such cases, Cabinet delegated 
authority to the Premier to make an executive decision. Even then, an issue received considerable 
oversight.   
 
Central agency oversight of ministerial activity at ministerial councils was recognised as 
important, but constrained by matters of governance and resources. ‘Ten years ago [oversight of 
ministers at ministerial councils] was fairly loose’. Certainly, Victoria has not run a cabinet office 
anywhere near as centralised as the one described by Davis in mid-1990s Queensland. Today, it 
depends greatly upon ministers - ‘what needs to get to Cabinet, gets to Cabinet’. We were 
informed that the DPC does not assign responsibility for recording the outcomes of ministerial 
council meetings, and nor does it regularly report to Cabinet about what is happening in individual 
ministerial councils and the agenda for forthcoming meetings. Instead, the DPC employs a 
‘distributed model’ in which the relevant policy branch of DPC ‘shadows’ a line department and 
observes what is happening in the relevant ministerial councils. 
 
Despite these efforts, officials expressed concern that the State became committed to ‘things’ 
without it having first gone through a cabinet process. There was no reporting requirement to 
cabinet about recent ministerial meetings. The view was also expressed that Victoria was spread 
thinly across the ministerial councils and ministers are always at risk of being ‘rolled’ by their 
Commonwealth counterparts.  
 
The Western Australian Cabinet maintains regular oversight of COAG matters via an omnibus 
submission presented to Cabinet by the Department of Premier and Cabinet prior to each 
Cabinet meeting. This submission is prepared in direct consultation with the Department of 
Treasury and Finance. Line agencies are sometimes consulted on specific items pertaining to their 
policy areas. Occasionally, big items, such as the National Health and Hospital Networks 
Agreement, are presented in a single submission. In such cases, the line agency may take 
responsibility for preparing the submission; however, it will still pass through the central agencies 
for consideration.   
 
Like Victoria, Western Australia has acknowledged the importance of ministerial councils and 
also the limited resources that it can commit to participating. In April 2010, the Premier released 




Given the expense and time involved in travelling ‘east’, ministers were strongly encouraged to 
utilise telepresence facilities. They were also informed that agendas needed to be submitted to the 
Deputy Director General - Policy Coordination in the DPC a fortnight prior to meetings and that the 
outcomes be reported no later than a fortnight after the meeting.  
 
During the tenure of the New South Wales Labor Government, COAG issues regularly went to the 
full Cabinet and to the Budget committee, which dealt with reward payments and milestones. 
Where timeliness of Commonwealth agendas was an issue, i.e., they arrived too late for full 
Cabinet to consider, the most recent draft was used. Normally, the Premier had a ‘rider’ – with 
certain parameters – for the final negotiations, if required. National agreements and national 
partnerships were signed off by the Premier. Implementation plans, which are subordinate to 
others, had to first be cleared through the Treasury and the DPC before they could be signed off by 
the responsible minister.  
 
A memorandum circulated by the New South Wales Premier in September 2009 also highlighted 
central agency oversight of ministerial involvement in ministerial councils. Ministers were 
instructed to forward agendas, relevant papers and briefing notes to the Director General of the 
DPC upon receipt and outcomes ‘at the earliest opportunity’. Relatedly, ministers were directed to 
advice the DPC of agenda items or papers they proposed to submit to a ministerial council. 
Ministers were also required to receive cabinet approval before agreeing to ‘substantive change’ to 
policy and to refuse to consider matters, if they had not been given sufficient notice.  
 
The oversight arrangements established by the Queensland Cabinet are designed to achieve a 
practical mix of accountability and flexibility. Prior to each COAG meeting, Cabinet receives the 
COAG papers and the items that will be considered. These come with comments and initial 
thoughts from the DPC. The Premier then receives from Cabinet approval to do what needs to be 
done at the negotiating table to get the best outcome for Queensland and ‘if that means trading 
off one priority for a greater priority, then so be it’. Finally, there is usually a ‘verbal briefing’ after 
the meeting.  
 
All national agreements are signed off by the Premier. If national partnership agreements will 
change Queensland government policy, present financial risks / exposure or are characterised by a 
high level of political sensitivity, then they are required to go to Cabinet for consideration. 
Conversely, if they are consistent with Queensland government policy and do not place financial 
commitments upon the State, then the DPC will consult with the line agency involved in the 
development of the national partnership agreement and, usually, encourage the agency to get its 
minister to write a letter to the Premier informing her that she is about to be asked to sign this 
agreement and that the minister ‘absolutely supports’ the signing. A copy of the letter from the 
Minister is then sent to the Premier, along with a briefing note stating that there has been 
consultation between the central and line agencies and that she should feel free to sign the 
attached copy of the national partnership agreement.  
 
5.3.2 Divisions of labour 
Within central agencies 
The divisions of labour within the individual central agencies reflect both the formal 
organisational structures and the practical realities in which the agencies operate. Formally, the 
intergovernmental relations units in first ministers departments tend to be situated in policy 




in Western Australia. Their role within this structure is essentially one of policy coordination; it may 
also be strategic, as least in respect to COAG matters. This is the case in the Victoria DPC, where 
the policy substance comes from the line areas under the Policy and Cabinet Group and the 
National Reform Area provides the coordination. 
 
More often, however, there is overlap, with the intergovernmental relations units occasionally 
engaging in policy development and the policy units liaising directly with their line agency 
counterparts. It depends upon where the expertise lies within the agency, the number of staff 
available and the demands placed upon the agency. For example, while there exist within each of 
the Queensland central agencies a formal division of labour between those units concerned with 
the coordination of intergovernmental relations and the various policy units, they are prepared to 
accommodate one another or contribute to some ‘heavy lifting’, if practicable. We were informed 
that this organisational arrangement depends heavily upon the relationships enjoyed between 
each of the groups. The size of each of the groups has remained fairly stable over the past few 
years, and so there is an inherent interdependency built into the system. This arrangement, which 
the DPC finds satisfactory, does not rely upon virtual groups, such as those that have been 
occasionally established in other jurisdictions.  
 
Likewise, in the Western Australian DPC, cooperation between different sections is essential to 
coordinate overlap between State and national policy making. For example, ‘disabilities’ is 
strategically linked to the government’s platform for improved non-government / not-for-profit 
service delivery, which includes service delivery to people with disabilities. This work is being led 
by the DPC’s strategic issues section. At the same time, the Intergovernmental Relations Unit is 
involved with the National Disability Strategy and the National Disability Agreement. Hence, the 
two sections sometimes have to collaborate to coordinate a consistent strategic response.   
 
The importance of internal collaboration and close communication has also been recognised 
within the New South Wales OFM.  The division of labour in the OFM between the health team in 
the Human and Social Services Directorate and the COAG Team in the Fiscal and Economic 
Directorate relies heavily on the personalities of the people involved. A good relationship means 
they are not too rigid about everything having to pass through the COAG team. For example, the 
health team reported directly to their deputy secretary and came to the COAG team when they 
needed advice, notably on the IGAFFR.  
 
Within the OFM, internal communications is the responsibility of the COAG team. A formal 
fortnightly meeting is held with the human and social reference group and a monthly meeting with 
the transport and competition reference group to ‘touch base’ on all matters concerned with 
COAG. While there are informal emails and telephone calls between officials, these formal 
meetings are regarded as a disciplining mechanism. Even if there are other governance issues 
happening, the meeting still takes place.  
 
Between central agencies 
The division of labour between the first minister’s departments and treasuries is essentially 
functional – policy formulation and coordination rests with the leaders’ departments, while the 
treasuries focus on policy evaluation, budgetary considerations and intergovernmental finance. 
However, all the central agencies were characterised by considerable cooperation. 
 
In our interviews with senior Commonwealth officials, it was evident that relations between the 




process are close. The former, representing the head of Cabinet, retains primacy; however, the 
Treasury is increasingly taking an equal or near equal role in various matters. The Department of 
Finance and Deregulation (DFD) has played only a minor role. This division of labour is evidenced 
by the following examples:  
 
• In December 2007, seven COAG Working Groups were formed. The Commonwealth 
deliberately intended each Group to comprise a Commonwealth minister as Chair, and 
senior representatives from the DPMC and the Treasury. The Department of Finance and 
Deregulation was only involved in the Business Regulation and Competition Working Group. 
After Easter 2008, it took over the secretariat for that working group from the DPMC. This 
was its only involvement in COAG-related matters apart from its minister’s membership of 
the Strategic Priorities and Budget Committee of Cabinet, that is, the so-called, ‘Gang of 
Four’. 
 
• In 2008, senior people from the DPMC and the Treasury formed the Commonwealth 
Coordinating Group and met monthly. At this time, officials in the DPMC reviewed their 
work with their central agency colleagues. It was later reinstituted as a coordinating group 
among senior executives.  
 
• Every time a new agreement is conceived, the Treasury and the DPMC work together. While 
national partnerships are normally initiated by line agencies, the Treasury has circulated a 
template for developing national partnerships, which was developed in collaboration with 
the DPMC and the States. 
 
• The IGAFFR was a joint product of the DPMC (the COAG Unit was heavily involved) and the 
Treasury, signed off by the Ministerial Council for Commonwealth-State Financial Relations 
prior to the March 2008 meeting of COAG, and finally negotiated by the Heads of Treasury.  
 
Nevertheless, tensions can exist between the Commonwealth central agencies. For example, the 
Treasury was given the responsibility of developing the guidelines for national partnerships to be 
distributed among the Commonwealth line agencies. We were told that it took so long that DPMC 
took it over (and produced quite a reasonably neat product - it was remarked). We were also 
informed that there has been some ‘resistance’ to the involvement of Treasuries in the COAG 
reform process. While the Treasury has new responsibilities, the DPMC has been reluctant to let go 
and let them deliver. A senior Treasury official from one of the larger States also commented upon 
the apparent reluctance of the Commonwealth Treasury to stand up to the DPMC regarding the 
IGAFFR principles. This struck the official as odd given that the Treasurer and the Secretary are 
both powerful players in their field. 
 
Although a functional division of labour is clearly evident between central agencies in  each of 
the States, officials from all agencies were at pains to emphasise the close working relationships 
they share with their colleagues in ‘the other’ agency. In Victoria, the DTF handles the money, 
taxation and financial modelling, while the DPC negotiates with the Commonwealth on behalf of 
the line departments because the national agreements are between the Premier and the Prime 
Minister. When the South Australia Treasurer was invited to attend COAG, the DPC and DTF worked 
‘hand-in-hand’ to ensure that the Premier and the Treasurer received the same set of briefs, with 
no competing or contradictory advice. In NSW, the National Reform Branch (DPC) and the Central 




through email. In doing so, ‘policy people talk to policy people’.  
 
The cases of Queensland and Western Australia provide insight into the organisational strategies 
employed by central agencies in the middling jurisdictions to compensate for the lack of 
resources. In Queensland, the division of labour that characterised the participation of the 
Queensland central agencies in the initial COAG working groups was overwhelming weighted 
towards the DPC to maximise the use of resources. Sending several representatives to make the 
same argument for Queensland was considered inefficient and pointless. It made more sense to 
achieve agreed State positions prior to meetings, and send in a representative from a central 
agency and one from the responsible line agency. Hence, the DPC was represented on all of the 
working groups except Housing, while the DTF was only represented on the Housing and the 
Business Regulation and Competition Working Groups. In health reform, the two central agencies 
worked ‘very much side-by-side’ because it constitutes one of the State’s biggest financial risks. 
 
The functional division of labour between the Western Australian central agencies is also 
qualified by the need to balance the workload between the central agencies. Usually, the DPC 
coordinates work around COAG, SOMs and CAF, monitors the ‘big picture’ and is engaged in policy 
development, while the DTF coordinates work concerned with HOTs, the budget, and ensuring 
policy effectiveness. However, the CRC process is divided between the two central agencies. After 
the Steering Committee for the Review of Governments Service Provision has drafted the primary 
data report, it is sent to the States for verification before being sent to the CRC. Largely because of 
workload issues, the DPC has an agreement with the Department of Treasury to handle the initial 
dissemination of data for verification purposes to the line agencies, receive and collate their 
responses and return the State’s response to the Productivity Commission. Once the CRC has 
drafted its report, it is sent to the DPC. The DPC then sends it to the line agencies and coordinates 
Western Australia’s input. In other words, the Treasury looks after the first stage and the DPC 
attends to the final stage.  
 
Between central agencies and the line agencies 
The COAG reform agenda has had a significant effect upon the coordination and balance of 
relations between the central and line agencies. Within the Commonwealth, the view among 
those officers we interviewed was that there has been a deliberate shift from reactive to 
proactive management of intergovernmental relations, better forward planning pipelines and 
work plans, and general agreement on strategic and policy objectives.  
 
• The DPMC COAG Unit, which has worked closely with the Treasury, has been expanded to 
coordinate COAG meetings, Senior Officials Meetings and created the Deputy Senior Officials 
Meeting to disseminate information across the entire service. The Department Secretary also 
chaired meetings of the Commonwealth Secretaries to ensure everyone was ‘on the same 
page’.  
 
• In addition, there were meetings of the Commonwealth COAG Integration Group (CIG), 
which comprises Commonwealth–State people from central and line agencies. If a new 
agreement is due or planned, the CIG meets beforehand to conduct training to ensure 
everyone understands the reform logic, identify appropriate measures, distinguish leading 
indicators if measures are not yet available, and make certain that the reporting 
requirements are fair and reasonable.  
 




comprised the line agency heads of the various COAG working group areas, and their 
DPMC and Treasury counterparts – which met regularly to review the reform process. As 
the secretariats of the COAG working groups mostly comprised line agency people more 
familiar with coordination and process than with policy substance, the policy ‘grind’ was 
overseen by the troikas. The DPMC was generally regarded as ‘strong’ in health reform and 
business regulation reform, the Treasury in education and indigenous affairs, and the line 
agencies in infrastructure and housing.  
 
• Similarly, health reform was driven from the centre with the involvement of the 
Commonwealth Department of Health and Ageing (DOHA). A special taskforce was created 
within DPMC, with twelve or thirteen FTE personnel from DPMC, the Treasury, DFD and 
DOHA working on it. This can be contrasted against the 1990 federal reforms, which were 
shared around the States and the Commonwealth. For example, New South Wales drove 
regulatory reform and Western Australia chaired the energy reform working group, which 
was serviced by the New South Wales Electricity Commission. 
 
The political and contractual complexity of the new federal financial arrangements has resulted 
in State central agencies taking the lead on COAG-policy development and negotiations with the 
Commonwealth, albeit in consort with the line agencies.   
 
• In New South Wales, the central agencies have become the focal point because of their 
greater experience in negotiating agreements with the Commonwealth. Some agencies are 
unaware of the support that could have been provided to them during negotiations and that 
they need not have signed off on everything put before them. In the case of the smaller 
national partnerships, agencies may assign these to specific units who will only ever have 
experience in negotiating this particular agreement. An official suggested that a Premier’s 
Memorandum may be overdue instructing line agencies in the ‘do’s and don’ts’ and to 
contact the central agencies if they have difficulties negotiating reporting requirements 
(‘burden’) – financial details have to be approved by both of the central agencies.  
 
Central agency officials explained that, as a consequence of the COAG Reform Agenda, there 
had been considerably more interdepartmental meetings to coordinate relations between 
central agencies and line agencies. For example, a working committee comprising officials 
from the DPC, OFM and the NSW Department of Health meets weekly to oversee the 
implementation of the State’s COAG commitments in the area of health policy. This group 
informs a steering committee of directors-general, which meets every two to three months. 
Similar high-level meetings are held regularly to discuss matters concerning infrastructure, 
business regulation and competition. Hence, there is a real effort made to get ‘common 
briefs’ for DPC, Treasury and the relevant line agencies. Although there are not as many 
meetings as when the national agreements and early national partnership agreements were 
being negotiated, there continue to be a large number.  
 
• In South Australia, various procedures and mechanisms have been instituted to facilitate the 
work of line agencies in intergovernmental relations. For example, the DPC has prepared – in 
collaboration with CIREG, the PRGs and the DTF – a best practice guide for agencies 
explaining how to prepare national partnership agreements. Cross agency evaluation 
workshops have also been held focussing upon what good evaluation should consider and 
that has flowed through to evaluation principles that are being drafted for the States. In this 




influence outcomes at COAG and protect its interests. 
  
• In Queensland, the central agencies have dominated the State’s negotiations over national 
SPPs and national partnerships. This is largely due to the Commonwealth wanting to 
negotiate directly with representatives of central agencies. Nevertheless, officials with the 
Queensland central agencies were at pains to acknowledge the expertise of their colleagues 
in the line agencies and draw upon it whenever possible. Intergovernmental officials in the 
Queensland central agencies informed us that while there are more interdepartmental 
‘conversations’ concerned with COAG-related policy issues and implementation plans, there 
are not necessarily more formal meetings. Some of these conversations do take place in 
meetings. However, more often than not, they take place in emails and telephone calls 
between officials who simply want to ‘touch base’ with one another. If they have not met for 
a while, then someone will initiate a meeting to debrief on current issues and / or activities. 
They do not a have a forward agenda for such meetings. 
 
• Likewise, Western Australia’s central agencies have led that State’s negotiations with the 
Commonwealth. The DPC heads up coordination, but works closely with the Treasury. Line 
agency officials are brought in for their policy expertise when required. 
 
• The Victorian central agencies present a contradiction: on the one hand, they lead federal 
reform; on the other hand, they do not evidence the same level of coordination with the 
State’s line agencies. It should be noted that we are not suggesting that coordination is 
lacking or relations are poor. Officials pointed out to us that from early 2006 through to 2009, 
when all the modelling work was being done to prove the economic benefits of the NRA / 
COAG Reform Agenda, ‘there was heavy engagement with the line agencies’.  
 
Surprisingly, there is no formal or regular interdepartmental committee that informs and 
discusses the latest events at COAG or matters concerning the COAG Reform Agenda, rather 
such meetings are ad hoc. For example, following the April 2010 COAG meeting, the 
intergovernmental relations groups from the other agencies were invited by the DPC to 
discuss what happened and matters concerning the CRC reports and ministerial council 
developments. Senior officials in both the DPC and the DTF recognise this deficiency and the 
need to formalise a regular committee to discuss intergovernmental matters. 
 
Warhurst’s metaphorical characterisation of federal intergovernmental relations in terms of iron 
rods and gossamer threads appears much less germane, today, with central agencies and line 
agencies being more closely bound by jurisdictional, rather than agency, interests. The 
complexity of the federal reforms encapsulated by the COAG Reform Agenda encompasses the 
whole-of-government and, hence, a whole-of-government response. Both the first ministers’ 
departments and the respective treasuries possess greater policy capacity than they did in the 
1970s and 1980s and this has enabled them to engage, if not on an equal policy footing, at least 
with a greater understanding of the positions advocated by the line agencies.  
 
Certainly, the Commonwealth line agencies do not possess quite the degree of autonomy from 
central agency oversight that they once enjoyed. In accordance with the new IGAFFR, line 
agencies are shifting from being input controllers to outcome achievers – and this has required a 
significant cultural shift. The Commonwealth central agencies, too, have had to change their 
outlook away from inputs to focus upon outputs, outcomes and rewards, which means they now 




central agencies provide to Cabinet the strategic and political advice that supports the policy 
expertise and proposals of the line agencies. 
 
Their level of engagement depends upon how busy the central agencies are with other matters. 
Other than through the COAG Integration Group, the COAG Unit seldom deals with 
Commonwealth line agencies. Over in the Treasury, the Commonwealth–State Relations Division 
works one-on-one with the line agencies to discuss individual national agreements and national 
partnerships. However, while the Treasury’s Social Policy Division works with the line agencies, the 
latter provides the advice on national partnership payments.  
 
Likewise, State line agencies are no longer joined to their Commonwealth counterparts by ‘iron 
rods’, rather the IGAFFR has transformed the balance of power.  
 
• A Victorian Treasury official explained that, previously, intergovernmental relations for the 
DTF meant trying to have some influence over negotiations with the Commonwealth that 
were led through the line agencies. Relations between the DTF and the line agencies changed 
dramatically after the Prime Minister invited State and Territory treasurers to attend COAG 
meetings.  
With the stroke of a communiqué at the start of 2008, suddenly line agencies 
weren't in those conversations let alone leading them; … Treasurers were 
negotiating all of the SPPs and they were looking at the framework for all other 
agreements. So, it was a fundamental system break for how line agencies and 
central agencies had to deal with each other in order to deal with the 
Commonwealth.  
 
It was no longer an issue to get line agencies to communicate with the DTF – it effectively 
became mandatory. Nevertheless, from the perspective of the central agencies, relations 
across the whole-of-government have been cordial and interdependent. One senior official 
commented that, ‘from the beginning there was heavy engagement with the line agencies’. 
The policy areas of the DPC are heavily reliant upon their relationships with the line agencies, 
which possess the resources (including information) to respond to or counter 
Commonwealth positions, and to ensure that those engaged in intergovernmental 
negotiations are aware of their options. When a brief is prepared, it is expected to be 
consistent with the position of the line agency. Even later, during the ‘bedding down’ process 
when the DPC and DTF provided considerable input, there was still a ‘markedly strong 
engagement’ with the line agencies.  
 
• A central agency official from New South Wales felt that although some line ministers and 
their directors-general were concerned that they were losing influence and authority under 
the new regime, this fear was mostly unwarranted. Firstly, the official argued those 
departments with major national partnerships, i.e., Health, Education and Communities, 
Housing, Transport, and Family and Community Services, all have discrete intergovernmental 
relations sections with identifiable ‘IGR people’. Secondly, the COAG Reform Agenda has 
strengthened the strategic centre’s relations with the line agencies, especially in their 
struggles to meet the additional reporting requirements imposed by their Commonwealth 
counterparts. However, sometimes the interests of the OFM and the line agencies are not 
identical – line agencies have objectives and services that require funding, but are not always 
focused on the associated costs – and the OFM must assert itself at this formative stage or 





• The South Australian central agencies have endeavoured to encourage, rather than direct, 
line agencies. An official commented that while it is recognised that the line agencies have 
had to deal with numerous national partnerships - ‘it's hard to get some agencies to think 
above the grind’ – they are ‘encouraged’ to see the ‘opportunities’. Not surprisingly, they 
have found it is easier to get some agencies interested and involved in intergovernmental 
relations than others. Some agencies are even anticipating the direction of 
intergovernmental relations between the different levels of government. For example, the 
Department of Family and Communities anticipated the national reform to split aged care 
and disabilities, which had been signalled two or three years earlier, and reorganised itself as 
a department and how it viewed its clients. Now that the Commonwealth has itself 
undertaken this reorganisation ‘they're ahead of the curve [and] able to make [a] sensible 
contribution at the Commonwealth level … The feds are really interested in service delivery 
reform and, ultimately, service delivery reform finds expression at the State level’.  
 
• Queensland officials acknowledged the emergence of a ‘cadre’ of central agency officials 
experienced in intergovernmental relations; however, they questioned the amount of 
influence they possessed. ‘Very informed – yes; “influential” is a bit an overstatement’. From 
their perspective, information can be quite a powerful resource – one that colleagues in the 
line agencies can draw upon to help them understand how the ‘bits and pieces’ fit together. 
An example given was the need to understand how the review on ministerial councils relates 
to the other work of COAG and how it relates to the reforms being announced in the budget. 
This, we were told, requires a degree of collegiality. Line agencies regularly contact their 
central colleagues asking for strategic advice. In this sense, information is considered more as 
a resource, rather than as an ability to push items forward. Nonetheless, the central agencies 
recognise that the line agencies possess considerable expertise in their individual policy 
areas, and regularly draw from it. 
 
• Western Australia constitutes something of an outlier. Not only does there exist a cadre of 
intergovernmental relations specialists in the central agencies, but officials believe the State’s 
central agencies have always retained oversight of what they regard as an essentially joint 
partnership, although the degree of policy initiative and activity has increased within the DPC 
in recent years. In fact, Warhurst’s observation that in the late 1970s and early 1980s that 
intergovernmental power lay with the line agencies has not been the case in Western 
Australia in recent memory, if at all. (Keeping in mind, of course, that neither Warhust nor 
Painter studied intergovernmental relations in Western Australia as part of their comparative 
studies.) 
 
5.3.3 Alignment of State strategic plans with the COAG Reform Agenda 
The alignment of State strategic plans with the COAG Reform Agenda is not as significant as 
might be expected. On the contrary, the States have negotiated with the Commonwealth to 
incorporate into the national SPP agreements, national partnership agreements and 
implementation plans, targets and indicators that reflect those in the State strategic plans. In this 
respect, the State’s are retaining some degree of policy autonomy.  
 
Certainly, when the Victorian strategic plan, Growing Victoria Together, was launched in 2000 
(and refreshed in 2005), it was not designed with the federal reform agenda in mind. As one 




We weren't consciously trying to align it closely to where we were going with the 
National Reform Agenda, but it was undoubtedly broadly consistent. What is perhaps 
more important is that the thinking about Growing Victoria Together, which is 
outcomes-based thinking, was then translated into the NRA, which is: define the 
outcomes; define the key measures; and then hold people accountable against them. 
 
However, following the adoption by COAG of the NRA in 2007, efforts were made to align the 
performance reporting required through COAG and the various agreements with the State's own 
performance reporting. In the first instance, officials endeavoured to ‘marry up’ COAG 
implementation plans with the State strategic plan. The mechanism for this was to be the Public 
Finance and Accountability Act. It was intended to align the requirements of State performance 
reporting with national performance reporting and establish new outcome measurements 
consistent with those developed by COAG.  
 
Officials then advocated the adoption of Victorian integrated COAG strategies by government 
agencies. These are supposed to set out how COAG outcomes will be integrated into the overall 
plans of line agencies and encourage line agencies to think about and explain how they will meet 
the challenges / outcomes for which the Premier has signed up. In the respect, we were told that 
the Department of Education and Early Childhood Development has been at the forefront in 
responding to COAG outcomes, while other line agencies have treated COAG as more of an aside. 
The DTF has responded by trying to ‘encourage’ the line agencies to develop strategic plans that at 
least incorporate elements of the COAG Reform Agenda.  
 
Following its defeat, the Brumby Labor government’s final State strategic plan, Action for 
Victoria’s Future, was shelved. The implications for performance reporting for the central agencies 
and the rest of the Victorian public service remain unclear. 
 
The South Australia Strategic Plan (SASP) also predates the COAG Reform Agenda and is 
generally viewed by South Australian officials as having been more influential in the 
restructuring of the South Australian public service. The COAG Reform Agenda is viewed as one 
of several ‘organising devices’ employed by the State government. An official within the South 
Australia DPC described it, thus: ‘it is more about the intersection of three whole-of-government 
drivers of policy development: the SASP; the State reform agenda / policy framework (introduced 
in 2009), with its five big policy ideas and five enablers; and COAG’. The objective from the South 
Australian perspective, then, is to ensure a ‘virtuous connection’ between the various elements, 
focus upon the ‘interconnections’, look for ‘opportunities’ and be aware of ‘threats’. 
 
First released in March 2004, the targets and objectives of the SASP are intended to provide a 
whole-of-government perspective to the State’s strategic direction. Although not a statutory 
document, the current strategic plan is built upon extensive community engagement undertaken 
by a team of twenty-six people selected by the Premier, which was charged with including the 
views of South Australians in the updated strategic plan and making recommendations to the 
government about new targets. Principal governance for the implementation of SASP resides with 
ExComm. The SASP Audit Committee is responsible for providing advice and recommendations to 
ExComm about the ‘interpretation of targets, and on the appropriate indicators and data sources 
to use when measuring progress against the targets and/or the starting point, or baseline’, and for 
preparing two-yearly assessment reports. It is expected that Chief Executives will work towards 
achieving SASP targets and this is integrated into their performance assessment. They 




otherwise) in achieving targets and, through this Committee, are held accountable to Cabinet and 
the Premier. In this way, the central agencies retain their coherence and autonomy vis-a-vis the 
community.  
 
The development of the SASP is also regarded as integral to the State’s capacity to negotiate with 
the Commonwealth. Officials believe that the strength (or weakness) of South Australia's 
arguments when it came time to make input into the development of the various COAG indicators 
of the national agreements greatly reflected those areas where they had already engaged in 
serious analysis for the SASP.  
 
In some cases, they did not succeed in mirroring South Australian indicators with national 
indicators. For example, in one policy area, South Australia was collecting data on 15-19 year olds, 
when COAG agreed upon similar data but for 16-20 year olds. South Australia could not 
immediately change classes to suit, as the Strategic Plan is community driven and community 
approval is required (at least in spirit, if not legally). Consequently, South Australia is providing both 
sets of data for the respective reports. 
 
The New South Wales State strategic plan was initiated in November 2006 and its targets were  
mostly aspirational, rather than linked directly to COAG-related targets. However, some effort 
was been made to integrate COAG-related targets, especially those concerned with education 
policy and ‘closing the gap’ between indigenous and non-indigenous Australians, so as to minimise 
reporting requirements. Internally, this was not viewed or resented as the ‘COAG tail wagging the 
State Plan dog’. Rather, for the most part the State Plan was welcomed by the bureaucracy because 
it identified priorities and used a framework to measure progress – and was generally believed to 
be constructive. Furthermore, COAG targets were used in cases where it was considered most 
sensible; however, there were still plenty of NSW-specific targets not contained in national 
partnerships.  
 
The new Premier, Barry O’Farrell, released a new State strategic plan – NSW 2021: A Plan to 
Make NSW Number One – in September 2011. It is not dissimilar to its predecessor in that it 
integrates some COAG-related targets. Overall, however, it is a policy device focused on the State’s 
objectives, rather than COAG and national reporting. 
 
There is some evidence to suggest that the Queensland strategic plan, Toward Q2: Tomorrow’s 
Queensland, is being increasingly aligned with the COAG Reform Agenda policy objectives. 
Launched by the Queensland Premier in September 2008, it comprises a set of goals (‘ambitions’) 
and targets to be met by 2020. However, unlike some State strategic plans, these goals and targets 
were set by the government and based upon its vision for Queensland in 2020. The original 
document did not contain references to COAG, national agreements or national partnership, 
although there was a single reference to ‘reform agendas at both a state and national level’ (2008: 
7). 
 
The cornerstone of accountability under the State strategic plan were what were originally 
termed ‘agency agreements’ and have since become known as ‘target delivery plans’. Essentially, 
these documents set out agencies’ objectives under the strategic plan and explain how they will 
achieve these objectives. Lead agencies are assigned responsibility for specific targets. For 
example, in 2010-11, the Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation is 





Under this arrangement, the agreements / plans require Cabinet approval, while ministers and 
directors-general share responsibility for meeting the targets contained within the target 
delivery plans. Ministers are informed in writing by the Premier of her expectation that their 
departments will take deliberate action to achieve the targets. Similarly, the directors-general of 
the lead agencies have it written into their performance agreements that their departments will be 
progressing towards achieving the targets. The government has also made clear that policy 
programs attached to the strategic plan will take precedence in the distribution of funding.   
 
The government publishes annual reports setting out progress meeting the various targets and 
the plan for the next twelve months. To date, annual progress reports have been published for 
2008-09, 2009-10 and 2010-11. Significantly, the 2009-10 Annual Progress Report explicitly 
associated parts of the Queensland strategic plan to COAG Reform Agenda policy objectives 
(Queensland Government 2010: 20). For example, in response to the target that ‘All children will 
have access to a quality early childhood education so they are ready for school’, a chart is 
presented that   
shows the anticipated growth in enrolments needed to achieve the National 
Partnership Agreement on Early Childhood Education, the associated bilateral 
agreement and the Q2 target. 
 
Officials also explained that the program delivery office in the DPC is engaged in ongoing work 
concerned with performance reporting. The primary objective has been to achieve consistency of 
data for the performance indicators in the national agreements, in Q2 and in budgetary 
documents. It is expected that alignment in the language used to describe the indicators and the 
use of the same data sources will avoid multiple numbers for essentially the same indicator. To 
date, they are getting closer to achieving their objective. 
 
Western Australia does not have a strategic plan; however, it was made clear to us that 
whenever a new intergovernmental agreement or national partnership agreement is proposed, 
the central agencies – usually the DPC – refer back to State policy to check for compatibility. If 
the proposal does not align, then officials from the central agencies will endeavour to renegotiate 
the conflicting points.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
The COAG Reform Agenda has played a part in effecting change in the organisation and conduct 
of intergovernmental relations in Australia. More resources are being dedicated both formally to 
central agency intergovernmental relations units and informally to policy units, where people not 
previously involved in the reform process now find themselves undertaking COAG-related work. 
Consequently, there are closer working relations between the intergovernmental relations units 
and policy units in central agencies. Historically more significant are the apparently closer ties 
between State central agencies and line agencies, with the former seeing themselves taking on the 
role of educator and ‘big brother’ to the latter in their dealings with the Commonwealth.   
 
The COAG Reform Agenda has also played a part in effecting change in most of the central 
agencies. The central agencies in Victoria drove the introduction of the COAG Reform Agenda and 
used it to achieve policy reforms and goals and facilitate internal restructuring. In South Australia, 
the COAG Reform Agenda (along with the South Australia Strategic Plan) has stimulated a major 
restructuring of its whole-of-government dealings. Prior to the COAG Reform Agenda, the Western 




regard. The COAG Reform Agenda effectively forced the strategic centre to commit greater 
resources to intergovernmental relations and take seriously what was being agreed to at COAG. 
Despite the Queensland DPC administering the CAF Secretariat and the Queensland Premier 
chairing CAF in 2008-09, there has been commitment of increased resources to the COAG Reform 
Agenda in that state. The New South Wales central agencies were concerned with political turmoil 
for most of the period under review and not as focused on the COAG Reform Agenda as might be 
expected of the largest State. However, under new leadership and with a government of a different 
political hue from the Commonwealth, it is possible that New South Wales may wish to reassert 








The communiqué and comments that followed the COAG meeting held in December 2007 
conveyed a desire to achieve ‘real reform’ of Australian federalism and to cease the ‘blame game’. 
The COAG Reform Agenda not only comprised a reform program targeting health and ageing, 
housing, infrastructure, business regulation and competition, indigenous reform, climate change 
and water, and productivity, and a promise that Commonwealth-State financial arrangements 
would be overhauled, but also a commitment by the members to cooperate to achieve these 
reforms within a reasonable timeframe. Such an ambitious reform program would inevitably place 
pressures on the agencies of government responsible for intergovernmental relations, and in 
particular central agencies. Hence, in the first chapter, we asked: To what extent and in what ways 
has the COAG Reform Agenda impinged upon the conduct of intergovernmental relations by State 
and Commonwealth central agencies? And, how has the COAG Reform Agenda impacted on the 
broader operations of the central agencies? 
 
In this final chapter, we summarise and reflect upon our findings. We contend that while the 
COAG Reform Agenda has caused governments and their central agencies to pay greater attention 
to federal matters and centralise coordination of negotiations, it has not transformed the conduct 
of intergovernmental relations. It is not quite ‘business as usual’, but it is also not quite a ‘brave 
new world’ either. Rather, after an initial period of sustained collaboration, the conduct of 
intergovernmental relations is recognisably similar to the situation prevailing before the Reform 
Agenda commenced, with some exceptions – most notably the rise in importance of the COAG 
Reform Council. However, we also contend that the COAG Reform Agenda has impacted on the 
broader internal operations of the central agencies and that this appears to be a more permanent 
outcome. This impact has been welcomed by some and resented by others, but in almost all cases 
the COAG Reform Agenda has led to greater attention and resources being devoted to 
intergovernmental relations (IGR) units and concerns within central agencies, and accentuated and 
accelerated the significance of central agencies within government. While some State governments 
may wish to see COAG trim its ambitions and reach, they nevertheless have beefed up their 
capacity to deal with it. 
 
6.1 Driving change: The COAG Reform Agenda as the independent variable  
The COAG Reform Agenda has undoubtedly impinged upon the conduct of intergovernmental 
relations. Broadly speaking, there has been greater oversight by Cabinets around the country, 
tighter policy coordination by the central agencies and, hence, a greater commitment of resources 
to deal with ‘COAG matters’. We have also found that the legislative demands of the reform 
process have seen greater use being made of uniform legislation. A prima facie case can also be 
made that the system of ministerial councils was overhauled in light of its perceived ineffectiveness 
as a means to effect federal reform. 
 
6.1.1 Greater oversight by Cabinet 
The COAG Reform Agenda has stimulated more rigorous Cabinet oversight of federal matters, 
especially intergovernmental agreements, than was sometimes the case in the past. Previously, 
some ministers had entered into agreements that were not always brought to the immediate 
attention of their ministerial colleagues or the central agencies. Under the new fiscal regime, first 




agreements. The exceptions are a handful of smaller bilateral agreements that have been signed 
off by ministers. In those cases, notably Queensland, it is on the understanding that they do not 
contradict State policy, pose no financial risk or are not politically sensitive. Implementation plans, 
which are subordinate to the national agreements, are not receiving the same level of Cabinet 
scrutiny. Typically, they are being signed off by ministers and senior officials after having first been 
approved by the central agencies.  
 
While there is generally a greater focus and oversight of COAG-related matters by cabinets across 
the federation, the mechanisms and their usage vary. South Australia’s Integrated Reporting and 
Evaluation Framework, with oversight being provided by the Executive Committee of Cabinet, is 
the most formalised and structured. Victoria’s Policy and Strategy Committee of Cabinet receives 
and considers a submission from the National Reform Branch prior COAG meetings. The 
Commonwealth and the other State central agencies utilise less structured mechanisms of 
oversight; however, all cabinets receive briefing notes from their central agencies and established 
their overall policy position. All cabinets grant their leaders autonomy to enter into last minute 
negotiations.  
 
6.1.2 Tighter coordination by central agencies 
Intergovernmental relations across the country have been centralised to better coordinate work 
on the COAG Reform Agenda. Central agency leadership has centred on an understanding of the 
original intent and objectives of the IGAFFR, experience garnered from negotiations over now 
numerous agreements and, of course, proximity to the two senior members of Cabinet – first 
ministers and treasurers. The central agencies, certainly in the larger jurisdictions, also possess 
considerable policy expertise in their own right and this enables them to engage with line agencies 
on a more equal footing.  
 
The ‘iron rods’ between line agencies, identified by Warhurst (1983), have been bent, if not 
destroyed, by the Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal Financial Relations. By agreeing to 
have national SPPs and national partnership payments transferred directly from the 
Commonwealth Treasury to State treasuries, the IGAFFR has undermined the influence of the 
Commonwealth line agencies. At the same time, almost all the central agencies have endeavoured 
to improve their capacity to engage in intergovernmental relations. As the studies by Davis (1998) 
and Weller (1996) show, the ascendency of the first ministers’ departments in intergovernmental 
relations coincided with the creation of COAG and the perception that policy problems were best 
addressed from a whole-of-government perspective. 
 
A ‘cadre’ of IGR-experienced officials has developed within central agencies, and this group is 
increasingly influential relative to the ‘traditional’ Commonwealth-State groups of line agency 
officials. Funding is now distributed from the Commonwealth Treasury to State treasuries and then 
to the State line agencies. The Commonwealth line agencies are no longer responsible for 
distributing specific purpose payments and this has greatly undermined their power base. 
Nevertheless, they have endeavoured to include in national partnership agreements what the 
States regard as onerous input controls that are not in the spirit of the IGAFFR, perhaps reflecting a 
lack of cultural change (see section 6.2.6 below) within Commonwealth line agencies. State central 
agencies have acted to stem such behaviour both by advising their own line agencies as well as by 






However, the line agencies have not been marginalised. Almost every official we spoke with from 
the central agencies commented that it was important to maintain close operational relations with 
their line agencies because they possess considerable policy expertise and experience. In fact, in 
some cases, central agencies have seconded officials from line agencies to further strengthen 
capacity to deal with major negotiations, such as those concerning health agreements. The ‘them 
and us’ distinction now applies mostly to relations between the States and the Commonwealth, 
not between officials in State central and line agencies. We add the condition ‘mostly’ because 
some treasury officials still feel that officials in the line agencies either have been captured by 
stakeholders or are more concerned with their departments’ interests, rather than national or 
State interests.   
 
There is usually a vague division of labour between the intergovernmental relations units and the 
policy divisions within central agencies, especially in Premier’s departments. Formally, the 
intergovernmental relations units are assigned organisational / coordination functions and the 
various branches of the policy and strategy divisions are responsible for their respective policy 
areas, e.g. education, health, etc. The vagueness, as it were, is reflected in department responses 
to increasing workloads and looming deadlines. If necessary, the intergovernmental relations units 
attached to smaller governments also engage in policy work.  
 
The division of labour between leader’s departments and treasuries is more formal and functional. 
The various leaders’ departments remain ultimately responsible for coordinating the negotiation of 
national SPP agreements and national partnership agreements across the whole-of-government. 
Treasuries are mostly, but not entirely, concerned with policy analysis and fiscal matters. Almost all 
officials remarked that considerable efforts were made to ensure that these two central agencies 
were ‘on the same page’ and acting together on behalf of the government. If there is competition 
between them, the officials we spoke with were not forthcoming on the matter.  
 
To manage and coordinate the centralisation of intergovernmental relations, there are increasingly 
more inter-departmental meetings concerned with addressing COAG-related policy issues and 
implementation plans. This is especially the case for intergovernmental relations units based in 
premier’s departments. Commonwealth and State central agencies are conducting many more 
briefings of both senior (secretaries / deputy secretaries) and more junior (directors / managers) 
officials. Likewise, State central and line agency officials are meeting more often to discuss 
positions vis-a-vis national agreements. These meetings are being supplemented by even more 
frequent communications by telephone and email, which are universally regarded as crucial for 
day-to-day management and coordination. 
 
6.1.3 The Council for the Australian Federation – a brief moment of sunshine? 
Although the Council for the Australian Federation (CAF) provides a potentially useful 
institutional vehicle for managing intergovernmental relations concerned with the COAG Reform 
Agenda, it has not proved to be an entirely successful experiment in cooperative federalism 
between the States and Territories. With consensus between all eight jurisdictions being the basis 
for decision-making, it is difficult to quickly achieve acceptable decisions. It is a challenge made 
even harder when first ministers belong to different political parties and / or are more committed 
to competition with the other States and Territories, rather than cooperation. Moreover, given the 
relatively small size of the intergovernmental relations community in Australia, some officials view 
CAF as an unnecessary gathering of the same officials who already meet to address the same 




how CAF can be reconstituted to provide all jurisdictions with the strategic direction and added 
capacity necessary to justify their continued support.   
 
The individual States and Territories have never been inherently ‘close’ – since Federation, the 
primary strategy of the federal game has been to cooperate only when necessary, as the primary 
objective has been to seek advantage for their own jurisdiction in negotiations with the 
Commonwealth, sometimes in competition with other States and Territories. The Council of the 
Australian Federation was instituted at a time when all jurisdictions were being governed by Labor 
in opposition to a Liberal Prime Minister, who was actively encroaching upon traditional State 
policy areas. It was no coincidence that CAF emerged in these circumstances and not surprising 
that it stalled soon after the election of a Labor Prime Minister, and even more so once Labor lost 
its monopoly on State and Territory governments.  
 
6.1.4 More uniform legislation 
The COAG Reform Agenda has stimulated greater use of uniform legislation to deal with the 
increased legislative workload. Template legislation, mirror/model legislation, framework laws, 
referral of powers legislation have all been utilised to varying degrees. Of these different types of 
uniform legislation, the States are clearly most comfortable with mirror / model legislation. It 
provides effective legislative harmonisation, without undermining the State’s ownership of the 
legislation. However, there remains considerable reluctance to utilise referral of powers legislation, 
especially as the States are unsure whether the Commonwealth could be forced to return these 
powers. 
 
6.1.5 Ministerial councils  
While the system of ministerial councils was not directly transformed as a consequence of the 
COAG Reform Agenda, the process highlighted its relative insignificance in federal policymaking 
and precipitated the new system of ministerial councils. Previously, they were widely dismissed as 
ineffective and / or captured by interest groups and stakeholders. The need for reform of the 
ministerial councils was acknowledged; yet nothing substantial had eventuated. The creation of 
COAG working groups led by Commonwealth ministers reflected the Commonwealth government’s 
belief that the ministerial councils were unlikely to progress the COAG Reform Agenda at an 
acceptable rate. Many of the old ministerial councils were effectively sidelined, with most of the 
substantive work being carried out by central agencies. Now, it has been agreed that the work of 
the (substantially reduced number of) ministerial councils will be directed by COAG and that each 
must report annually to COAG on the progress of assigned tasks.  
 
6.2 Reflecting federal realities: The COAG Reform Agenda as dependent variable 
Claims about the extent of the effects that the COAG Reform Agenda has had upon 
intergovernmental relations must be tempered against other legal, political, historical and 
institutional factors. During the period in question, intergovernmental relations have undoubtedly 
been affected by factors not directly connected to the reform process, such as the constitutional 
division of powers, political stability, personal relations between political leaders, the strategic 
leadership of senior bureaucrats, developments in information and communications technology, 





6.2.1 The constitutional division of powers 
That the COAG Reform Agenda even came into being is a function of the constitutional division 
of powers. The Australian Constitution is often popularly dismissed as an archaic document that 
does not reflect the functioning of Australian political system – its failure to even identify the Prime 
Minister is oft cited. However, the Constitution is structured around the division of powers 
between the Commonwealth and the States and several High Court decisions have consolidated 
policymaking in Canberra and privileged the position of the Commonwealth political executive.  
 
Without Prime Minister Rudd’s support for the COAG Reform Agenda, Victoria’s proposal for a 
National Reform Agenda would have been ‘dead in the water’. It was the Prime Minister’s 
decision to push for the development of the IGAFFR, have Commonwealth Cabinet ministers chair 
the COAG working groups and have the working groups commit to firm deadlines for their 
workplans and reports that made possible the reforms already achieved.  
 
The COAG Reform Agenda has not changed the balance of power; the conduct of 
intergovernmental relations remains inherently asymmetrical. The Prime Minister decides when 
COAG will meet, sets the agenda and approves the site of the meeting. State officials commented 
that, if summoned, they have to come to the table – they cannot force the Commonwealth’s hand. 
The Commonwealth’s monopoly on personal income tax and receipt of the GST as well as its array 
of constitutional, legislative and institutional ‘weapons’ means that they have to negotiate with the 
Commonwealth to get what they regard as their fair share of revenues and policy outcomes they 
can live with. 
 
6.2.2 Political stability 
Another factor exogenous to the COAG Reform Agenda that has affected the conduct of 
intergovernmental relations over the period in question is the stability / instability of the 
governing political parties. The instability and turmoil that followed the resignation of New South 
Wales Premier, Bob Carr, is indicative. New Premiers are usually followed by Cabinet reshuffles and 
department overhauls as political leaders seek to make their mark on government. While such 
changes may lead to improved governance, they can also be a distraction from the 
(intergovernmental) events outside of the jurisdiction. It is extremely difficult to quantify the 
extent to which political instability at the top affects the work of officials; however, machinery of 
government changes and department restructures almost always instil a temporary administrative 
burden and increase the focus on internal state matters to the detriment of COAG work.  
 
Similarly, the hung Commonwealth parliament appears to have distracted the Prime Minister and 
her Cabinet from the COAG reform process. Concerned with maintaining the numbers in the House 
of Representatives following the 2010 election, the Prime Minister has called just two COAG 
meetings in the eighteen months since her elevation. We are not suggesting here that the Prime 
Minister is uninterested in the reform process; rather that she is not necessarily in the same 
position as her predecessor was to drive reforms.  In addition, just as Prime Minister Howard was 
less interested in using COAG when he first came to office (COAG had been initiated by his Labor 
predecessors), so the COAG Reform Agenda was closely associated with former Prime Minister 
Rudd and initially involved all Labor governments. It is not surprising in the circumstances in which 
she found herself (a minority government and the breaking of the all-Labor stranglehold on COAG) 





This is not to say that Commonwealth-State relations have become any less important or 
contentious. Clearly, the mining tax, the carbon tax, the health reforms and the debates about the 
distribution of the GST are major ongoing issues. But the COAG Reform Agenda has to a large 
extent morphed into the normal ‘slog’ of intergovernmental negotiations, now that the formal 
headline reforms such as the signing of the IGAFFR, the full establishment of the COAG Reform 
Council and the restructuring of the ministerial council system, have all been achieved. 
 
6.2.3 Personal relations between political leaders 
The conduct of intergovernmental relations between the central agencies of the mainland States 
and with the Commonwealth central agencies has also been affected by personal relations 
between political leaders. In intergovernmental relations, party alignment has never guaranteed 
policy alignment or political acquiescence for any reasonable period of time. In fact, some leaders 
from different parties have been able to work quite well together. For example, Martin Painter 
(1998: 88) highlighted the close working relations between the then Queensland Labor Premier 
Wayne Goss and the Victorian Liberal Premier Jeff Kennett in negotiating the National Competition 
Policy.  
 
However, having Labor governments across the country undoubtedly helped garner the States’ 
initial ‘cooperation’ at COAG and their agreements to implement the reform agenda. Certainly, 
the Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, reputedly enjoyed friendships with the Queensland Labor Premier 
Anna Bligh (http://www.abc.net.au/sundayprofile/stories/3089944.htm) and the South Australian 
Labor Premier Mike Rann (http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/opinion/post-to-
ease-ranns-pain/story-e6frgd0x-1226110446647).  
 
When the Commonwealth proposed hospital reforms that would cost the States thirty percent of 
their GST revenue, the conduct of intergovernmental relations became more acrimonious. Not 
only did the new Western Australia Liberal Premier, Colin Barnett, refuse to sign the resultant 
agreement, but the Victoria Labor Premier, John Brumby, proposed an alternative plan. Relations 
between Prime Minister Rudd and Premier Brumby were described at that time as ‘toxic’ 
(http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/politics/brumbys-resolve-robs-rudd-of-a-clean-victory-on-
health-20100414-sdap.html).   
 
The implications of personal relations for the conduct of intergovernmental relations and the 
reform process going forward are now even more important. The Commonwealth and the State 
governments are now split along party lines – New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia 
have Liberal governments, while the Labor Party leads majority governments in the 
Commonwealth, South Australia, Queensland and Tasmania. The Prime Minister cannot expect 
loyalty from the Liberal States, nor can she take for granted the continued public support that 
Prime Minister Rudd enjoyed from some Labor States. If the Prime Minister is committed to the 
reform process and wants/needs the States’ political support for reform, then she needs to 
develop closer personal relations at COAG and beyond.  
 
6.2.4 Strategic leadership of senior bureaucrats 
Without stable, strategic leadership, all the resources in the world will be misdirected. Success 
will be random and attributable to little more than luck. Publicly, leadership is associated with the 
political figureheads of government – the First Ministers. Behind the scenes, however, it is 




– often generate much of the forward, blue-sky thinking. Historically, this is recognised in the work 
of former DPMC Secretary, Mike Codd, who helped convince Prime Minister Bob Hawke to put 
federalism on his fourth term agenda and who established the Commonwealth-State Secretariat 
within the DPMC. Likewise, Terry Moran, the erstwhile Secretary of the Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet and previously the Secretary for the Victorian Department of Premier and 
Cabinet, is intrinsically linked to the COAG reform process.  
 
The newly elected New South Wales government implicitly recognised this in March 2011, when it 
announced that Chris Eccles would become the new Director-General of the Department of 
Premier and Cabinet. Not only does he bring a proven track record as a department head – having 
transformed South Australia’s DPC – he also brings, as an intergovernmental relations official from 
another State pointed out, a wealth of knowledge and experience in the area of intergovernmental 
relations.  
 
6.2.5 Developments in information and communications technology 
In government, references to central agency ‘resources’ imply people and the number of FTEs 
available to conduct various tasks. It is generally assumed that the more resources that an agency 
has at its disposal, the more tasks and detailed analyses it can undertake. However, ‘resources’ do 
not have to be people; they may also be technological.  
 
The advances in information and communications technology over the past two decades have 
undoubtedly transformed how central agencies conduct intergovernmental relations. Most 
officials we interviewed recognised their integration into networks across the whole-of-
government and other jurisdictions as being crucial to finding out what is happening elsewhere 
and to tap into various sources of policy knowledge. Traditionally, contact was made by telephone; 
sometimes daily as Warhurst uncovered. Face-to-face contact was less frequent, especially with 
counterparts’ colleagues ‘so far away’ in other parts of the country. Mobile telephones, email and 
teleconference facilities make it much easier to communicate with others. Furthermore, it is 
possible to tap into much larger policy networks than ever before.  
 
6.2.6 Cultural attitudes 
The conduct of intergovernmental relations is also subject to cultural attitudes that have not 
been immediately overcome by the introduction of the COAG Reform Agenda. This is consistent 
with our finding that Commonwealth line agencies have been endeavouring to insert conditions 
inconsistent with the intent of the IGAFFR into national partnership agreements and their related 
implementation plans. Some State central agency officials expressed the belief that 
Commonwealth line agencies were simply anxious to retain the policy influence they held under 
the previous Commonwealth-State financial regime. The acrimony expressed to us by State officials 
was acknowledged in the HOTs review and is reflected in the efforts of the SOM working groups to 
negotiate and develop mechanisms that circumvent conflict affecting the conduct of 
intergovernmental relations.  
 
This cultural resistance to the intent of the IGAFFR is likely reinforced by the belief widely held in 
the community that Commonwealth ministers are ultimately responsible for solving problems 
perceived as beyond the capacity of the States. Typically, Australian news media outlets aggregate 
issue positions, so that a simplified picture of the state-of-affairs can be presented to the viewer / 




what are considered the basic positions, and usually led by the Prime Minister / Premiers and the 
Leaders of the Opposition. (This is consistent with Shattschneider’s [1960] thesis that politics is a 
contest between two sides, that people are attracted to the conflict and that they will take sides.) 
The news media can then identify, which side is to blame for the perceived problem and who 
should take responsibility.  
 
Although the simplification of issues can construct distinct lines of accountability for the viewer / 
reader to understand, it ultimately stratifies Australian politics in such a way as to subsume the 
positions adopted by the various State governments under the positions being adopted by either 
the Prime Minister or the Leader of the Opposition. Rather, the news media presents accounts of 
issues, such as the construction of housing for indigenous people, that assume the Commonwealth 
should know what is going on ‘out there’, even if, constitutionally, the issues fall under the purview 
of the States. Consequently, Commonwealth ministers feel that they must be fully briefed on all 
matters.  
 
This construction of federal responsibility is reinforced, of course, by Prime Ministers anxious to 
present themselves as taking responsibility for policy problems. For example, Prime Minister John 
Howard sought to takeover Mersey Hospital in Tasmania to demonstrate that the Commonwealth 
was capable and prepared to provide a service that the State – rightly or wrongly – was no longer 
prepared to provide. Likewise, Prime Minister Rudd came to power promising to end the so-called 
‘blame game’ that had come to characterise Australian health policy, for example.  
 
6.3 Broader impacts on the central agencies 
In an earlier ANZSOG report, Kelly (2010) noted how governments at all levels were under pressure 
to develop strategic centres capable of responding to emerging internal and external pressures. 
One of these pressures has been intergovernmental relations. The influence of the COAG Reform 
Agenda has not been confined to IGR units, however, or even to central-line agency relations. It has 
also impacted on the broader operations of the central agencies themselves, and on the policy 
priorities of government. In this section, we discuss some of these broader impacts, beginning with 
perhaps the most obvious – the strain on agency resources arising from the adoption of the COAG 
Reform Agenda at the COAG meeting in November 2007. 
  
6.3.1 Increased staff resources 
The COAG Reform Agenda has certainly precipitated considerably more staff being directed to 
specialist intergovernmental relations units. All Commonwealth and State first ministers’ 
departments now have discrete units to coordinate intergovernmental relations. The roles of these 
units vary and depend upon the capacity they are provided in terms of staff numbers. Certainly, 
the current intergovernmental relations units are much larger and significantly more important 
than their predecessors (Warhurst 1983; Chapman 1988).  
 
Two caveats are attached to the data for 2008-09 and 2009-10, below. First, the number of FTEs 
can be best described as ‘nominal’. In any given period, the number of FTE can fluctuate depending 
upon the timely needs of an intergovernmental relations unit and the manner in which a 
department structures its intergovernmental policy work. Moreover, policy work with an 
intergovernmental dimension is sometimes delegated to policy units – separate to the 
intergovernmental relations unit – within the first minister’s department. Hence, the FTE 




department’s full commitment to the COAG Reform Agenda.  
 
Second, in some cases Treasuries also provide substantial personnel to supplement those in first 
ministers’ departments. This is particularly the case in the New South Wales OFM, where, in 2009-
10, there were twenty-five FTE working on COAG issues and nine FTE in the central COAG team.  
 
It is also worth noting that ‘federal affairs’ or the like is no longer assigned to an individual 
minister; rather, it is assumed that the major policy areas have intergovernmental dimensions for 
which individual Cabinet ministers will take immediate responsibility. Nevertheless, federalism / 
intergovernmental relations is considered a whole-of-government matter with the first ministers 
through Cabinet providing formal oversight. 
 
Table 5: Intergovernmental Relations Managers and Resources, 1983-2010 
 
Government Responsible Minister Department 
Staff (FTE) 
1983 1986 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 
         
Commonwealth Prime Minister 
Prime Minister 
and Cabinet 6 0 N/A N/A 12 10 




Cabinet 1 1 3 4 4 5 
         
Victoria Premier Premier and Cabinet 6 6 N/A N/A 26 19 
         
Queensland Premier Premier and Cabinet 4 6 N/A 7 7 7 
         
South Australia Premier Premier and Cabinet 3 8 3 12 10 10 




Cabinet 2 0 7 8 10 13 
 
Table 5 shows that the States not only committed increased resources to intergovernmental 
relations as a consequence of the COAG Reform Agenda, but that these remain at a higher level 
than at 2006-07. This is contrary to Menzies’ (2011) finding that the capacity of the DPMC to 
engage in intergovernmental relations has ebbed and flowed over the past quarter of a century 
corresponding to the ad hoc concerns of Prime Ministers. Instead, the States have ‘beefed up’ their 
central agencies to be better equipped to play the ‘game’ and, in particular, to defend their 
interests if the Commonwealth proposes a more assertive stance.  
 
It is important to remember that the increased emphasis (and resources) given to COAG and IGR 
matters generally was not accompanied by a lessening of other policy issues claiming the attention 
of governments. ‘Normal’ government continued. For newly elected Commonwealth and WA 
governments, election promises and new policy directions unrelated to COAG were their top 
priorities. COAG matters had to be ‘fitted in’ by a combination of new resources, re-allocation of 
existing resources, work intensification, and harnessing resources from line agencies. Reassigning 
internal priorities to cater for COAG was invariably a last resort, unless – as in the case of Victoria – 





6.3.2 Staff management  
The COAG Reform Agenda drove staff management within the central agencies for only a limited 
period. While the recruitment and retention of sufficient staff with knowledge of, and experience 
in, IGR is proving more difficult over time for Premier’s departments, this was due, only in part, to 
the very intense period of work from early 2008 to around mid-2010. Turnover is mostly 
attributed to staff moving between central and line agencies looking to advance their careers. 
Experience working in a central agency is well regarded in the line agencies as it provides a broader 
whole-of-government perspective, as well as an expanded network of contacts. Once they have 
gained that experience they return, often to a higher position.  
 
Intergovernmental relations units within Treasury departments, on the other hand, have not found 
it as difficult to retain staff. This may be because, as one senior treasury official remarked, treasury 
officers are ‘cut from a different cloth’ to their colleagues in the first ministers’ departments. 
Certainly, they tend to forge careers within treasuries, rather than move around from agency to 
agency. This is particularly the case with treasury officials who work in Commonwealth-State 
financials relations areas – many have been in their current positions for a number of years. 
 
Little formal training has been instituted by State central agencies in response to the COAG 
Reform Agenda. While central agencies occasionally recruit staff specialising in intergovernmental 
relations, such people are rarely available and most training normally occurs on the job, within the 
organisation. The intergovernmental relations units within central agencies are employing both 
generalists and staff with specific policy knowledge. Induction briefings are held to bring newly 
recruited officers ‘up-to-speed’, but most of the training is on-the-job. 
 
6.3.3 Skewing priorities? 
The COAG Reform Agenda has to some extent skewed government priorities away from what 
they would otherwise have been. In some ways, the COAG Reform Agenda initially had a greater 
impact upon the Commonwealth central agencies than upon the State central agencies, as so 
much of the newly elected Rudd Government’s agenda was dependent on progress at COAG and 
winning cooperation from the States and Territories. Victoria, which to that point had driven the 
reform process, was already prepared for action and had built much of its domestic policy agenda 
around the COAG reforms. New South Wales by contrast was in political turmoil for much of the 
period under review and preoccupied with organisational restructuring. The Commonwealth, on 
the other hand, committed much of its political and personnel resources towards driving the 
process and realising the reforms.  
 
The smaller jurisdictions were more limited in how they could respond given their resource 
constraints. For most, keeping the Commonwealth to their word on the new IGAFFR, while 
securing the increased funding on offer, became a core objective. In the cases of Western Australia 
and Queensland, their policy foci have been to maximise the income they receive from mining 
royalties, to facilitate the development of the infrastructure required for mining development, and 
to respond to the demands for affordable housing in city and regional areas. In South Australia, 
following the reorganisation of their DPC in 2007, the priority was the State Plan, into which they 
tried to ‘fit’ the COAG Reform Agenda (see next section). In both Western Australia and South 
Australia, the demands of the COAG Reform Agenda assisted in, and were consistent with, the 




on policy coordination and advice, along with a heightened integration of the work of their IGR 
units with the policy sections of the department.  
 
6.3.4 State strategic plans 
All States and Territories, with the exception of Western Australia, developed strategic plans in the 
decade 2000-10. In most cases, the strategic plans constituted a formal statement of the State’s 
policy objectives and agenda and were developed prior to the COAG Reform Agenda. As a result, 
the States have where possible tried to align national partnership indicators with those already 
contained within their State strategic plans. Only on rare occasions has the COAG process required 
significant amendment to existing State-generated indicators. 
 
6.3.5 The COAG Reform Council 
Despite their frustration with the Commonwealth, the State strategic agencies are generally 
satisfied with the oversight provided by the COAG Reform Council. Its performance monitoring 
remains focused on outputs and the States appreciate its consistency in its reporting of their 
progress. However, concerns were raised that there were too many indicators contained within the 
various national payments agreements and that the datasets are still inadequate for the purpose of 
meaningful policy analysis and evaluation under the COAG Reform Agenda.  
 
6.4 Interdependency and the game of intergovernmental relations 
In Chapter 2, we identified two themes running through much of the academic literature on 
intergovernmental relations in Australia: the first was that relations between the two levels of 
government can be conceptualised as a game; and the second was the notion that the States and 
the Commonwealth are interdependent. These themes have been evident throughout the 
duration of the COAG Reform Agenda.  
 
Consistent with the concept of a game, the Commonwealth and the States utilise and exchange 
their various resources, in accordance with the formal and informal rules of the game, to achieve 
particular objectives. As we explained in Chapter 3, intergovernmental relations in Australia are 
structured by the Australian Constitution. In effect, it constitutes the formal rules of the game 
and the High Court is the referee. The decisions handed down over the years have increasingly 
favoured the Commonwealth, effectively preventing the States from raising income tax, allowing 
the Commonwealth to move into policy areas previously considered the purview of the States and 
enabling the Prime Minister to set the federal policy agenda, even including the COAG meeting 
schedule. If the Prime Minister chooses not to play, then there is no game.  
 
There are also informal rules of the game (Rhodes 1988) that have shaped the conduct of 
intergovernmental relations between the Commonwealth and the States. One is the view that 
the States have the right to govern independently of the Commonwealth. Although their existence 
is guaranteed under the Constitution, there is a generally shared view that the Commonwealth 
should only encroach upon the States’ policy territory in the national interest. Of course, what 
constitutes the ‘national interest’ is a matter of debate. A second informal rule is that the 
Commonwealth will consult the States on matters affecting their interests. This can take different 
forms ranging from a ‘heads up’ telephone call between officials to a formal letter between first 
ministers. A third rule is that consensus is preferable to conflict and that the participants will strive 




one another to stand by their commitments, regardless of whether they are contractually bound or 
whether a former leader from another party has committed the jurisdiction to a constitutionally, 
non-binding national agreement. 
 
For the past two decades, the objectives of the game for the Commonwealth have been twofold. 
It has sought to expand the scope of its involvement in constitutionally concurrent policy areas 
(notably health and education) and, as Menzies (2011) has noted, to further its long-term program 
of economic reform (especially the national competition policy and the COAG Reform Agenda). 
The objectives of the States have been to retain some autonomy in their traditionally, 
constitutionally coordinate policy areas, to maximise the financial payments they receive from 
the Commonwealth, all the while lessening the corresponding reporting burden.  
 
In addition to the systemic bias that it enjoys, the Commonwealth also possesses significant 
resources. The DPMC and the Commonwealth Treasury are staffed by experts in all major policy 
areas and, if necessary, second personnel from the line agencies when needed. They possess the 
capacity to undertake extensive policy analysis, provide policy advice to the Commonwealth 
government, set meeting agendas, prepare papers and lead negotiations. Importantly, the 
Australian Public Service is large enough to engage with the States across all policy areas. None of 
the States can counter the Commonwealth in this regard. Although the States possess greater 
expertise in some policy areas, this is not sustained across the policy spectrum.  
 
However, the States are not without resources. Many senior officials possess greater experience 
in intergovernmental relations than their Commonwealth counterparts – this is especially the case 
with those Treasury officials who have well established careers overseeing their States’ shares of 
the GST and the national budget. A cadre of officials within the Premiers’ departments have also 
emerged as key players. In many cases, we found people who were engaged with the COAG Reform 
Agenda from the start and now advise their colleagues in other departments. Crucially, the States 
have considerably more expertise in service provision than the Commonwealth. 
 
To achieve their respective objectives, both levels of government have needed to exchange 
resources. The States did not ‘roll over’ in the face of the Commonwealth’s constitutional pre-
eminence and its control of the purse strings. They challenged the Commonwealth over the 
wording and implementation of intergovernmental agreements, and sought financial recompense 
for their cooperation and compliance. This is evidenced by the IGAFFR. The Commonwealth 
effectively bought State cooperation and compliance by agreeing to reduce the conditions 
attached to specific purpose payments. In return, the States agreed to implement the policy 
components of the reform agenda – closing the gap on Indigenous disadvantage, reducing the 
regulatory burden on business, improving hospital and health care, improving productivity through 
early learning education and care, water and climate policies, infrastructure and access to 
affordable housing.  
 
Although the Commonwealth maintains a dominant position over the States in the ‘game’ that is 
the COAG Reform Agenda, it was not so dominant as to overwhelm and make pointless the 
engagement between the two levels of government. The Commonwealth knows that without 
State cooperation to implement federal policies, then its objectives are unlikely to be met. The 
States know that they can further their objectives, if they comply with some of the 





6.5 Conclusion  
The COAG Reform Agenda and the reform process have highlighted the central role that the 
Commonwealth must play if national reforms are to be achieved. Intergovernmental relations 
between the Commonwealth and State central agencies are heavily weighted towards the former 
in terms of constitutional standing and available resources. Even if the Commonwealth does not 
provide the intellectual capital necessary to stimulate reform, only it can provide the financial 
incentives necessary for the States to comply. 
 
The Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal Financial Relations – the cornerstone of the COAG 
Reform Agenda – has not alleviated tensions between Commonwealth and State central 
agencies over tied grants. Ostensibly, a non-binding legal document written in plain English and 
devoid of obfuscation, the IGAFFR has become central to negotiations. The States signed it on the 
understanding that the old system of specific purpose payments would be rationalised and that the 
conditions attached to the new agreements would not be onerous. Input controls would give way 
to reporting outputs and outcomes. However, almost all of the State officials that we interviewed 
voiced their concern and frustration at the ever-increasing number of national partnership 
agreements and the level of micro-management sought by the Commonwealth line agencies. 
Without a cultural change, promoted by the Commonwealth, this is likely to remain a sticking 
point on the road to more collaborative federalism. 
 
At the same time, the central agencies of the State governments appear to have more capacity 
to deal with COAG and intergovernmental relations than prior to the reform agenda being 
commenced in 2006. While some governments have been more enthusiastic than others about 
the rising importance of COAG (the Western Australian Premier has been particularly critical of the 
expanded role being assigned to COAG), all governments are ‘on their guard’ and willing to 
scrutinise and criticise what they see as recalcitrant behaviour from Commonwealth line agencies 
in particular. They are also able to marshal resources from their own line agencies and from within 
their central agencies to meet urgent policy and operational demands, such as the health reforms 
of 2010. In essence, the COAG Reform Agenda has increased the strategic oversight capacity and 
influence of central agencies, even while placing more pressure on them. 
 
It has not been uncommon in the history of Australian federalism to witness a general tendency 
towards Commonwealth dominance being interrupted by bursts of reform activity during which 
more intensive intergovernmental relations, lubricated by financial sweeteners from the 
Commonwealth, have arisen – and been accompanied by active central agency responses. The 
sweeping reforms of the Whitlam government and more particularly the period of the early 1990s 
which led to the National Competition Policy and the establishment of COAG are two such 
instances. The COAG Reform Agenda of 2007-2010 combined with the signing of the IGAFFR is 
another. In all cases, the policy and administrative capacity and influence of the central agencies, 
and the relative importance of the intergovernmental relations function internally within the 
central agencies, has been enhanced and retained, even though the initial burst of reform activity 
has subsided. 
 
At the same time, it is less clear that the actual conduct of intergovernmental relations itself has 
changed significantly. As we saw during the Prime Ministership of Kevin Rudd, the nature of IGR 
depends greatly on leadership and drive from the centre. Rudd was able to convince State 
Premiers of the need for swift action – in part, by promising them a new federal financial system, 




context of increased funding overall. But suspicions linger on both sides about the extent to which 
the IGAFFR has changed the essential character of intergovernmental relations, while competition 
between the States remains despite the creation of the Council for the Australian Federation. In 
the meantime, the central agencies of all governments are in a stronger position to defend their 
own patch and to monitor the activities of their own agencies and the central and line agencies of 
other governments within the broader COAG system. Much will therefore depend on the degree to 
which the COAG Reform Council can win the trust of all governments and keep in check the natural 
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Appendix 1: COAG Working Groups 
A1.1 COAG Health and Ageing Working Group / Sub-groups 
The COAG Health and Ageing Working Group was assigned two broad tasks. The first of these tasks 
concerned developing implementation plans for: 
• preventative health care; 
• elective surgery waiting times; 
• investing in aged care and transition care; 
• GP superclinics; and  
• investing in public dental programs. 
 
The second task involved examining the following health care issues:  
• community-based care;  
• e-health; 
• workforce planning; 
• funding of aged care and disability services; 
• emergency departments in public hospitals; and 
• the relationship of health issues to social inclusion and indigenous reforms. 
 
The Working Group was also required to liaise with the National Health and Hospitals Reform 
Commission (NHHRC) to secure effective coordination and demarcation of their tasks. 
 






COAG Health and Ageing Working Group 
 
Jurisdiction Agency Position 
   
Commonwealth 
Minister Nicola Roxon (Chair) Minister for Health 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet Deputy Secretary 
Department of the Treasury  
Department of Health and Ageing Secretary 
   
New South Wales 
Department of Premier and Cabinet Director General 
Department of Premier and Cabinet Deputy Director General 
Department of Treasury and Finance Deputy Secretary 
Department of Health Deputy Director General 
   
Victoria 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet Acting Deputy Secretary 
Department of the Treasury and Finance Director 
Department of Human Services Secretary 
   
Queensland Department of the Premier and Cabinet Executive Director QLD Health Director General 
   
South Australia 
Department of Treasury and Finance Deputy Under Treasurer 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet Executive Director 
Department of Health Acting Director General 
   
Western Australia 
Department of Health  
Department of Treasury and Finance Executive Director, Agency Resources 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet  
   
Tasmania 
Department of Health and Human Services Deputy Secretary 
Department of Treasury and Finance Deputy Secretary 
Department of Treasury and Finance Director 
   
Australian Capital 
Territory 
Health Chief Executive 
Chief Minister’s Department Director 
Department of Treasury Executive Director 
   
Northern Territory 
Department of Health and Community Services  
Treasury Assistant Under Treasurer 
Department of Chief Minister Manager 
 
Health Agreement Sub-group 
Chair – New South Wales, Commonwealth  
Members – Western Australia, South Australia 
 
Indigenous Sub-group  
Chair – Queensland / Western Australia 
Members – New South Wales, South Australia 
 
Ageing and Finance Sub-group  
Chair – South Australia / Commonwealth 
Members – Western Australia, New South Wales 
 
Ministerial Council working in parallel to the Working Group: 






A1.2 COAG Working Group on Indigenous Reform / Sub-groups 
The terms of reference of the COAG Working Group on Indigenous Reform were to:  
• close the gap on indigenous disadvantage;  
• close the life expectancy gap within a generation; 
• halve the gap in mortality rates for Indigenous children under five within a decade; and 
• within a decade, halve the gap in reading, writing and numeracy achievements. 
 
The COAG Working Group on Indigenous Reform was required to ensure that the various 
Implementation Plans reflected the Commonwealth government’s election commitments in 
Indigenous housing, health and education.  
 
More broadly, the COAG Working Group on Indigenous Reform was assigned a number of tasks 
concerned with Indigenous well-being:  
• overseeing the National Agreements in housing, education and health all contains specific 
targets for Indigenous people;  
• identifying overlap and duplication of the roles and responsibilities for service delivery by 
the  Commonwealth and State governments;  
• passive welfare; 
• reducing alcohol and substance abuse;  
• improving school attendance; 
• increasing business and employment opportunities; and  
• ensuring access to primary health services. 
 
The Working Group secretariat was based in the Commonwealth Department of Family, 





COAG Working Group on Indigenous Reform 
 
Jurisdiction Agency Position 
   
Commonwealth 
Minister Macklin (Chair) Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet Deputy Secretary 
Department of the Treasury Secretary 
Department of Families, Housing, Community 
Services and Indigenous Affairs Secretary 
   
New South Wales 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet Assistant Director General 
Treasury Executive Director 
Aboriginal Affairs NSW Chief Executive 
   
Victoria 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet Acting Deputy Secretary 
Department of the Treasury and Finance Director 
Department of Justice Secretary 
   
Queensland 
Department of Communities 
Department of Communities 
Director General 
Government Coordinator 
Department of Premier and Cabinet  Director 
   
South Australia 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet Director 
Department of the Treasury and Finance Principal Policy Officer 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet 
(Aboriginal Affairs and Reconciliation AARD) Director 
   
Western Australia 
Department of Treasury and Finance Executive Director 
Department of Indigenous Affairs A/Director-General 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet Director 
   
Tasmania 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet Director 
Department of Health and Human Services Deputy Secretary 
Department of Education Manager 
   
Australian Capital 
Territory 
Department of Disability, Housing and 
Community Services Chief Executive 
Chief Minister’s Department Deputy Chief Executive 
Department of Treasury Senior Manager 
   
Northern Territory 
Department of the Chief Minister Deputy Chief Executive 
Department of Corporate and Information 
Services Chief Executive 
Treasury Senior Director 
 
 
Building the Evidence Base Sub-group 
 
The Building the Evidence Base Sub-group was established to develop the reporting framework 
that will be used to report progress against the COAG targets. It has identified gaps in the data that 
are needed and is likely to recommend that a nationally consistent set of key performance 
indicators be developed for all Indigenous-specific primary health care services that are funded 
either by the Commonwealth government or by State and Territory governments. 
 
Chair – New South Wales 
Members – Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia, Commonwealth, Northern Territory, Queensland, 
Western Australia1 
 






Optimising Service Delivery Sub-group 
The work of this sub-group includes monitoring the activities of other COAG working groups. It has  
identified the importance of communicating with working groups in sectors that generally do not 
deliver services in indigenous communities and may require information regarding service delivery 
to remote communities.  
 
It is currently inactive, but work has recently revolved around the Remote Service Delivery National 
Partnership and the Urban and Regional Delivery Strategy. 
 
Chair – Northern Territory 
Members – Victoria, Tasmania, Western Australia, South Australia, New South Wales, 
Commonwealth 
 
Indigenous Early Childhood Steering Committee Sub-group 
Chair –  
Members – Queensland, Western Australia, New South Wales, South Australia 
 
Food Security Sub-group 
Drafted the National Healthy Eating Action Plan, which outlines a framework consisting of 
seventeen action areas concerned with increasing the demand for health food, facilitating access 
to health food, improving the supply of health food, building a sustainable and quality workforce, 
and ensuring effective ongoing monitoring and evaluation. 
 
Chair –  
Members – South Australia, Western Australia, Queensland 
 
Remote Indigenous Infrastructure Sub-group 
Working on developing a remote Indigenous infrastructure national partnership. 
 
Chair –  
Members – South Australia, Queensland, Northern Territory, Western Australia, Commonwealth, 
New South Wales 
 
Community Safety, Alcohol and Substance Abuse Sub-group 
The sub-group sought to ensure that Indigenous adults, children and families live in a safe 
environment where the harmful effects of alcohol and substance abuse are minimised. 
 
Chair – Australian Capital Territory 
Members – Western Australia, South Australia, New South Wales, Commonwealth 
 
Economic Participation and Welfare Reform Sub-group  
The sub-group addressed ‘Economic Participation and Welfare Reform’ through developing 
strategies to improve employment opportunities for Indigenous people across the country, whilst 
diminishing reliance on welfare payments. 
 
Chair – Queensland 





Building Blocks and Governance Sub-group 
The Building Blocks and Governance Sub-group had responsibility (in close association with the 
other sub-groups) for ensuring that the ‘building blocks’ that underpin the achievement of the 
COAG Closing the Gap targets were being addressed as central to overcoming Indigenous 
disadvantage. It aspired to embed the building blocks in the work of other COAG Working Groups 
and monitor the development of advice on those building blocks being led in either other WGIR 
sub-groups or in other COAG Working Groups. 
 
Chair – New South Wales  
Members – Commonwealth, Victoria, South Australia 
 
Note: WA was not a member of the Building Blocks and Governance Sub-group, rather it had a 
monitoring role. 
 
Ministerial Councils working in parallel to the Working Group: 
• Ministerial Council for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs 
• Drug Strategy 
• Housing Ministers 
• Ministerial Council on Vocational and Technical Education 
• Ministerial Council on Gambling 
• Standing Committee of Attorneys-General 
 
 
A1.3 COAG Housing Working Group / Sub-groups 
The policy objectives of the COAG Housing Working Group were as follows: 
• improve housing supply; and   
• improve housing affordability;   
• reduce by fifty percent in five years the number of homeless refused entry to shelters; 
• improve community and social housing; and  
• and develop specific objectives that meet the needs of Indigenous Australians. 
 
To meet these policy objectives, the COAG Housing Working Group was required to deliver 
implementation plans on the following:  
• a new National Housing Affordability Agreement; 
• a Housing Affordability Fund; 
• a National Rental Affordability Scheme; 
• State and Territory involvement in the National Housing Supply Research Council 
• an audit of Commonwealth, State and Territory land that could be released; and 
• the construction of  600 homes and units for homeless people. 
 
The Working Group secretariat was based in the Commonwealth Department of Family, 





COAG Housing Working Group 
 
Jurisdiction Agency Position 
   
Commonwealth 
Minister Tanya Plibersek (Chair) Minister for Housing 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet First Assistant Secretary 
Department of the Treasury Executive Director 
Dept of Families, Housing, Comm Services and Indigenous Affairs Secretary 
   
New South Wales 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet Deputy Director General 
Treasury Deputy  Secretary 
Department of Housing Director General 
   
Victoria 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet Acting Director 
Department of the Treasury and Finance Deputy Secretary 
Department of Planning & Community Development Secretary 
   
Queensland Department of Housing Director General Treasury Deputy Under Treasurer 
   
South Australia 
Department of Treasury and Finance Under Treasurer 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet Deputy Chief Executive 
Department of Families and Communities Deputy Chief Executive 
   
Western Australia 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet Acting Director General 
Department of Treasury and Finance Executive Director 
Department of Housing and Works Acting Director General 
Department for Planning and Infrastructure  
   
Tasmania 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet Secretary 
Department of Health and Human Services Secretary 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet Assistant Director 
   
Australian Capital 
Territory 
Department of Disability, Housing and Community Services Deputy Chief Executive 
Chief Minister’s Department Director 
Department of Treasury Director 
   
Northern Territory 
Department of the Chief Minister Deputy Chief Executive 
Treasury Director 
Department of Local Government, Housing & Sport Executive Director 
   
ALGA  Executive Director 
 
Housing and Homelessness Policy Research Working Group 
Chair –  
Members – Western Australia, Queensland, New South Wales 
 
Housing Ministers Advisory Council 
Chair –  
Members – Western Australia, Queensland, New South Wales, South Australia 
 
Ministerial Councils working in parallel to the Working Group: 
• Housing Ministers’ Conference 




1.4 COAG Business Regulation and Competition Working Group / Sub-groups 
The terms of reference for the COAG Business Regulation and Competition Working Group were:  
• to reduce the regulatory burden on business; 
• to deliver COAG’s regulatory ‘hot spots’ agenda;  
• to improve the processes for regulation-making and review; and 
• to help improve Australia’s overall competitiveness and productivity. 
 
To these ends, implementations plans were requested to:    
• identify the first tranche regulatory reform initiatives; 
• reduce the regulatory burden; 
• expedite the regulatory ‘hot spots’ agenda; 
• identify regulations that hinder workforce mobility and the acquisition of skills; and 
• assist the COAG Reform Council to report on the progress made to address energy, 
infrastructure and transport regulation, and on best practice regulation reform. 
 
The Working Group secretariat was based in the Commonwealth Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet. 
 
Business Regulation and Competition Working Group 
 
Jurisdiction Agency Position 
   
Commonwealth 
Minister Tanner (co-Chair) Minister for Finance and Deregulation 
Minister Emerson (co-Chair) Minister for Small Business, Independent Contractors, and the Service Economy 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet Deputy Secretary 
Department of the Treasury Deputy Secretary 
Department of Finance and Deregulation Deputy Secretary 
Dept of Innov., Industry, Science and Research Deputy Secretary 
   
New South Wales 
Department of Premier and Cabinet Deputy Director General 
Treasury Director 
Department of Premier and Cabinet Director 
   
Victoria 
Department of Premier and Cabinet Director 
Department of Treasury and Finance Deputy Secretary 
Department of Treasury and Finance Secretary 
   
Queensland Treasury Under Treasurer / Under Secretary Department of Premier and Cabinet Executive Director 
   
South Australia 
Department of Treasury and Finance Deputy Under Treasurer 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet Director 
Department of Trade and Economic Development Director 
Attorney General’s Department Chief Executive 
   
Western Australia Department of Treasury and Finance Under Treasurer 
   
Tasmania Department of Treasury and Finance Deputy Secretary Department of Justice Deputy Secretary 
   
Australian Capital 
Territory 
Department of Treasury Under Treasurer 
Chief Minister’s Department Director 
   
Northern Territory 
Department of the Chief Minister Senior Policy Advisor 
Treasury Director 
Department of Business, Economic and Regional 





Skills Recognition Steering Committee (later the National Licensing Steering Committee) 
The COAG Skills Recognition Steering Committee (CSRSC) was established by COAG in February 
2006 to achieve across-the-board mutual recognition of occupational licences. In December 2007, 
it engaged The Allen Consulting Group to evaluate the effectiveness of the existing regime, access 
its sustainability and make recommendations as to what further work was needed. Its report was 
accepted by the CSRSC in June 2008. In April 2009, COAG signed off on an intergovernmental for a 
national licensing system for particular occupations. The national occupation licensing system is 
due to commence in July 2012 (http://nola.gov.au/).  
 
Chair – Western Australia 
Members – Queensland, New South Wales, South Australia 
 
Regulatory Reform Sub-group 
Chair – 
Members –  
 
Ministerial Councils working in parallel to the Working Group: 
 
• Ministerial Council for Consumer Affairs 
• Small Business Ministerial Council 
• Local Government and Planning Ministers’ Council 
• Australian Transport Council 
• Standing Committee of Attorneys-General 
• Australian Health Ministers’ Conference 
• Ministerial Council on Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
• Building Ministers’ Forum 
• Australia and New Zealand Food Regulation Ministerial Council 
• Workplace Relations Ministerial Council 
• Ministerial Council on Energy 
• Environmental Protection and Heritage Council 
• Ministerial Council on Federal Financial Relations 
 
 
A1.5 COAG Productivity Agenda Working Group / Sub-groups 
The policy objectives of the COAG Agenda Productivity Working Group were as follows: 
• to pursue substantial reform in the areas of education, skills and early childhood 
development, to deliver significant improvements in human capital; and  
• to strengthen Australia’s economic and social foundations through this reform workplan.  
 
To meet these policy objectives, the COAG Productivity Agenda Working Group was required to 
deliver implementation plans concerning:  
• universal access to early childhood learning for all four year olds;  
• the promotion of Asian languages in schools; 
• a national curriculum by 2010; 
• oversight of the Commonwealth government’s Digital Education Revolution initiative;  




450,000 training places over the next for years; and  
• the lifting to ninety per cent by 2020, the number of students completing Year 12. 
 
The Working Group secretariat was based in the Commonwealth Department of Education, 
Employment and Workplace Relations. 
 
COAG Productivity Agenda Working Group 
 
Jurisdiction Agency Position 
   
Commonwealth 
Minister Julia Gillard (Chair) Deputy Prime Minister 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet First Assistant Secretary 
Department of the Treasury Secretary 
Department of Education, Employment and 
Workplace Relations Secretary 
   
New South Wales 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet Assistant Director General 
Treasury Deputy Secretary 
Department of Education and Training Deputy Director General 
   
Victoria 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet Secretary 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet Deputy Secretary 
Department of Treasury and Finance Deputy Secretary 
Department of Education and Early Childhood 
Development Secretary 
   
Queensland Department of Education, Training and the Arts Director General Department of the Premier and Cabinet (Policy) Executive General 
   
South Australia 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet Executive Director 
Department of Treasury and Finance Executive Director 
Department of Education and Children’s Services Chief Executive 
Department of Further Education, Employment, 
Science and Technology Chief Executive 
   
Western Australia 
Department of Education and Training Director General 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet Director, Intergovernmental Relations Unit 
Department for Communities Director General 
Department of Education and Training Executive Director Policy, Planning and Accountability 
   
Tasmania Department of Education Secretary Department of the Premier and Cabinet Director 
   
Australian Capital 
Territory 
Department of Education and Training Chief Executive 
Chief Minister’s Department Deputy Chief Executive, Policy 
Department of the Treasury Director 
   
Northern Territory 
Treasury Assistant Under Treasurer 
Department of Employment, Education and Training Chief Executive 
Department of Employment, Education and Training Senior Policy Officer 
 
Early Childhood Development Sub-group 
Now disbanded, the Early Childhood Development Sub-group developed plans for achieving 
universal access by 2013 to quality early childhood education in the year before schooling, with 
specific attention to addressing the barriers to access that face Indigenous and disadvantaged 
children. The sub-group also established four working parties to take forward the key action areas 
of data improvement, workforce, quality standards and the Early Years Learning Framework. Its 




Childhood Education and Care’.    
 
Chair – Commonwealth  
Members – New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Northern Territory, Western Australia 
 
Schooling Sub-group 
It developed the Digital Education Revolution strategic plan, ‘Success through Partnership: 
Achieving a National Vision for ICT in Schools’ (2008). 
 
Chair – New South Wales 
Members –South Australia, Northern Territory, Queensland, Western Australia 
 
Skills and Workforce Development Sub-group 
Established to progress those national reforms related to the work of the COAG Productivity 
Agenda Working Group. One notable task was a collaboration with the National Quality Council on 
a project called ‘VET Products for the 21st Century’.  
 
Chair – Victoria 
Members – New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Northern Territory 
 
Sub-sub-groups 
• Early Years Learning Framework; 
• Quality; 
• Data; and  
• Early Years Workforce Development. 
 
Ministerial Councils working in parallel to the Working Group: 
• Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs 
• Ministerial Council on Vocational and Technical Education 
• Community and Disability Services Ministers’ Conference 
• Australian Health Ministers’ Conference 
• Ministerial Council for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs 
 
 
A1.6 COAG Working Group on Climate Change and Water / Sub-groups 
The terms of reference for the COAG Working Group on Climate Change and Water were as 
follows: 
• to establish a national emissions trading scheme; 
• to develop climate change measures that complement the emissions trading scheme; 
• to formulate a national adaptation approach to climate change; and 
• to ensure sustainable water use throughout the country. 
 
Implementation plans were required to: 
• achieve the national Mandatory Renewable Energy Target by 2009; 
• formulate a climate change measures across jurisdictions that complement Commonwealth 
implementation of the emissions trading scheme; and  




irrigation infrastructure, water markets and the challenges facing urban water supply.  
 
In the longer term, the COAG Working Group on Climate Change and Water was expected to devise 
options that would expedite the adoption of energy efficiency measures, accelerate 
implementation of plans under the National Adaptation Framework, and support long-term 
planning for urban water supply.  
 
The Working Group secretariat was based in the Commonwealth Department of Environment, 
Water, Heritage and the Arts. 
 
COAG Working Group on Climate Change and Water 
 
Jurisdiction Agency Position 
   
Commonwealth 
Minister Wong (Chair) Minister for Climate Change and Water 
Department of the Prime Minster and Cabinet (Industry, 
Infrastructure and Environment Division)  First Assistant Secretary 
Department of the Treasury General Manager 
Department of Climate Change Secretary 
Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts Secretary 
   
New South Wales 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet Deputy Director General 
Treasury Deputy Secretary 
Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water Deputy Director General 
Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water Deputy Director General 
   
Victoria 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet Deputy Secretary 
Department of Treasury and Finance Director 
Department of Sustainability and Environment Secretary 
   
Queensland 
Department of Natural Resources and Water Director General 
Executive Director 
Executive Director 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet 
Office of Climate Change 
   
South Australia 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet Secretary 
Sustainability and Workforce Management Deputy Chief Executive 
Department of Treasury and Finance Assistant Under Treasurer 
Department of Treasury and Finance Director 
Department of Transport, Energy and Infrastructure  
Department of Water, Land and Biodiversity Conservation  
   
Western Australia Department of Environment and Conservation Director General Department of the Premier and Cabinet Director, Environment 
   
Tasmania Office of Climate Change, Department of Premier and Cabinet Director Department of Primary Industries and Water General Manager 
   
Australian Capital 
Territory 
Department of Territory and Municipal Services Chief Executive 
Chief Minister’s Department Director 
Department of Treasury Director 
   
Northern Territory 
Department of the Chief Minister Executive Director 
Treasury Director 
Department of Natural Resources, Environment and the Arts Chief Executive 
   
ALGA  Executive Director 
 
 
Water Sub-group  




water reforms, progress on the assessment of irrigation infrastructure and progress in the 
development of water markets. 
 
Chair – Commonwealth 
Members – All States and Territories 
 
Adaptation Sub-group  
The COAG Adaptation Sub-group considered and presented options for a national strategy and 
action plans on adaptation to climate change.  
 
Chair – Queensland 
Members – All States and Territories 
 
Complementary Measures Sub-group  
It was agreed by COAG that each jurisdiction would review the complementarity of its existing 
climate change mitigation measures with the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme. Formerly under 
the COAG Working Group on Climate Change and Water, the Complimentary Measures Sub-group 
was charged with responsibility for preparing a final summary report of the jurisdictions’ reviews. 
It has since reported back to COAG Senior Officials. 
 
Chair – Commonwealth 
Members – All States and Territories 
 
Sub-sub-groups 
• Experts Groups on Streamlining Greenhouse Energy and Reporting 
 
Energy Efficiency Sub-Group (disbanded) 
The Working Group established the Energy Efficiency Sub-Group of the COAG Working Group to 
advise on options to accelerate or expand the uptake of energy efficiency measures, including the 
need for a comprehensive and integrated approach.  
 
Chair – Commonwealth 
Members – New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Australian Capital Territory, 
Northern Territory 
 
Renewable Energy Sub-Group (disbanded) 
In response to COAG’s request that the COAG Working Group on Climate Change and Water 
present by October 2008 a national renewable target scheme, the Working Group established the 
Renewable Energy Sub-group to aid in the design of the scheme.  
 
Chair – Commonwealth 
Members – All States and Territories 
 
Ministerial Council working in parallel to the Working Group: 






A1.7 COAG Infrastructure Working Group / Sub-groups 
The terms of reference for the COAG Infrastructure Working Group were twofold:  
• to better coordinate infrastructure planning and investment across governments and the 
private sector; and  
• identify and eliminate obstacles blockages to productive investment in infrastructure. 
 
The COAG Infrastructure Working Group was also required to develop an implementation plan that 
covered:  
• the establishment of Infrastructure Australia Council;  
• a forward program and reporting mechanisms for Infrastructure Australia; and  
• the parameters for the National Infrastructure Audit. 
 
In the longer term, the COAG Infrastructure Working Group was expected to formulate strategies 
to address any identified bottlenecks and deficiencies, and devise options for improved 
coordination of infrastructure planning and investment across governments and the private sector. 
 
The Working Group secretariat was based in the Commonwealth Department of Infrastructure, 
Transport, Regional Development and Local Government 
 
COAG Infrastructure Working Group 
 
Jurisdiction Agency Position 
   
Commonwealth 
Minister Anthony Albanese (Chair) 
Minister for Infrastructure, 
Transport, Regional Development 
and Local Government 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet First Assistant Secretary 
Department of the Treasury Deputy Secretary 
Department of  Infrastructure, Transport, Regional 
Development and Local Government Deputy Secretary 
   
New South Wales 
Department of Premier and Cabinet Deputy Director General 
Treasury Deputy Secretary 
Department of Premier and Cabinet Deputy Director General 
   
Victoria 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet Acting Executive Director 
Department of Treasury and Finance Deputy Secretary 
Department of Infrastructure Secretary 
   
Queensland Department of the Premier and Cabinet Executive Director Department of Infrastructure and Planning Director General 
   
South Australia 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet (Cabinet Office) Deputy Chief Executive 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet Director 
Department of Transport, Energy and Infrastructure Executive Director 
   
Western Australia Department of Treasury and Finance Executive Director Department for Planning and Infrastructure Director General 
   
Tasmania Department of Infrastructure, Energy and Resources Deputy Secretary 
   
Australian Capital 
Territory 
Department of Treasury Director 
Chief Minister’s Department Director 
   
Northern Territory 
Chief Minister’s Department Executive Director 
Treasury Deputy Under Treasurer 
Department of Planning and Infrastructure Chief Executive 





Indigenous Initiatives Sub-Group (disbanded) 
Chair – Commonwealth 
Members – Western Australia, South Australia 
 
Public Private Partnerships Sub-Group (current) 
Chair – Commonwealth, 
Members – Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia 
 
Pre-qualification Regimes in the Construction Industry Sub-Group (current) 
Chair – Queensland 
Members –  
 
Audit Template Sub-Group (current) 
Chair – Queensland 
Members – Western Australia 
 
Ministerial Council working in parallel to the Working Group: 







Appendix 2: National Specific Purpose Payments and 
Agreements (at 23 March, 2011) 
 
National SPPs National Agreements 
  
National Healthcare SPP National Healthcare Agreement 
  
National Schools SPP National Education Agreement 
  
National Skills and Workforce Development SPP National Agreement for Skills and Workforce Development 
  
National Disability Services SPP National Disability Agreement 
  







Appendix 3: National Partnerships 
Current National Partnerships (at 23 March, 2011) 
 
Policy Area National Partnerships 
 
Health  




















Productivity Places Program 
 
Digital Education Revolution 
 
Early Childhood Education 
 
TAFE Fee Waivers for Childcare Qualifications 
 
Improving Teacher Quality 
 
Literacy and Numeracy 
 
Low Socio-Economic School Communities 
 
Nation Building and Jobs Plan 
 
School Pathways Program 
 
Youth Attainment and Transitions 
 







First Home Owners Boost 
 
Extending the First Home Owners Boost 
 
Indigenous 
Closing the Gap in Indigenous Health Outcomes 
 
Indigenous Economic Participation 
 
Remote Service Delivery 
 
Closing the Gap in the Northern Territory 
 
Closing the Gap: Indigenous Early Childhood Development 
 
Closing the Gap: Remote Indigenous Public Internet Access 
 





Nation Building and Jobs Plan 
 





Fort Street High School Noise Insulation 
 
National Road Safety Council 
 
Local Government and Regional Development 
 
Rail Safety Regulatory Reform Project Office 
 
Heavy Vehicle Regulatory Reform Project Office 
 
Environment 




Natural Disaster Reconstruction and Recovery 
 
Natural Disaster Resilience 
 
Water for the Future 
 
Great Artesian Basin Sustainability Initiative 
 
Pilot of Drought Reform Measures in WA 
 
Community Services 
Certain Concessions for Pensioners and Seniors Card Holders 
 
Victorian Bushfire Reconstruction and Recovery Plan 
 
